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1 
INTRODUCTION 
Under the First Amendment, no government may compel a privately owned website or 
application to disseminate speech and interfere with its editorial discretion over its own platform. 
E.g., Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 581 (1995); 
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of California, 475 U.S. 1, 12 (1986) (plurality op.) 
(“PG&E”); Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974). Likewise, under the 
Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (“Section 230”), no state government may impose 
liability on privately owned websites or applications for moderating content on their platforms. 
And under the Commerce Clause, no state government may extraterritorially regulate Internet 
communications. E.g., Healy v. Beer Inst., Inc., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989). 
Yet Texas House Bill 20 (“H.B. 20”) does all three. H.B. 20 prohibits “censorship” based 
on “viewpoint”—and since almost all expression online has a viewpoint, H.B. 20 would sweep-
ingly ban covered online platforms from moderating user-provided content. Thus, it would compel 
those platforms to disseminate anything and everything with a “viewpoint,” including pro-Nazi 
speech, medical misinformation, terrorist propaganda, and foreign government disinformation. It 
exposes those platforms to the exact liability that Congress protected against in enacting Section 
230. And it both regulates how the targeted websites disseminate speech to and from users around 
the globe—regardless of their connection to Texas—and specifically requires the websites to con-
tinue doing business in Texas.  
The Northern District of Florida recently enjoined a similar Florida law based upon these 
First Amendment and Section 230 violations. NetChoice, LLC v. Moody, 2021 WL 2690876, *12 
(N.D. Fla. June 30, 2021), appeal pending, 11th Cir. No. 21-12355. The court found that the Flor-
ida law would have made the covered platforms “unacceptable—and indeed useless—to most us-
ers.” Id. at *7. H.B. 20 is even broader than the Florida law, applying to all speech and viewpoints 
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2 
on platforms, globally. For these reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court preliminar-
ily enjoin the Texas Attorney General from enforcing this unconstitutional and preempted law 
against Plaintiffs’ members before it takes effect on December 2, 2021. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65. 
BACKGROUND 
A. Plaintiffs’ members include “social media platforms” covered by H.B. 20 that 
exercise editorial discretion over their own websites and applications.  
H.B. 20 covers “social media platforms”—which H.B. 20 defines as any “Internet website 
or application” that (1) “functionally has more than 50 million active users in the United States in 
a calendar month”; is (2) “open to the public”; (3) “allows a user to create an account”; and (4) “en-
ables users to communicate with other users for the primary purpose of posting information, com-
ments, messages, or images.” Tex. Bus. & Com. Code §§ 120.001(1), .002(b); Tex. Civ. Prac. & 
Rem. Code § 143A.003(c).1 H.B. 20 thus covers websites and applications operated by Plaintiffs’ 
trade-association members—including Facebook, Instagram, Pinterest, TikTok, Twitter, Vimeo, 
WhatsApp, and YouTube. See Ex. A ¶¶ 5-6 (Decl. of CCIA); Ex. B ¶¶ 4-5 (Decl. of NetChoice, 
LLC).  
To operate their services, Plaintiffs’ members exercise editorial discretion over the presen-
tation of content on their platforms. Ex. A ¶¶ 9-21; Ex. B. ¶ 11; Ex. C ¶¶ 5-17 (Decl. of YouTube); 
Ex. D ¶¶ 5, 8, 10, 17-23 (Decl. of Facebook). The platforms’ content-moderation policies and 
enforcement efforts embody the types of communities and social discourse they want to foster, 
maintain, and provide. Ex. A ¶¶ 19, 22-27; Ex. C ¶ 7; Ex. D. ¶ 8. In other words, the platforms’ 
content moderation “is an important way that online services express themselves and effectuate 
 
1 “Users” includes any “person who posts, uploads, transmits, shares, or otherwise pub-
lishes or receives content through a social media platform” and “a person who has a social media 
platform account that the social media platform has disabled or locked.” Tex. Bus. & Com. Code 
§ 120.001(2). 
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their community standards.” Ex. A ¶ 19. These content-moderation and trust-and-safety efforts are 
necessary to ensure that the platforms are hospitable forums for their users. E.g., Ex. B ¶¶ 8, 14; 
Ex. C ¶ 9; Ex. D ¶ 8; Ex. E ¶ 5 (Decl. of LGBT Technology Institute). 
Each covered platform provides its users a distinctive experience—according to its own 
policies formalized in terms of service and community standards. And each has expended vast 
time, resources, and human effort to develop and enforce these policies for moderating and dis-
seminating staggering amounts of content submitted by billions of users. Ex. A ¶ 13; Ex. C ¶ 57; 
Ex. D ¶¶ 4, 8. This user-submitted expression is displayed on each platform’s distinctive user in-
terface next to its branding, and sometimes next to the platform’s own direct expression.  
Platforms use a combination of content-moderation tools to determine whether and how 
user content is displayed on their platforms. These tools reflect a range of editorial judgements, 
from what kind of content the platforms permit (or forbid) to how that content is disseminated to 
individual users. The platforms apply their terms and policies using both human and algorithmic 
processes, reflecting the platforms’ judgments about which speech to display. Ex. A ¶ 14; Ex. C 
¶¶ 5-8, 27, 40-45; Ex. D ¶¶ 10, 14. Algorithmic processes simply allow the platforms to apply their 
judgments on a vast scale to billions of pieces of user-submitted expression. Ex. A ¶¶ 9, 31-32; 
Ex. C ¶¶ 24-27; Ex. D ¶ 14. 
Applying their policies, Plaintiffs’ members seek to ensure that disseminated user-submit-
ted content adheres to their platforms’ terms and guidelines. Ex. A ¶ 13; Ex. C ¶¶ 6-7, 12-13, 20-
23; Ex. D ¶¶ 11, 13-14. In some cases, platforms may also bar particular users for failing to comply 
with their policies. Ex. C ¶ 13; accord NetChoice, 2021 WL 2690876, at *2. Just as other Internet 
forums dedicated to specific communities establish and enforce the standards for discourse, the 
covered platforms here also have their own distinctive policies concerning what expression they 
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want, and do not want, to disseminate. Enforcing those policies is critical to the experience that 
the platforms provide their users. E.g., Ex. C ¶¶ 5-8; Ex. D ¶¶ 8-10. The platforms have always 
enforced such policies, which have evolved over time to reflect the platforms’ evolving judgments 
regarding new threats to the safety of the platforms and their users. Ex. C ¶¶ 21-23; Ex. D ¶ 11. 
Covered platforms (like other websites and applications) therefore routinely refuse to dis-
seminate spam, criminal speech, pornography, hate speech, disinformation, and other content that 
these platforms deem objectionable. Ex. A ¶¶ 11, 20; Ex. B ¶ 15; Ex. C ¶ 18; Ex. D ¶¶ 14-16; Ex. 
F (Decl. of Stop Child Predators) ¶¶ 5-9 (outlining how platforms work to identify and remove 
Child Sexual Abuse Material (“CSAM”)); Ex. G ¶¶ 4-6 (Decl. of Technology Network). Without 
such actions, users would be flooded with abusive and objectionable material, which would drown 
out the unobjectionable content and make the platforms inhospitable to and unsafe for their users. 
Ex. A ¶ 12; Ex. B ¶ 14; Ex. D ¶ 4; Ex. E ¶¶ 6-12 (harmful effects on the LGBTQ community); Ex. 
F ¶¶ 8-16 (harmful effects on efforts to curtail CSAM); see NetChoice, 2021 WL 2690876, at *7 
(“In the absence [of] curation, a social-media site would soon become unacceptable—and indeed 
useless—to most users.”). For instance, during 6 months in 2018 alone, Facebook, Google, and 
Twitter took action on over 5 billion accounts or user submissions—including 3 billion cases of 
spam, 57 million cases of pornography, 17 million cases of content regarding child safety, and 12 
million cases of extremism, hate speech, and terrorist speech. Ex. B ¶ 15. Within these categories 
of objectionable speech, the platforms must exercise judgment about what constitutes “hate 
speech,” for instance. Ex. A ¶¶ 23, 25; Ex. C ¶ 35; Ex. D ¶ 13; Ex. E ¶¶ 8-10. And beyond these 
categories, platforms must make similar evaluations about what other kinds of content to exclude 
(such as medical misinformation) and how to define that content. Ex. C ¶¶ 28-30; Ex. D ¶¶ 10, 16. 
Platforms also prioritize, arrange, recommend, and otherwise make content accessible in 
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ways that accord with the platforms’ design. Ex. B ¶ 11; Ex. D ¶¶ 4-5.2 Generally, the platforms 
provide their users with unique products, compiling user-submitted content curated according to 
the platforms’ judgments about what content the user would like to see and how that user would 
like the content displayed. Ex. C ¶¶ 16-17; Ex. D ¶¶ 4-5. In other words, platforms often “mak[e] 
more readily available to a user content the provider believes the user will most wish to see.” 
NetChoice, 2021 WL 2690876, at *3. This necessarily means that other content will be less readily 
available. In addition to reflecting the platforms’ respective policies, these functions are necessary 
for the platforms to operate. Without content curation, there would be no effective way to deliver 
the content that users want. E.g., Ex. A ¶ 47; Ex. D ¶ 4.  
Platforms also engage in their own affirmative speech. Ex. A ¶ 17; Ex. C ¶ 9; Ex. D ¶¶ 13, 
27. They append warning labels, disclaimers, links to related sources, and other kinds of commen-
tary to user-submitted expression that the platforms believe are necessary based on their judg-
ments. Id.; Ex. C ¶ 16. For example, platforms may warn their users that certain images may be 
upsetting or graphic. Ex. A ¶ 17.a. Or platforms may warn their users that certain information has 
not been verified by official sources or may contain misinformation. Id. ¶ 17.c; Ex. C ¶ 16; Ex. D 
¶ 17. Beyond the expression inherent in the speech itself, the decision of whether, when, and how 
to engage in such speech reflects those platforms’ terms and community standards.  
Finally, the platforms also provide different experiences to different audiences. For in-
stance, the platforms may restrict certain content to people of certain ages, reflecting the platforms’ 
judgments that different products are appropriate for users of different ages. Ex. A ¶ 15; Ex. C 
¶¶ 40, 53-54. And the platforms provide tools so users can further curate their own experiences 
(for example, seeing more content about sports or from family members). Ex. A ¶ 16; Ex. D ¶ 18. 
 
2 Even the choice to present content chronologically is an editorial choice.  
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These tools often require the platform to categorize certain kinds of user-submitted content. E.g., 
Ex. A ¶¶ 15-16. 
Without these policies, the platforms would offer a very different—and, to most users, a 
vastly inferior—set of experiences. The platforms would be full of hate speech and misinformation 
(not to mention spam, pornography, and the like), which would be presented no differently than 
other unobjectionable speech (assuming that unobjectionable speech would not be entirely 
drowned out by the objectionable speech). Users would not have the benefit of the platforms’ 
judgments (sometimes relying on independent fact checkers) that certain content may be false or 
misleading, or that certain content might be graphic or otherwise upsetting.  
B. H.B. 20 was enacted for the express purpose of stifling platforms’ editorial dis-
cretion.  
H.B. 20 was enacted to address covered platforms’ purported political bias in how they 
foster, maintain, and provide their respective communities on their platforms for their users. On 
March 4, 2021, during the Texas Legislature’s regular biennial session, State Senator Bryan 
Hughes and Governor Greg Abbott introduced a precursor bill to H.B. 20, announcing on Twitter 
that this bill would “allow Texans to participate on the virtual public square free from Silicon 
Valley censorship.” Senator Bryan Hughes (@SenBryanHughes), Twitter (Mar. 5, 2021, 11:48 
PM), https://bit.ly/3zb2eSK. The next day, Governor Abbott supported this bill on Twitter by 
tweeting “Silencing conservative views is un-American, it’s un-Texan and it’s about to be illegal 
in Texas.” Greg Abbott (@GregAbbott_TX), Twitter (Mar. 5, 2021, 9:35 PM), 
https://bit.ly/3mndV5e. After the Senate passed its bill during the first special session, Senator 
Hughes tweeted, “A handful of West Coast elites cannot be allowed to control our right to free 
speech.” Senator Bryan Hughes (@SenBryanHughes), Twitter (July 14, 2021, 3:35 PM), 
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https://bit.ly/2VKMyXp. The Legislature failed to pass this or similar bills during the regular ses-
sion and the first special legislative session. 
On August 5, 2021, the Governor called a second special legislative session, directing the 
Legislature to “consider and act upon . . . [l]egislation safeguarding the freedom of speech by pro-
tecting social-media and email users from being censored based on the user’s expressed view-
points, including by providing a legal remedy for those wrongfully excluded from a platform.” 
Proclamation by the Governor of the State of Texas (Aug. 5, 2021), https://bit.ly/37uTuuw. Sena-
tor Hughes again introduced his version of the bill (“Senate Bill 5”) and announced the bill on 
Twitter: “Texans must be able to speak without being censored by West Coast oligarchs. I filed 
#SB5 to give Texans a path to hold Big Tech accountable and get their voice back online.” Senator 
Bryan Hughes (@SenBryanHughes), Twitter (Aug. 9, 2021, 5:34 PM), https://bit.ly/3lQTpJY. 
Representative Cain introduced the substantially similar House Bill 20, which the House passed 
after declining to adopt amendments that would alleviate some of the burdens imposed by the Bill. 
The Senate then passed House Bill 20 after amending the Bill’s definition of “censor” to match 
Senator Hughes’ original bill text.   
After signing House Bill 20 into law on September 9, 2021, Governor Abbott stated, 
“[T]here is a dangerous movement by social media companies to silence conservative viewpoints 
and ideas. That is wrong, and we will not allow it in Texas.” Office of the Texas Governor | Greg 
Abbott, Governor Abbott Signs Law Protecting Texans From Wrongful Social Media Censorship 
(Sept. 9, 2021), https://bit.ly/38ZEkxQ. During the signing ceremony, Governor Abbott said, “It 
is now law that conservative viewpoints in Texas cannot be banned on social media.” Office of 
the Governor Greg Abbott (@TexasGovernor), Facebook, WATCH: Signing House Bill 20 into 
Law—Relating to censorship on social media platforms (Sept. 9, 2021), https://bit.ly/3z0Ysub. 
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H.B. 20 is set to take effect “the 91st day after the last day of the legislative session”—that is, 
December 2, 2021. H.B. 20 § 10. 
Just like Florida’s similar unconstitutional law, H.B. 20 “imposes sweeping requirements 
on some but not all social-media providers.” NetChoice, 2021 WL 2690876, at *1. By targeting 
platforms with at least 50 million monthly active U.S. users, the Bill singles out a minority of the 
Internet’s most-used websites and applications for disfavored treatment. See Tex. Bus. & Com. 
Code §§ 120.001(1), .002(b); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 143A.001(4). H.B. 20’s definition 
of “social media platform” covers not just Facebook and YouTube, but other “West Coast,” “Sil-
icon Valley” sites like Reddit and Pinterest. See Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 120.001(1); Tex. Civ. 
Prac. & Rem. Code § 143A.001(4). Yet the definition excludes all sorts of smaller social media 
platforms—like Parler, Gettr, Gab, and Rumble, which purport to appeal to more conservative 
users. Even so, all these noncovered platforms moderate the content they display in some form. 
Ex. A ¶ 12 n.26. 
H.B. 20 also expressly excludes certain favored businesses: (1) Internet service providers; 
(2) electronic mail providers; and (3) websites or applications that “consist[] primarily of news, 
sports, entertainment, or other information or content that is not user generated but is preselected 
by the provider” where user chats and comments are “incidental to” the content posted by the 
website or application. Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 120.001(1)(A)-(C).  
Section 7 of H.B. 20 directly restricts covered platforms’ editorial discretion over all ex-
pression on their respective platforms—not just expression submitted by Texas users in Texas. By 
prohibiting covered platforms from moderating content based on “viewpoint” (which is not de-
fined) in “expression,” H.B. 20 interferes with the platforms’ messages about the communities that 
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they hope to foster, maintain, and provide. Specifically, covered platforms:  
may not censor [i.e., “block, ban, remove, deplatform, demonetize, de-boost, re-
strict, deny equal access or visibility to, or otherwise discriminate against expres-
sion”] a user, a user’s expression, or a user’s ability to receive the expression of 
another person based on: (1) the viewpoint of the user or another person; [or] (2) the 
viewpoint represented in the user’s expression or another person’s expression[.] 
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §§ 143A.001(1); .002. These prohibitions purportedly do not apply 
if the platform “is specifically authorized to censor by federal law”—but H.B. 20 makes no men-
tion of what this provision covers, and H.B. 20 does not define “specifically authorized.” Id. 
§ 143A.006(a)(1). H.B. 20 also does not define vague terms such as “de-boost” and “deny equal 
access or visibility.” 
After establishing this broad prohibition, H.B. 20 then carves out content-based exceptions 
that allow platforms to engage in a limited amount of “viewpoint” discrimination that H.B. 20 
favors. First, covered platforms may moderate content that “is the subject of a referral or request 
from an organization with the purpose of preventing the sexual exploitation of children and pro-
tecting survivors of sexual abuse from ongoing harassment.” Id. § 143A.006(a)(2). Second, cov-
ered platforms also may moderate content that “directly incites criminal activity or consists of 
specific threats of violence targeted against a person or group because of their race, color, disabil-
ity, religion, national origin or ancestry, age, sex, or status as a peace officer or judge.” Id. 
§ 143A.006(a)(3).  
Whenever a user believes a platform has improperly “censored” content based on “view-
point,” the platform may be held civilly liable, required to disseminate such content, and made 
responsible for the user’s attorney’s fees. Id. § 143A.007(b)(1). Additionally, H.B. 20 grants courts 
the authority to pursue “all lawful measures to secure immediate compliance with the order, in-
cluding daily penalties sufficient to secure immediate compliance” with any court order. Id. 
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§ 143A.007(c) (emphasis added). Furthermore, H.B. 20 grants the Texas Attorney General author-
ity to bring a civil action for injunctive relief for any violation and any “potential violation,” along 
with fee-shifting and compensation for the Attorney General’s “reasonable investigative costs.” 
Id. § 143A.008(b). This anti-editorial-discretion provision “applies only to a cause of action that 
accrues on or after the effective date of this Act.” H.B. 20 § 9.3 
H.B. 20’s prohibition on editorial judgment contains three more extraordinary provisions. 
First, because H.B. 20 covers both contributing and viewing content, H.B. 20 attempts to regulate 
all content on covered platforms—regardless of where in the world and by whom such content is 
posted. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 143A.002(a) (covering a “user’s ability to receive the ex-
pression”). Second, a platform cannot seek to avoid these requirements by limiting its interaction 
with users in the state. Id. § 143A.002(a)(3) (preventing “censorship” based on “a user’s geo-
graphic location in this state or any part of this state”). In other words, H.B. 20 requires covered 
platforms to do business in the state—and according to the state’s terms. Third, H.B. 20 does not 
allow users to waive H.B. 20’s “protections” if those users prefer a moderated and curated experi-
ence. Id. § 143A.003. Such waivers are “void as unlawful and against public policy.” Id. 
Finally, the Bill provides that a covered social media platform may “authoriz[e]” or “facil-
itat[e] a user’s ability to censor specific expression on the user’s platform or page at the request of 
that user.” Id. § 143A.006(b). It is not clear how far this provision extends. For instance, if a user 
wants to block hate speech that H.B. 20 otherwise compels platforms to disseminate as a protected 
“viewpoint,” H.B. 20 is not clear whether the covered social media platform may label certain 
posts as hate speech to “facilitate[e]” its users’ desires to avoid hate speech.  
 
3 It is not clear whether this provision allows people who “ha[ve] a social media platform 
account that the social media platform has disabled or locked” before the effective date to sue to 
reinstate their account. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 143A.001(6). 
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Even beyond H.B. 20’s outright prohibition on editorial functions in Section 7, Section 2 
of H.B. 20 also imposes a slew of onerous disclosure and operational requirements burdening the 
platforms’ enforcement of its policies. These reporting and operational requirements will require 
substantial investment. And even where the requirements are not onerous, they are vague—invit-
ing arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement from the Texas Attorney General. 
First, a covered platform must provide “public disclosures” about how the platform oper-
ates in a manner “sufficient to enable users to make an informed choice regarding the purchase of 
or use of access to or services from the platform.” Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 120.051(b). H.B. 20 
does not provide an exhaustive list of disclosures that covered platforms must make, ostensibly 
permitting lawsuits when platforms fail to disclose un-specified information. Instead, H.B. 20 
identifies a non-exhaustive list of information: Among other information, each platform must dis-
close how it “(1) curates and targets content to users; (2) places and promotes content, services, 
and products, including its own content, services, and products; (3) moderates content; [and] 
(4) uses search, ranking, or other algorithms or procedures that determine results on the plat-
form[.]” Id. § 120.051(a)(1)-(4). Even within these identified categories, H.B. 20 does not explain, 
for instance, how a platform could satisfy explaining how it “moderates content.” 
Second, a covered platform must “publish an acceptable use policy”—that explains what 
content the platform will allow, how the platform will ensure compliance with the policy, and how 
users can inform the platform about noncompliant content. Id. § 120.052. H.B. 20 does not explain 
what will make such policies sufficient to “reasonably inform” or “explain” to their users the re-
quired disclosures.  
Third, a covered platform must publish a “biannual transparency report” that requires in-
formation about the platform’s enforcement of their policies. Id. § 120.053(a). Specifically, the 
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covered platforms must explain in painstaking detail: 
● “the total number of instances in which the social media platform was alerted to 
illegal content, illegal activity, or potentially policy-violating content” and by what 
means (i.e., by users, employees, or automated processes);  
● how often the platform “took action” with regard to such content including “content 
removal,” “content demonetization,” “content deprioritization,” “the addition of an 
assessment to content,” “account suspension,” “account removal,” and “any other 
action” that accords with the acceptable use policy, “categorized by” “the rule vio-
lated” and “the source for the alert”;4  
● “the country of the user who provided the content for each instance described” 
above; 
● “the number of coordinated campaigns” (an undefined and unexplained term); 
● “the number of instances in which a user appealed the decision to remove the user’s 
potentially policy-violating content”; 
● “the percentage of appeals . . . that resulted in the restoration of content”; 
● “a description of each tool, practice, action, or technique used in enforcing the ac-
ceptable use policy.” 
Id. § 120.053(a)(1)-(7), (b). These reporting requirements apply to potentially billions of pieces of 
expressive content submitted to covered platforms.  
 Fourth, covered platforms must provide for a comprehensive “complaint system to enable 
a user to submit a complaint in good faith and track the status of the complaint”—regarding either 
a report of violative content or “a decision made by the social media platform to remove content 
posted by the user.” Id. § 120.101. For reports of illegal content, the covered platform must “make 
a good faith effort to evaluate the legality of the content or activity within 48 hours of receiving 
the notice,” excluding weekends. Id. § 120.102. Because of the incredible volume of content sub-
mitted to the covered platforms, this complaint system could flood covered platforms with requests 
to which the platforms must respond within a very short period of time. The complaint process 
does not account for the possibility that platforms will be deluged by complaints made in bad faith. 
 
4 Specifically, H.B. 20 identifies governments, users, “internal automated detection 
tool[s],” “coordination with other social media platforms,” and “persons employed by or contract-
ing with the platform” as potential sources. Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 120.053(b)(2).  
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 Fifth, covered platforms must offer a notice and appeal system for any content that plat-
forms decide to remove (assuming H.B. 20 allows the platform to remove the content notwith-
standing its outright prohibition on doing so). Subject to limited exceptions, every time a covered 
platform “removes” content, it must give the user (1) a notice of the removal; (2) an opportunity 
to appeal; and (3) a written explanation of the decision on appeal, including an explanation for any 
reversal. Id. § 120.103. H.B. 20’s mandated appeal process allows a user-initiated appeal—in 
which the platform must “review the [removed] content,” “determine whether the content adheres 
to the platform’s acceptable use policy,” and “take appropriate steps” (including providing any 
notice described above) within 14 days (excluding weekends). Id. § 120.104. This process subjects 
the covered platforms to an onerous requirement to respond to appeals of exercises of the plat-
forms’ everyday judgments.   
The Texas Attorney General has authority to enforce these disclosure and operational re-
quirements, and may collect attorney’s fees and “reasonable investigative costs” if successful in 
obtaining injunctive relief. Id. § 120.151. The Attorney General thus has substantial discretion to 
sue covered platforms for purported violations. The Attorney General may sue on the purported 
basis that a covered platform did not provide certain unenumerated information in its required 
disclosures, rendering the platform’s public disclosure “[in]sufficient to enable users to make an 
informed choice regarding the purchase of or use of access to or services from the platform.” Id. 
§ 120.051(b). Similarly, the Attorney General ostensibly has authority to sue a covered platform 
because he believes the platform has miscategorized data in its biannual transparency report.  
ARGUMENT 
Plaintiffs are entitled to a preliminary injunction blocking the Texas Attorney General’s 
enforcement of H.B. 20 because they meet the preliminary-injunction standard: “(1) a substantial 
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likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a substantial threat of irreparable harm if the injunction 
does not issue; (3) that the threatened injury outweighs any harm that will result if the injunction 
is granted; and (4) that the grant of an injunction is in the public interest.” Gonzales v. Mathis 
Indep. Sch. Dist., 978 F.3d 291, 294 (5th Cir. 2020) (quotation marks and citation omitted). 
I. H.B. 20 violates the First Amendment. 
H.B. 20 violates the First Amendment rights of Plaintiffs’ members for multiple reasons. 
H.B. 20 compels privately owned platforms to disseminate third-party content and interferes with 
their editorial discretion over their platforms. It discriminates based on content and speaker. And 
it is unconstitutionally vague. H.B. 20 is unconstitutional no matter which level of heightened 
scrutiny applies. NetChoice, 2021 WL 2690876, at *11. 
A. The First Amendment guarantees privately owned Internet platforms the 
right to exercise editorial discretion over the content they display. 
The Supreme Court recognized a generation ago that “the content on the Internet is as 
diverse as human thought,” and there is “no basis for qualifying the level of First Amendment 
scrutiny that should be applied to this medium.” Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997) (internal 
citation omitted). The “dissemination of information” through an Internet website or application, 
no less than through other media, is “speech within the meaning of the First Amendment.” Sorrell 
v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 570 (2011); see Brown v. Entm’t Merchants Ass’n, 564 U.S. 
786, 792 n.1 (2011) (“distributing” speech is protected); Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 527 
(2001) (“if the acts of ‘disclosing’ and ‘publishing’ information do not constitute speech, it is hard 
to imagine what does fall within that category”) (citation, alteration, and quotation marks omitted). 
In fact, the Internet has provided virtually limitless new opportunities “for individuals to publish 
their views . . . than existed before” the Internet. NetChoice, 2021 WL 2690876, at *7. That is 
precisely why “the Internet can hardly be considered a ‘scarce’ expressive commodity. It provides 
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relatively unlimited, low-cost capacity for communication of all kinds.” Reno, 521 U.S at 870. 
Privately owned Internet platforms have a First Amendment right to moderate user-sub-
mitted content disseminated on their platforms. E.g., Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 
139 S. Ct. 1921, 1932 (2019) (recognizing “private entities’ rights to exercise editorial control over 
speech and speakers on their properties or platforms”); Hurley, 515 U.S. at 581; PG&E, 475 U.S. 
at 12 (plurality op.); Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 258. As addressed above, Plaintiffs’ members are not 
mere passive conduits that simply transmit expression of their users. Rather, they provide unique 
experiences on their respective platforms that are realized through their terms of service and their 
content-moderation policies. That “editorial function itself is an aspect of ‘speech’” protected by 
the First Amendment. Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 
737-38 (1996) (plurality op.). Furthermore, the Constitution protects not only the editorial process 
but also the dissemination and “presentation of an edited compilation of speech generated by other 
persons.” Hurley, 515 U.S. at 570 (citation omitted); see also Arkansas Educ. TV Comm’n v. 
Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 674 (1998) (when a party “exercises editorial discretion in the selection and 
presentation” of content, “it engages in speech activity” protected by the First Amendment). 
In Tornillo, the Supreme Court confirmed that the First Amendment protects the editorial 
discretion of private entities disseminating speech, including the fundamental “choice of material” 
disseminated. 418 U.S. at 258. The state law in Tornillo required newspapers to publish political 
candidates’ responses to criticism. Id. at 250, 258. The Court invalidated this law because “the 
choice of material to go into a newspaper, and the decisions made as to limitations on the size and 
content of the paper, and treatment of public issues and public officials—whether fair or unfair—
constitute the exercise of editorial control and judgment” protected by First Amendment. Id. at 258 
(emphasis added). The mandatory “right of reply” was constitutionally indistinguishable from a 
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law “forbidding [a newspaper] to publish specified matter.” Id. at 256. At bottom, the law at issue 
in Tornillo violated “the First Amendment because of its intrusion into the function of editors.” Id. 
at 258. 
Similarly, in Hurley, the Supreme Court held that the government may not use equal-access 
laws to “alter the expressive content” of private parties’ platforms. 515 U.S. at 572; id. at 573 (no 
law may “ha[ve] the effect of declaring the sponsors’ speech itself to be the public accommoda-
tion” subject to government restriction). Specifically, the Court held that the government could not 
compel a privately operated parade—over which the organizers decided which floats to include—
to include a float featuring a message with which the parade operators disagreed. Id. at 572-73. 
The Court reiterated “that a speaker has the autonomy to choose the content of his own message.” 
Id. at 573. “Indeed this general rule”—shared “by business corporations generally and by ordinary 
people engaged in unsophisticated expression”—“that the speaker has the right to tailor the speech, 
applies not only to expressions of value, opinion, or endorsement, but equally to statements of fact 
the speaker would rather avoid.” Id.  
Even if the platforms may not always present a singular “particularized message” to their 
users, the First Amendment does not privilege singular expression over compilations of diverse 
expression. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569, quoted in, e.g., Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado C.R. 
Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1741-42 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring). Likewise, Plaintiffs’ members 
retain their First Amendment rights over their platforms even if they do not adopt user-submitted 
content as their own or agree with every user post on their sites: “[A] private speaker does not 
forfeit constitutional protection simply by combining multifarious voices” even if it is “rather le-
nient in admitting participants.” Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569. “Nor, under [the Supreme Court’s] prec-
edent, does First Amendment protection require a speaker to generate, as an original matter, each 
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item featured in the communication.” Id. at 570.  
The Northern District of Florida thus recently recognized that laws that interfere with plat-
forms’ editorial discretion violate their First Amendment rights, as have other courts. E.g., 
NetChoice, 2021 WL 2690876, at *9; Isaac v. Twitter, 2021 WL 3860654, at *7 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 
30, 2021) (Twitter has “First Amendment right to decide what to publish and what not to publish 
on its platform”) (citation omitted); Davison v. Facebook, Inc., 370 F. Supp. 3d 621, 629 (E.D. 
Va. 2019) (“Facebook has, as a private entity, the right to regulate the content of its platforms as 
it sees fit.”), aff’d, 774 F. App’x 162 (4th Cir. 2019); e-ventures Worldwide, LLC v. Google, Inc., 
2017 WL 2210029, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 8, 2017) (“Google’s [editorial decisions] are the same as 
decisions by a newspaper editor[.] . . . The First Amendment protects these decisions, whether they 
are fair or unfair, or motivated by profit or altruism.”); La’Tiejira v. Facebook, Inc., 272 F. Supp. 
3d 981, 991 (S.D. Tex. 2017) (Facebook has “First Amendment right to decide what to publish 
and what not to publish on its platform”); Zhang v. Baidu.com, Inc., 10 F. Supp. 3d 433, 437, 440 
(S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“Government may not interfere with the editorial judgments of private speakers 
on issues of public concern”; “‘[t]here can be no disagreement’ that [a search engine] is ‘engage[d] 
in and transmit[s] speech”; the search engine “‘exercise[s] editorial discretion’ over its search re-
sults”) (citations omitted; alterations in original); Langdon v. Google, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 622, 
629-30 (D. Del. 2007) (Google has First Amendment right not to publish unwanted ads); see also 
Publius v. Boyer-Vine, 237 F. Supp. 3d 997, 1008 (E.D. Cal. 2017) (“Hoskins has a First Amend-
ment right to distribute and facilitate protected speech on [his] site.”).5 
 
5 In fact, H.B. 20 itself recognizes that a covered social media platform engages in editorial 
discretion in how it “(1) curates and targets content to users; (2) places and promotes content, 
services, and products, including its own content, services, and products; (3) moderates content; 
[and] (4) uses search, ranking, or other algorithms or procedures that determine results on the 
platform[.]” Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 120.051(a)(1)-(4) (listing topics for disclosure). 
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The Constitution accordingly protects covered Internet platforms from having to dissemi-
nate third-party content they do not wish to distribute. “For corporations as for individuals, the 
choice to speak includes within it the choice of what not to say,” so “compelling a private corpo-
ration to provide a forum for views other than its own may infringe the corporation’s freedom of 
speech.” PG&E, 475 U.S. at 9, 16 (plurality op.); see Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 256 (“[A]ny such com-
pulsion to publish that which ‘reason tells them should not be published’ is unconstitutional.”). 
Simply put, just as the government may not tell a newspaper, parade, or bookstore what speech it 
must disseminate, it also “may not . . . tell Twitter or YouTube what videos to post; or tell Face-
book or Google what content to favor.” United States Telecom Association v. FCC, 855 F.3d 381, 
392 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); see also Den-
ver, 518 U.S. at 816 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part) (govern-
ment cannot “force the editor of a collection of essays to print other essays on the same subject”). 
B. H.B. 20 violates the covered platforms’ First Amendment rights.  
1. H.B. 20 compels privately owned websites and applications to dissemi-
nate third-party content, denying them editorial discretion over their 
platforms. 
Like Florida’s similar law, the “legislation compels providers to host speech that violates 
their standards—speech they otherwise would not host—and forbids providers from speaking as 
they otherwise would.” NetChoice, 2021 WL 2690876, at *1. Covered platforms “use editorial 
judgment in making [] decisions” about which content to remove that violates their policies and 
how to disseminate content to their users—“much as more traditional media providers use editorial 
judgment when choosing what to put in or leave out of a publication or broadcast.” Id. at *7. The 
exercise of editorial discretion over the dissemination of content is inherently expressive. Dissem-
inating speech sends the message that it is “worthy of presentation.” Hurley, 515 U.S. at 575. A 
decision to remove certain content, permanently remove a particular user’s access to their account, 
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or prioritize certain content over other content thus conveys a message about the type of commu-
nity a platform wants to foster.  
H.B. 20 prohibits Plaintiffs’ members from moderating content based on user “viewpoint” 
(undefined), banning virtually all forms of the platforms’ moderation efforts. Tex. Civ. Prac. & 
Rem. Code §§ 143A.001(1); .002. If H.B. 20 takes effect, it will therefore require covered plat-
forms to disseminate, for example, pro-Nazi expression, terrorist propaganda, and foreign-govern-
ment disinformation. In fact, legislators rejected amendments allowing platforms to exclude vac-
cine misinformation, terrorist content, and Holocaust denial. Tex. H.R. Journal (87th Leg., 2d 
Spec. Sess.) at 229-31 (2021), https://bit.ly/2Y2YGEp. The covered platforms have policies 
against all kinds of content that express some kind of “viewpoint.” By requiring platforms to apply, 
or decline to apply, their standards in ways they would not otherwise apply them, H.B. 20 requires 
platforms to “alter the expressive content of their” message. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 572-73.  
H.B. 20 also constrains how Plaintiffs’ members disseminate content according to the plat-
forms’ policies. For instance, H.B. 20’s prohibition on actions that “de-boost” and “deny equal 
access or visibility to or otherwise discriminate against expression”—to the extent that these pro-
hibitions can even be understood—impede covered platforms’ ability to place “post[s] in the 
proper feeds.” NetChoice, 2021 WL 2690876, at *3; Ex. C ¶¶ 46-48. It is hard to imagine a post 
that does not express some “viewpoint.” The platform must determine how and where users see 
those different viewpoints, and some posts will necessarily have places of prominence—even if 
just at the top of the website. Id.  
H.B. 20’s prohibition on “censorship” thus completely alters the covered online platforms’ 
products. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 572-73. Not only are covered platforms required to disseminate con-
tent they find objectionable, but they are also required to disseminate that objectionable content 
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no differently than other, non-objectionable content on their websites and applications. H.B. 20 
therefore puts the covered platforms to an unconstitutional choice: (1) disseminate content that is 
contrary to the platforms’ community standards, thereby altering the very nature of the expressive 
communities they seek to foster; or (2) remove broad categories of unobjectionable content (on 
entire topics, for example) to avoid improperly discriminating based on “viewpoint”—an outcome 
that would “burn[] the house to roast a pig.” NetChoice, 2021 WL 2690876, at *11 (citing Reno, 
521 U.S. at 882). In either case, H.B. 20 imposes a “far greater burden on the platforms’ own 
speech than” the Supreme Court has ever recognized as permissible. Id. at *9; id. (“[T]he statutes 
compel the platforms to change their own speech in other respects, including, for example, by 
dictating how the platforms may arrange speech on their sites.”). The First Amendment prohibits 
the government from forcing these platforms to disseminate this content. E.g., Hurley, 515 U.S. at 
572-73. 
That is especially true here where content on covered platforms is attributed to, or associ-
ated with, the platforms. Current and prospective platform users, business partners, advertisers, 
and the public at large, often conclude that the platforms find content permitted on the sites to be 
“worthy of presentation.” Hurley, 515 U.S. at 575; see Ex. A ¶ 28; Ex. B ¶¶ 16-18. As a result of 
the platforms’ long histories of moderating various forms of objectionable content, users may as-
sume that content disseminated by platforms also reflects the platform’s tacit “support.” Id. And 
as reflected by their public statements, public officials in Texas believe that the platforms moderate 
content in line with the platforms’ perceived political beliefs. See supra pp.6-8. The same was true 
in Florida, and the court there recognized that “the targets of the statutes at issue are the editorial 
judgments themselves,” and that the “announced purpose of balancing the discussion—reining in 
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the ideology of the large social-media providers—is precisely the kind of state action held uncon-
stitutional in Tornillo, Hurley, and PG&E.” NetChoice, 2021 WL 2690876, at *9.  
Furthermore, these platforms disseminate expression to people on their own branded web-
sites and applications, with unique user interfaces and right next to their businesses’ logos. So it is 
understandable that the platforms want to moderate what content they distribute because users and 
others associate that content with the platforms themselves. Indeed, many believe that “content 
moderation policies often reflect a company’s values[.]” Ex. E ¶ 14. That is precisely why covered 
platforms would suffer reputational harm and lost advertising revenue if harmful and objectionable 
content had to appear on their websites and applications. Ex. A ¶ 28; Ex. B ¶¶ 16-18.  
In addition, H.B. 20 limits the platforms’ ability to engage in their own speech. Specifi-
cally, H.B. 20’s prohibition against covered platforms “otherwise discriminat[ing] against” user-
submitted content restricts speech generated by the platforms. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 
§ 143A.001(1). For instance, if a platform appends its own speech to certain user-submitted con-
tent—such as posts from state-sponsored media or containing medical misinformation—users 
might argue that the platform has “discriminated” against that content if it does not append a dis-
claimer to other content. Id. This provision thus restricts the covered platforms’ right to engage in 
expression when they disagree with or object to user-submitted expression or believe that user-
submitted expression requires more context—striking at the core of the covered platforms’ First 
Amendment rights. See NetChoice, 2021 WL 2690876, at *9 (“unlike the state actions in FAIR 
and PruneYard,” discussed below, the Florida law “explicitly forbid social media platforms from 
appending their own statements to posts”).  
All these features distinguish H.B. 20 from the law upheld in Rumsfeld v. Forum for Aca-
demic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47 (2006) (“FAIR”), which did not involve government 
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restrictions on editorial functions. The “equal access” law there—unlike the content- and speaker-
based law here—simply required schools that allowed employment recruiters on campus to also 
allow military employment recruiters on campus. Id. at 65. That campus-recruiter law thus “regu-
lates conduct, not speech,” and any resulting compelled speech was “plainly incidental to 
the . . . regulation of conduct.” Id. at 62; accord Voting for Am., Inc. v. Steen, 732 F.3d 382, 388 
(5th Cir. 2013) (FAIR held that the law-school recruitment was conduct, not expression). As the 
Supreme Court explained, “accommodating the military’s message does not affect the law schools’ 
speech, because the schools are not speaking when they host interviews and recruiting receptions.” 
FAIR, 547 U.S. at 64. In stark contrast, the core business of many Internet websites and applica-
tions is to present speech, making them inherently “expressive,” and covered platforms engage in 
core First Amendment protected expression when they enforce their terms and community stand-
ards regarding what content to display and how. Reno, 521 U.S at 870. Because the platforms have 
an “expressive character,” H.B. 20 cannot declare that “speech itself to be [a] public accommoda-
tion” that must present all viewpoints. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 573; see also NetChoice, 2021 WL 
2690876, at *9 (distinguishing FAIR because the law upheld there did not compel or restrict 
speech). 
The covered platforms have First Amendment rights as privately owned speakers. See 
NetChoice, 2021 WL 2690876, at *7 (citing Manhattan Cmty., 139 S. Ct. at 1930). PruneYard 
Shopping Center v. Robins, does not change that analysis. 447 U.S. 74 (1980). PruneYard upheld 
a California law that required a shopping mall that never engaged in expression to host people 
collecting signatures for petitions, because the Court concluded there was no “intrusion into the 
function of editors” where the shopping mall’s operation of its business lacked an editorial func-
tion. Id. at 88. Crucially, “the owner did not even allege that he objected to the content of the 
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pamphlets; nor was the access right content based.” PG&E, 475 U.S. at 12 (plurality op.) (discuss-
ing PruneYard) (emphasis added); see Hurley, 515 U.S. at 580 (“PruneYard did not involve ‘any 
concern that access to this area might affect the shopping center owner’s exercise of his own right 
to speak.’”) (citation omitted). Here, as explained above, the covered platforms are engaged in 
expression and enforce their terms and policies to facilitate the type of community and discourse 
they want to foster, as described in their policies. And H.B. 20 is a content-based restriction on 
that editorial judgement. So “PruneYard [] does not undercut the proposition that forced associa-
tions that burden protected speech are impermissible.” PG&E, 475 U.S. at 12 (plurality op.). 
H.B. 20 will trample on the covered platforms’ right to “eschew association for expressive pur-
poses.” Janus v. AFSCME, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2463 (2018). 
2. H.B. 20’s onerous disclosure and operational requirements further 
burden platforms’ editorial discretion. 
H.B. 20 supplements its outright prohibition on platforms’ exercise of editorial discretion 
with further onerous content-based procedural and reporting requirements (see supra pp.11-13), 
which also unconstitutionally infringe on the platforms’ rights. The First Amendment prohibits a 
“law that subjects the editorial process to private or official examination merely to satisfy curiosity 
or to serve some general end such as the public interest.” Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 174 
(1979). “Lawmakers may no more silence unwanted speech by burdening its utterance than by 
censoring its content.” Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 556; accord, e.g., National Inst. of Family & Life Ad-
vocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2378 (2018) (“NIFLA”) (invalidating “unduly burdensome 
disclosure requirement that will chill [] protected speech”); Washington Post v. McManus, 944 
F.3d 506, 518 (4th Cir. 2019) (law requiring disclosures about published political advertisements 
“intrud[ed] into the function of editors and forc[ed] news publishers to speak in a way they would 
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not otherwise”) (internal quotation marks omitted). That is why “content-based burdens must sat-
isfy the same rigorous scrutiny as . . . content-based bans.” United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., 
Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 812 (2000); accord Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N. Carolina, Inc., 487 
U.S. 781, 795 (1988).  
Even if H.B. 20’s procedural and reporting requirements were not per se invalid as intru-
sions targeting editorial functions, the Supreme Court has sharply circumscribed the situations 
under which governments may burden First Amendment expression through disclosure and oper-
ational requirements. To survive constitutional scrutiny, such a law (1) must require only “purely 
factual”; (2) “noncontroversial” information; and (3) cannot be “unjustified or unduly burden-
some.” NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2372 (citation omitted).  
None of H.B. 20’s disclosure and operational provisions meet all three elements. For start-
ers, they are extremely—and intentionally—burdensome. H.B. 20 compels platforms to disclose 
in excruciating detail how they moderate potentially billions of pieces of user-submitted content 
worldwide—every piece and every type of content. See Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 120.051. Plat-
forms must publish an “acceptable use” policy that would describe each platform’s policies and 
the way it will enforce those policies—a statement of judgments, rather than mere facts. See id. 
§ 120.052. They must publish a “biannual transparency report” including voluminous detail about 
the moderation of potentially billions of pieces of content worldwide, and any and all action they 
take under their acceptable use policies. Id. § 120.053. And they must provide and operate inher-
ently burdensome “complaint” and appeal procedures with incredibly tight deadlines for all con-
tent subject to the covered platforms’ policies—again, covering potentially billions of posts from 
across the globe. Id. §§ 120.101-04.  
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In other words, H.B. 20 imposes operational mandates and disclosure requirements de-
signed to prescriptively manage—and therefore interfere with and chill—covered social media 
platforms’ constitutionally protected editorial discretion. H.B. 20’s invasive disclosure require-
ments go far beyond the “factual, noncontroversial information” disclosures the First Amendment 
permits in certain circumstances because they compel the covered platforms to speak about their 
judgments—including on topics that are highly controversial. NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2372. Moreo-
ver, the required disclosures, particularly with respect to “algorithms or procedures that determine 
results on the platform,” may reveal trade secrets and other nonpublic, competitively sensitive 
information about how the platforms operate. Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 120.051(a)(4). This in-
formation will also give bad actors, such as foreign adversaries, scammers, spammers, predators, 
and criminals a roadmap for evading even the minimal moderation permitted under H.B. 20, mak-
ing it more difficult and costly to keep harmful content off members’ platforms. Ex. F ¶ 10. Besides 
its disclosure obligations, H.B. 20’s requirements regarding individual notices to users whose con-
tent is subject to moderation and the complaint and appeal process are designed to overload the 
platforms and force them to refrain from exercising their editorial judgment. They invite bad-faith 
abuse from users who lack legitimate complaints and who wish only to impose burdens on the 
platforms. Individually and especially together all these requirements “unduly burden[]” covered 
platforms’ protected moderation—not to mention their basic business operations. NIFLA, 138 S. 
Ct. at 2377-78.  
These requirements are akin to requiring large bookstores to publicly declare their process 
to select which books to display and feature, disclose which books they chose not to display or 
feature, and provide a grievance procedure for writers whose books they declined to carry. The 
Constitution does not permit this. E.g., Herbert, 441 U.S. at 174; Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 258; id. at 
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256 (restraints “need not fall into familiar or traditional patterns to be subject to constitutional 
limitations on governmental powers”). For example, the Fourth Circuit recently invalidated pur-
ported disclosure requirements for “online platforms that host political ads.” McManus, 944 F.3d 
at 514. The court found the disclosure law unconstitutional because the law’s requirements “force 
elements of civil society to speak when they otherwise would have refrained. . . . It is the presence 
of compulsion from the state itself that compromises the First Amendment.” Id. (citations omitted). 
So too here with the covered online platforms regulated by H.B. 20: “It targets speakers, not 
speech, and imposes an unduly burdensome disclosure requirement that will chill their protected 
speech.” NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2378. 
3. H.B. 20 discriminates based on content and speaker. 
H.B. 20 has additional constitutional defects because it discriminates based on content and 
speaker. This discrimination pervades the entire statutory scheme, subjecting all of H.B. 20 to strict 
scrutiny regardless of its severability provision. See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 163 
(2015) (content discrimination); Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm’r of Reve-
nue, 460 U.S. 575, 591 (1983) (speaker discrimination). 
H.B. 20’s two content-based exceptions from its prohibitions on content moderation reveal 
that the statute “applies to particular speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or message 
expressed.” Reed, 576 U.S. at 163 (collecting cases); see Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 
§ 143A.006(a)(2)-(3). For instance, H.B. 20 permits moderation over “expression that directly in-
cites criminal activity or consists of specific threats of violence covered against a person or group 
because of their race, color, disability, religion, national origin or ancestry, age, sex, or status as a 
peace officer or judge.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 143A.006(a)(3). This exemption recog-
nizes and “permits” an important component of covered platforms’ current policies. See Ex. A 
¶ 24. But there is no legitimate reason to allow the platforms to enforce their policies over threats 
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based only on these favored criteria but not, for example, sexual orientation, military service, or 
union membership. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992); Ex. C ¶ 39. 
Targeting so-called “Big Tech,” H.B. 20 also sweeps in disfavored large businesses with 
over 50 million monthly active U.S. users and excludes favored social media businesses such as 
Parler, Gab, and Gettr, as well as sports (such as ESPN and Barstool Sports) and news (such as 
CNN and MSNBC) websites, and more. As the Supreme Court has recognized, such “discrimina-
tion between speakers is often a tell for content discrimination.” NetChoice, 2021 WL 2690876, 
at *10 (citation omitted); see Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250-51 (1936) (strik-
ing down tax targeting newspapers with large circulation). As the Fifth Circuit has explained, 
“Laws singling out a small number of speakers for onerous treatment are inherently suspect.” Time 
Warner Cable, Inc. v. Hudson, 667 F.3d 630, 638 (5th Cir. 2012); accord Citizens United v. FEC, 
558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010) (“Speech restrictions based on the identity of the speaker are all too often 
simply a means to control content.”). That principle has special force when it comes to speakers—
such as social media platforms—that disseminate user content, news, and information. Arkansas 
Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 228 (1987). Laws “that discriminate among media, 
or among different speakers within a single medium, often present serious First Amendment con-
cerns” because such laws present very real “dangers of suppression and manipulation” of the me-
dium. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 659, 661 (1994) (“Turner”). 
H.B. 20’s legislative history confirms that its arbitrary size threshold is a proxy for target-
ing platforms whose moderation efforts some perceive as disfavoring “conservative” views. As 
discussed above, Governor Abbott and H.B. 20’s earliest legislative proponents expressly argued 
that H.B. 20 was needed to stop the covered platforms from “silencing conservative views” due to 
perceived political viewpoints of these platforms, as expressed through their enforcement of their 
Case 1:21-cv-00840-RP   Document 8-2   Filed 09/30/21   Page 36 of 56
28 
policies. See supra pp.6-8. H.B. 20’s size limit thus discriminates based on content (and viewpoint) 
because it “cannot be ‘justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech,’” and it 
“w[as] adopted by the government ‘because of disagreement with the message’ the speech con-
veys.” Reed, 576 U.S. at 164 (citation omitted). These defects pervade these sections of H.B. 20 
and cannot be cured merely by severing off isolated provisions.   
4. H.B. 20 is unconstitutionally vague. 
Key provisions of H.B. 20 also are unconstitutionally vague—both facially and as applied 
to Plaintiffs’ members. “A fundamental principle in our legal system is that laws which regulate 
persons or entities must give fair notice of conduct that is forbidden or required.” FCC v. Fox TV 
Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. 239, 253 (2012). A law is unconstitutionally vague—and must be invali-
dated—when it fails “to provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited, 
or is so standardless that it authorizes or encourages seriously discriminatory enforcement.” Id. 
These principles apply with special force to expression, and “rigorous adherence to those require-
ments is necessary to ensure that ambiguity does not chill protected speech.” Id. at 253-54.  
H.B. 20’s definition of prohibited “censorship” raises more questions than answers. In par-
ticular, the provision requiring covered platforms to provide “equal access to or visibility” to con-
tent is hopelessly indeterminate. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 143A.001(1). This provision is 
akin to an unconstitutional provision in Florida’s enjoined law that required platforms to enforce 
their policies in a “consistent” manner—which the Northern District of Florida held “especially 
vague.” NetChoice, 2021 WL 2690876, at *11. The covered platforms process billions of pieces 
of content, and there is no administrable way to determine whether any single piece of content has 
“equal access or visibility” as another single piece of content. This provision could “prohibit[] a 
social media platform from” displaying content “in the proper feeds—to put the post in the feed 
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of a user who wishes to receive it or to exclude the candidate’s post from the feed of a user who 
does not wish to receive it. Including a post in the feed of a user who wishes to receive it places 
the post ahead of and in a more prominent position than the many posts the user will not receive 
at all. Excluding a post from the feed of a user who does not wish to receive it will eliminate the 
user’s exposure to the post.” NetChoice, 2021 WL 2690876, at *3.  
H.B. 20’s definition of “social media platform” is also unclear, and its multiple primary-
purpose tests threaten to cover websites and applications not generally understood as “social me-
dia.” The definition excludes websites and applications that “primarily” provide “news, sports, 
entertainment, or other information or content that is not user generated but is preselected by the 
provider.” Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 120.001(1)(C)(i). Even if “primarily” means “greater than 
50%,” a person of ordinary intelligence would have no idea what “primarily” refers to as the rele-
vant denominator, and would thus have no idea whether H.B. 20’s onerous provisions apply. Sim-
ilarly, it is unclear which websites and applications “enable[] users to communicate with other 
users for the primary purpose of posting information, comments, messages, or images.” Id. 
§ 120.001(1). Such “[a]n intent-based standard” is invalid for speech regulations because it “‘blan-
kets with uncertainty whatever may be said.’” FEC v. Wisconsin Right To Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 
468 (2007) (plurality op.) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 43 (1976) (per curiam)). Ordinary 
people would further have no idea what makes a chat or comment section “incidental to, directly 
related to, or dependent on” a platform’s preselected content. Tex. Bus. & Com. Code 
§ 120.001(1)(C)(ii). H.B. 20 provides no guidance about the necessary degree of connection or 
how much of the discussion in the chat or comment section must “relate” (however closely) to the 
platform’s preselected content. See id. § 120.001.  
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H.B. 20’s enforcement authority even empowers the Attorney General to seek an injunc-
tion against “potential violation[s]” of the statute. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 143A.008 (em-
phasis added). Other statutes using similar language specify that the potential violation must be 
imminent. E.g., Tex. Occ. Code § 1101.752(a). H.B. 20 lacks this important qualification, creating 
enormous uncertainty for covered platforms. If H.B. 20 permits the courts to enjoin any “potential 
violations” then the statute reaches all moderation decisions a covered platform might make—
chilling platforms’ First Amendment rights even further. 
The statute’s disclosure and operational requirements contain similar infirmities. Section 
2’s requirements, where they are not open-ended, are too vague to apprise covered platforms of 
their obligations. For instance, H.B. 20’s non-exhaustive list of disclosure requirements grants the 
Attorney General substantial discretion to sue based on a covered platform’s failure to include un-
enumerated information. See supra pp.11. All these vague provisions chill platforms’ exercise of 
their constitutionally protected editorial judgment. 
C. H.B. 20 fails any level of heightened First Amendment scrutiny. 
H.B. 20 contains content-based, viewpoint-based, and speaker-based restrictions that trig-
ger strict scrutiny, which is satisfied only if the state has adopted “the least restrictive means of 
achieving a compelling state interest.” Americans for Prosperity Found. v. Bonta, 141 S. Ct. 2373, 
2377 (2021) (“AFP”) (quoting McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 478 (2014)). In all events, 
H.B. 20 fails any form of heightened First Amendment review. Even under “intermediate scru-
tiny,” the state must prove that H.B. 20 is “narrowly tailored to serve a significant government 
interest.” Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1736 (2017); see also AFP, 141 S. Ct. 
at 2377 (requiring narrow tailoring under “exacting scrutiny” standard). H.B. 20 “come[s] nowhere 
close.” NetChoice, 2021 WL 2690876, at *11. 
Case 1:21-cv-00840-RP   Document 8-2   Filed 09/30/21   Page 39 of 56
31 
1. H.B. 20 serves no sufficient state interest. 
H.B. 20 furthers no legitimate—let alone a compelling or important—government interest. 
The government cannot compel some private entities to disseminate speech “in order to enhance 
the relative voice of others.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48-49; accord Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 254; Arizona 
Free Enter. Club v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721, 749-50 (2011) (“leveling” not a legitimate interest). 
Put another way, as the Northern District of Florida observed in NetChoice, “promoting speech on 
one side of an issue or restricting speech on the other . . . is not a legitimate state interest.” 2021 
WL 2690876, at *11 (citation omitted); accord Hurley, 515 U.S. at 581; PG&E, 475 U.S. at 9, 16 
(plurality op.). 
The “enviable” “size and success” of covered platforms’ communities does not “support[] 
a claim that [the covered platforms] enjoy an abiding monopoly of access to spectators.” Hurley, 
515 U.S. at 577-78. As the Supreme Court recognized in Hurley, even if there may be only one 
true St. Patrick’s Day parade in Southie, that does not diminish the parade organizers’ First 
Amendment rights. Id.; accord Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 250 (rejecting asserted interest in preventing 
the “abuses of bias and manipulative reportage” that government claimed were “the result of the 
vast accumulations of unreviewable power in the modern media empires”). The alleged “concen-
tration of market power among large social-media providers does not change the governing First 
Amendment principles.” NetChoice, 2021 WL 2690876, at *7.  
H.B. 20 declares that “social media platforms with the largest number of users are common 
carriers by virtue of their market dominance.” H.B. 20 § 1(4); see also § 1(3) (“social media plat-
forms function as common carriers”). But the statutory label as “a common carrier scheme has no 
real First Amendment consequences,” so “impos[ing] a form of common carrier obligation” cannot 
justify a law that “burdens the constitutionally protected speech rights” of platforms “to expand 
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the speaking opportunities” of others. Denver, 518 U.S. at 824-26 (Thomas, J., concurring in judg-
ment in part and dissenting in part); see PG&E, 475 U.S. at 17-18 & n.14 (plurality op.) (common 
carriers retain their “right to be free from state regulation that burdens [their] speech”). In other 
words, while H.B. 20 attempts to designate privately owned platforms as “common carriers,” 
§ 1(3)-(4), that label does not allow Texas to circumvent the First Amendment’s protections.  
Regardless, the covered platforms are not common carriers as a matter of law or fact. Under 
the common law before the American Founding, at the time of the Founding, and around the rati-
fication of the Fourteenth Amendment, common carriers were those who undertook to transport or 
carry goods “indifferently.” Allen v. Sackrider, 37 N.Y. 341, 342 (1867) (collecting authorities); 
Bank of Orange v. Brown, 1829 WL 2396 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1829) (“Every person who undertakes to 
carry, for a compensation, the goods of all persons indifferently, is, as to the liability imposed, to 
be considered a common carrier.”); Gisbourn v. Hurst, I Salk. 249, 250, 91 Eng. Rep. 220, 220 
(1710) (“[A]ny man undertaking for hire to carry the goods of all persons indifferently . . . is . . . a 
common carrier.”). As addressed above, the covered platforms do not hold, and have never held, 
themselves out as organizations that carry all persons or all content “indifferently.” Ex. A ¶ 12-13; 
Ex. C ¶ 11; Ex. D ¶8.6 For example, many platforms have never permitted adult content or por-
nography. H.B. 20 would force them to carry such content. More generally, the platforms may be 
used only by users who agree to the platforms’ terms and policies and comply with each platform’s 
respective community standards.  
 
6 This is why state and federal courts have consistently held that companies like (and in-
cluding) the covered platforms are not common carriers. E.g., Howard v. America Online, Inc., 
208 F.3d 741, 753 (9th Cir. 2000) (AOL not “common carrier”); Kinderstart.com LLC v. Google, 
Inc., 2006 WL 3246596, at *10-11 (N.D. Cal. July 13, 2006) (Google not “common carrier”); 
Millan v. Facebook, Inc., 2021 WL 1149937, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 25, 2021) (“Facebook does 
not satisfy the definition of a ‘common carrier.’”). 
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The Supreme Court’s decision in Turner supports this conclusion. Turner turned on “the 
unique physical characteristics of cable [television] transmission” which provided cable compa-
nies a physical “bottleneck, or gatekeeper, control over most (if not all) of the television program-
ming that is channeled into the subscriber’s homes.” Turner, 512 U.S. at 639, 656; see Reno, 521 
U.S. at 868-69 (“some of our cases have recognized special justifications for regulation of the 
broadcast media that are not applicable to other speakers,” such as “forums of the Internet”). As 
the Fifth Circuit held, “the Supreme Court [in Turner] applied intermediate scrutiny to a law im-
posing must-carry obligations on cable operators only because the cable medium uniquely allowed 
for the bottleneck control that explained Congress requiring just cable operators, and not other 
video service providers, from carrying certain stations.” Time Warner, 667 F.3d at 640 (emphasis 
added); accord Horton v. City of Houston, 179 F.3d 188, 192, 194 (5th Cir. 1999) (explaining that 
the law in Turner was only deemed content neutral because it was designed “to further the non-
speech-related goals of protecting local broadcasters and assuring free TV access to citizens who 
lack cable connections”) (emphasis added). 
Because of that unique physical bottleneck, there would have been a complete “elimination 
of broadcast television”—that is, “access to free television programming for the 40 percent of 
Americans without cable”—if cable companies nationwide had not been required to carry broad-
cast television channels. Turner, 512 U.S. at 646; see Time Warner, 667 F.3d at 640 (“Turner made 
clear, however, that the must-carry requirement impacted ‘almost all cable systems in the country, 
rather than just a select few’”) (emphasis added). And the Court noted that “broadcast licensees 
must retain abundant discretion over programming choices,” so government was not categorically 
prohibiting private editorial decisions. Turner, 520 U.S. at 651 (emphasis added). The regulation 
upheld in Turner only required cable companies to carry a small number of established broadcast 
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channels, and it did not purport to micromanage and burden every single decision cable providers 
make about the content they disseminate. By contrast, H.B. 20 is far more burdensome. 
Unlike the cable companies in Turner, the covered platforms have no natural monopoly 
over physical infrastructure, and they do not possess any bottleneck that would “destroy[]” an 
entire speech medium used by half of the country. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 577 (discussing Turner). 
As the Supreme Court recognized three years after Turner, “the Internet can hardly be considered 
a ‘scarce’ expressive commodity.” Reno, 521 U.S at 870. Technological progress has made the 
Internet replete with different forums for expression, as demonstrated by H.B. 20’s own otherwise 
unconstitutional speaker-based exemptions and distinctions. In all events, Turner is distinguisha-
ble in many other ways: (1) H.B. 20 is content-based, cf. Turner, 512 U.S. at 655-56; (2) the ex-
pression on the covered platforms can be, and often is, attributed to the platforms, cf. id. at 655; 
and (3) H.B. 20 cannot satisfy intermediate scrutiny; cf. id. at 662. 
2. H.B. 20 is neither the least restrictive means nor narrowly tailored. 
Even if H.B. 20 served a sufficient state interest—which it does not—it is neither narrowly 
tailored nor the “least restrictive” means of furthering any such interest. AFP, 141 S. Ct. at 2383.  
H.B. 20 is not narrowly tailored because, as discussed, it does not apply “evenhandedly” 
to “smalltime” and “giant” speakers. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 540-41 (1989). H.B. 20’s 
50-million-U.S.-user line for covered platforms is both arbitrary and unsupported by any legisla-
tive findings. See Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770-71 (1993) (requiring more than “mere 
speculation or conjecture” to justify speech restrictions). Indeed, the user threshold was amended 
at various points in the legislative process without much consideration. And during the regular 
legislative session, one state Senator proposed lowering the threshold to 25 million monthly users, 
in an effort to include “websites such as Parler and Gab, which are popular among conservatives.” 
Shawn Mulcahy, Texas Senate approves bill to stop social media companies from banning Texans 
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for political views, Texas Tribune (updated Apr. 1, 2021), https://bit.ly/3nU2ceV. But the amend-
ment failed. Id. 
By discriminating among platforms by size, H.B. 20 raises “serious doubts about whether 
the government is in fact pursuing the interest it invokes, rather than disfavoring a particular 
speaker or viewpoint.” NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2376 (quoting Brown, 564 U.S. at 802). As in Florida, 
the state cannot offer a “basis for imposing these restrictions only on the largest providers. . . . The 
application of these requirements to only a small subset of social-media entities would be suffi-
cient, standing alone, to subject these statutes to strict scrutiny.” NetChoice, 2021 WL 2690876, 
at *10. This size cutoff makes H.B. 20 hopelessly underinclusive to satisfy whatever possible state 
interest could be implicated.  
Furthermore, as discussed above, H.B. 20 permits covered platforms to moderate content 
disfavored by Texas—notwithstanding that exempted content may express a “viewpoint”—but the 
inclusion of these exceptions similarly demonstrates that H.B. 20 is underinclusive and thus not 
narrowly tailored. See supra pp.9, 26-27. The legislature rejected amendments, for example, that 
would have allowed platforms to exclude vaccine misinformation, terrorist content, and Holocaust 
denial. See supra p.19. 
H.B. 20 is also overinclusive by potentially sweeping in “systems nobody would refer to 
as social media.” NetChoice, 2021 WL 2690876, at *2. It is vague enough to include any website 
or application that allows users to communicate, regardless whether their primary use is the dis-
semination of content and information. 
Fundamentally, Texas cannot satisfy any tailoring requirement because there is an obvious 
alternative that would directly advance the state’s asserted interests without limiting or burdening 
private First Amendment rights. Texas could create its own government-run social media platform 
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if it thought it so important to provide a completely open forum allowing all speech regardless of 
viewpoint. In fact, such a proposal was considered—but rejected—by the Texas Legislature when 
it adopted H.B. 20. See Tex. H.R. Journal (87th Leg., 2d Spec. Sess.) at 232, 
https://bit.ly/2Y2YGEp. Instead of that alternative, H.B. 20 commandeers privately owned busi-
nesses, compels them to disseminate content, and eviscerates their editorial discretion over their 
own platforms.  
All these aspects indicate a “dramatic mismatch” between any interest H.B. 20 could pos-
sibly further and H.B. 20’s actual effects. AFP, 141 S. Ct. at 2386.  
* * * 
H.B. 20’s restrictions purportedly do not apply if a platform “is specifically authorized to 
censor by federal law,” but this attempted savings clause cannot rescue H.B. 20 from invalidation. 
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 143A.006(a)(1). H.B. 20 does not define “specifically authorized,” 
and it is unclear what federal rights this provision contemplates. Whatever this vague provision 
means, it would be strange for the legislature to enact a complex statute regulating social media 
platforms only to render them all a nullity via this amorphous savings clause.  
H.B. 20’s vague savings clause is no impediment to vindicating federal free-speech rights. 
Under the First Amendment, “a series of adjudications, and the chilling effect of the resolution on 
protected speech in the meantime would make such a case-by-case adjudication intolerable.” 
Board of Airport Comm’rs v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 576 (1987). This speech-chilling 
complexity created by the Legislature only enhances the need for prompt adjudication and vindi-
cation of Plaintiffs’ members’ federal rights. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 884 n.49 (“It would certainly 
be dangerous if the legislature could set a net large enough to catch all possible offenders, and 
leave it to the courts to step inside and say who could be rightfully detained, and who should be 
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set at large.”); City & Cnty. of San Francisco v. Trump, 897 F.3d 1225, 1239-40 (9th Cir. 2018) 
(“If ‘consistent with law’ precludes a court from examining whether the Executive Order is con-
sistent with law, judicial review is a meaningless exercise, precluding resolution of the critical 
legal issues.”); Hias, Inc. v. Trump, 985 F.3d 309, 325 (4th Cir. 2021) (“a purely theoretical savings 
clause” cannot immunize an order from judicial review). Regardless, under the Supremacy Clause, 
the First Amendment and the Communications Decency Act provide the federal “rule of decision” 
because they conflict with H.B. 20’s operative provisions imposing restrictions on private actors. 
Kansas v. Garcia, 140 S. Ct. 791, 801 (2020).  
H.B. 20’s severability clause in Section 8, likewise, does not save the challenged statutory 
provisions because they are facially unconstitutional in all applications. E.g., United States v. Sa-
lerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987) (law facially invalid when “no set of circumstances exists under 
which the [law] would be valid”). In the alternative, H.B. 20’s challenged provisions are also fa-
cially invalid under the First Amendment’s overbreadth doctrine because “a substantial number of 
its applications are unconstitutional, judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.” 
AFP, 141 S. Ct. at 2387. This federal overbreadth rule trumps any state severability clause. See 
Reno, 521 U.S. at 883-84 & n.49 (striking down statute despite severability clause purporting to 
preserve constitutional “application[s] . . . to ‘other persons or circumstances’” because “a sever-
ability clause is an aid merely; not an inexorable command”) (citation omitted).   
II. H.B. 20 is preempted by the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230.  
In addition to the First Amendment, Congress in the Communications Decency Act made 
clear that Plaintiffs’ members (like all businesses offering websites) are entitled to exercise their 
own “editorial and self-regulatory functions.” Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co. v. America Online Inc., 
206 F.3d 980, 986 (10th Cir. 2000); see 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A). “First Amendment values . . . 
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drive the CDA.” Google, Inc. v. Hood, 822 F.3d 212, 220 (5th Cir. 2016). Indeed, Congress titled 
Section 230, “Protection for private blocking and screening of offensive material.” 47 U.S.C. 
§ 230.7 Section 230 provides “broad” protection for the content-related decisions that online plat-
forms (of all sizes and shapes) make. Almeida v. Amazon.com, Inc., 456 F.3d 1316, 1321 (11th 
Cir. 2016); 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3) (“No cause of action may be brought and no liability may be 
imposed under any state or local law that is inconsistent with this section.”). Accordingly, Section 
230 “preempts the parts of” H.B. 20 “that purport to impose liability for other decisions to remove 
or restrict access to content” and the parts of the Bill “applicable to a social media platform’s 
restriction of access to posted material.” NetChoice, 2021 WL 2690876, at *6.  
Section 230 expressly preempts H.B. 20’s attempt to punish content moderation. Under 
Section 230, Plaintiffs’ members may not “be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information 
provided” by its users nor may they “be held liable on account of . . . any action voluntarily taken 
in good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider considers to be ob-
scene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable.” 47 
U.S.C. § 230(c)(1), (2)(A) (emphases added). Internet platforms thus may not be held liable for 
moderating content on their sites. Indeed, “Section 230 ‘specifically proscribes liability’” for a 
website’s “‘decisions relating to the monitoring, screening, and deletion of content from its net-
work—actions quintessentially related to a publisher’s role.’” Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 
420 (5th Cir. 2008) (Section 230 confers “broad immunity” for “all claims” related to the “publi-
cation of information created by third parties”) (citation omitted); see also La’Tiejira, 272 F. Supp. 
3d at 993-94 (“‘[A]ny activity that can be boiled down to deciding whether to exclude material 
 
7 Covered platforms and Plaintiffs’ members receive Section 230 protections because they 
are “interactive computer services” under Section 230. 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2).  
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that third parties seek to post online is perforce immune under section 230.’”) (quoting Fair Hous-
ing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1170 (9th Cir. 
2009)); Almeida, 456 F.3d at 1321 n.3 (“The language of section 230(c)(2) is clearly inconsistent 
with state law that makes interactive service providers liable based on their efforts to screen con-
tent.”). Courts have routinely held that platforms (and other websites) have the right to “restrict 
access to or availability of” objectionable content. E.g., Daniels v. Alphabet, 2021 WL 1222166, 
at *11-13 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2021) (YouTube’s removing conspiracy-theory videos). 
Yet H.B. 20 imposes liability on those same websites for moderating content based on 
“viewpoints” that the websites consider objectionable. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 
§ 143A.002(a)(1)-(3). For instance, many covered platforms (like other websites8) ban hate speech 
because hate speech is “objectionable.” Yet hate speech—no matter how abhorrent—expresses a 
“viewpoint” that Plaintiffs’ members must now carry under H.B. 20 or else face a civil lawsuit. 
Federal law expressly permits every website on the Internet to moderate content and provides that 
those websites be free from any “action” challenging how they exercise that discretion. 47 U.S.C. 
§ 230(c), (e)(3).  
III. H.B. 20 violates the Commerce Clause.  
Independently, H.B. 20 exceeds Texas’s authority under the Commerce Clause. H.B. 20 
regulates not only how platforms will operate in Texas, but also regulates the worldwide operations 
of platforms and what and how content is displayed to non-Texans on the platforms. In so doing, 
 
8 E.g., Texas Attorney General, Site Policies, https://bit.ly/3nHBwxX (last visited Sept. 30, 
2021) (“Members of the public should not post or share information on an OAG social media page 
if that information is personal, sensitive, obscene, threatening, harassing, discriminatory, or would 
otherwise compromise public safety or incite violence or illegal activities.”). 
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H.B. 20 unconstitutionally reaches far beyond Texas’s borders to regulate covered platforms’ eco-
nomic activity and affects the product everyone in the world receives through the Internet. To top 
it off, H.B. 20 also unlawfully discriminates against platforms engaged in interstate commerce by 
compelling covered platforms to continue doing business in Texas even if they do not want to. 
Both directly and in “practical effect,” H.B. 20 unconstitutionally regulates “commerce 
that takes place wholly outside of the state’s borders” and is therefore per se invalid. Healy, 491 
U.S. at 336 (quoting Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 642-43 (1982) (plurality op.)). H.B. 20’s 
provisions apply worldwide to content posted on covered platforms by Texas residents and busi-
nesses, regardless of where the resident or business is located, when it submits content, or where 
other users are located when they view it. H.B. 20 thus “directly controls commerce occurring 
wholly outside” Texas and “exceeds the inherent limits” of the state’s authority. Id. That makes 
H.B. 20 unconstitutional “regardless of whether the statute’s extraterritorial reach was intended by 
the legislature.” Id. H.B. 20 regulates extraterritorially in at least five specific ways. 
First, H.B. 20 restricts how covered platforms (headquartered outside Texas) may moder-
ate user-submitted content worldwide by creating an entitlement for Texas users to “receive” con-
tent free of “viewpoint” “censorship.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 143A.002(3). H.B. 20 pro-
hibits editorial discretion based on the views of “another person,” a term that—unlike covered 
“users”—has no geographic limit and thus includes anyone across the world. Id. § 143A.002(a)(1). 
Second, H.B. 20 compels covered platforms to publish and disseminate worldwide content 
posted by “users.” Id. § 143A.002(3). H.B. 20’s restrictions do not merely regulate how Texans 
view social media in Texas. On the contrary, H.B. 20 restricts how Plaintiffs’ members display 
their platforms everywhere. 
Third, H.B. 20 restricts moderation over content posted by covered “users” from anywhere 
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in the world. Id. § 143A.003(a). If a Texas resident lives in or travels to New York or Europe and 
posts to or receives social media from there, H.B. 20 applies. Likewise, if a company “does busi-
ness” in Texas but posts to social media from a location outside of Texas—even about matters that 
have nothing to do with Texas or its residents—H.B. 20 purports to restrict editorial discretion 
over such out-of-state posts. 
Fourth, H.B. 20 has the practical effect of regulating commerce outside Texas because 
Plaintiffs’ members operate their services and enforce their policies on a global scale. So even if a 
post is made in Texas, the decision about whether and how the post is displayed extends well 
beyond Texas’s borders. “Because the internet does not recognize geographic boundaries, it is 
difficult, if not impossible, for a state to regulate internet activities without ‘project[ing] its legis-
lation into other States.’” American Booksellers Found. v. Dean, 342 F.3d 96, 103 (2d Cir. 2003) 
(alteration in original; quoting Healy, 491 U.S. at 334); accord American Libraries Ass’n v. Pataki, 
969 F. Supp. 160, 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).  
Fifth, and finally, H.B. 20 reaches beyond Texas and compels Plaintiffs’ covered mem-
bers—headquartered and incorporated outside Texas—to engage in commerce with Texas users 
by prohibiting covered platforms from denying access based on “a user’s geographic location in 
this state or any part of this state.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 143A.002(a)(3). In other words, 
H.B. 20 makes it impossible for covered platforms to avoid its restrictions. If a covered platform 
decides it would rather not do business in Texas than be forced to disseminate pro-Nazi speech, it 
cannot do so under H.B. 20—or else it will face myriad lawsuits from Texas users seeking rein-
statement and their statutory entitlement to receive all user-submitted content worldwide. Just as 
states lack authority to regulate wholly extraterritorial commerce, they cannot drag extraterritorial 
commerce within their borders to then subject that commercial activity to the state’s intra-state 
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regulatory authority. See Healy, 491 U.S. at 336-37. 
For all these reasons, H.B. 20’s requirement of a Texas “user” obscures the fact that 
H.B. 20 fundamentally (and unconstitutionally) regulates how out-of-state companies interact with 
out-of-state users. As the Supreme Court has held, when a state regulates economic conduct wholly 
outside of the state’s borders, it does not matter “whether or not the commerce has effects within 
the State.” Id. at 336 (quoting MITE, 457 U.S. at 642-43). Accordingly, courts across the country 
have held unconstitutional laws that purport to peg their extraterritorial application to an in-state 
hook. E.g., North Dakota v. Heydinger, 825 F.3d 912, 921 (8th Cir. 2016) (Minnesota law regu-
lating company’s electricity generation was unconstitutional extraterritorial legislation because 
out-of-state company could not prevent Minnesota consumers from accessing its electricity and 
therefore would have to leave the market entirely or conduct even its out-of-state business on Min-
nesota’s terms); Sam Francis Foundation v. Christies, Inc., 784 F.3d 1320, 1323 (9th Cir. 2015) 
(en banc) (invalidating law that “regulates sales that take place outside” state with “no necessary 
connection with the state other than the residency of the seller”); TelTech Sys., Inc. v. Barbour, 
866 F. Supp. 2d 571, 576 (S.D. Miss. 2011) (holding Mississippi anti-spoofing law invalid under 
Commerce Clause in part because it was impossible for company to determine whether recipient 
of caller ID spoofing was in Mississippi, and therefore to conduct business anywhere in country 
without risk of liability under Mississippi’s statute), aff’d sub. nom. TelTech Sys., Inc. v. Bryant, 
702 F.3d 232 (5th Cir. 2012).  
Moreover, by forcing out-of-state firms to conduct business in Texas, H.B. 20 not only 
regulates extraterritorially but also punishes firms for doing business in other states. H.B. 20 dis-
criminates against companies for having a non-Texas user base—that is, for engaging in interstate 
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commerce. Such state regulations that penalize companies for “‘participat[ing] in interstate com-
merce’” are “facially discriminatory” and thus virtually per se unconstitutional. Camps New-
found/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 578 (1997) (quoting Fulton Corp. v. 
Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 333 (1996)). H.B. 20 thus violates the Commerce Clause in multiple re-
spects. 
IV. The remaining factors favor a preliminary injunction.  
The remaining factors all weigh in favor of granting Plaintiffs a preliminary injunction. 
Doing so maintains the status quo, allowing covered platforms to continue exercising their First 
Amendment and other rights as they have since their inception. 
“There can be no question that the challenged restrictions, if enforced, will cause irrepara-
ble harm. ‘The loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestion-
ably constitutes irreparable injury.’” Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 
63, 67 (2020) (per curiam) (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976) (plurality op.)); 
accord Texans for Free Enter. v. Texas Ethics Comm’n, 732 F.3d 535, 539 (5th Cir. 2013); 
NetChoice, 2021 WL 2690876, at *11.  
H.B. 20 will radically upset how platforms work and the core value that they provide to 
users. By compelling platforms to disseminate all user speech regardless of “viewpoint,” H.B. 20 
prohibits virtually all moderation and curation necessary to make the platforms safe and enjoyable 
for users. Ex. A ¶¶ 12-13; Ex. A ¶¶ 19-20; Ex. C ¶ 11; Ex. D ¶¶ 8-9, 13-14. If H.B. 20 goes into 
effect, users in Texas and worldwide will be inundated with abusive, unsafe, and offensive material 
including pornography, hate speech, foreign-state propaganda, domestic disinformation, and more 
that could make different platforms unusable or undesirable. Ex. A ¶ 45; Ex. B ¶ 20; Ex. C ¶ 61; 
Ex. D ¶ 24. And once H.B. 20 compels the platforms to disclose their methods and algorithms, it 
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will be too late to stop bad actors such as scammers, predators, and criminals from evading the 
platforms’ safeguards—even if the Court later finds H.B. 20 unconstitutional. Ex. C ¶ 57; Ex. D 
¶ 32.  
Thus, if allowed to go into force against Plaintiffs’ members, H.B. 20 would threaten mon-
umental changes to the way online platforms work. Covered platforms that engage in less moder-
ation will be less hospitable to their users and advertisers—who enjoy the platforms, and pay to 
place advertisements on the platforms, in part because the platforms prohibit harmful and objec-
tionable conduct. Ex. B ¶¶ 9-10, 16-18, 23; Ex. C ¶¶ 17, 50, 61-62; Ex. D ¶¶ 8, 35. The loss of 
those users and advertisers will likewise irreparably harm covered platforms. Florida Business-
men, Etc. v. City of Hollywood, 648 F.2d 956, 958 (5th Cir. 1981). For similar reasons, H.B. 20 
will harm covered platforms’ goodwill. Denbra IP Holdings, LLC v. Thornton, 2021 WL 674238, 
at *8 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 22, 2021) (“Grounds for irreparable injury include loss of control of reputa-
tion, loss of trade, and loss of goodwill.”) (quoting Emerald City Mgmt., L.L.C. v. Kahn, 624 F. 
App’x 223, 224 (5th Cir. 2015)). In addition, H.B. 20 would impose both (1) direct costs inherent 
in changing the covered platforms’ entire business model; and (2) difficult to measure costs from 
the harm arising from less moderation of harmful content. Ex. A ¶¶ 40-47; Ex. B ¶¶ 23-24. These 
economic and operational injuries are irreparable. E.g., Alabama Ass’n of Realtors v. Dep’t of 
Health & Human Services, No. 21A23, 2021 WL 3783142, at *4 (U.S. Aug. 26, 2021) (financial 
costs “with no guarantee of eventual recovery” are irreparable injury); Morales v. Trans World 
Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 381 (1992) (“irreparable injury” where “clear that [states] would seek 
to enforce” law and plaintiffs faced “Hobson’s choice” of “expos[ing] themselves to potentially 
huge liability” or “suffer[ing] the injury of obeying” preempted law); Florida Businessmen, 648 
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F.2d at 958 nn.2, 3. And it will require them to disclose non-public, competitively sensitive infor-
mation (particularly about their algorithms), which risks irreparable harm. Ex. C ¶ 57; Ex. D ¶ 32. 
The irreparable harm to Plaintiffs’ members from permitting H.B. 20’s enforcement far 
outweighs any harm to the state from an injunction. NetChoice, 2021 WL 2690876, at *11 (“The 
threatened injury outweighs whatever damage the injunction may cause the State.”). Ex. A ¶¶ 39-
47; Ex. B ¶¶ 23-24; Ex. C ¶¶ 61-62; Ex. D ¶¶ 21-35. Texas lacks a sufficient interest for H.B. 20 
(see supra pp.31-34), so the state will not be harmed if this unconstitutional and preempted law is 
enjoined. See Texans for Free Enter., 732 F.3d at 539 (state actors not harmed when they cannot 
enforce laws for which they lack a sufficient interest under the First Amendment).  
Finally, allowing Plaintiffs’ members to exercise their First Amendment rights as they have 
for years is in the public interest. NetChoice, 2021 WL 2690876, at *11 (“[T]he injunction will 
serve, not be adverse to, the public interest.”). As the Fifth Circuit has held, “‘injunctions protect-
ing First Amendment freedoms are always in the public interest.’” Texans for Free Enter., 732 
F.3d at 539 (quoting Christian Legal Soc’y v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853, 859 (7th Cir. 2006)). And 
here, the platforms’ continued moderation will benefit users and the public more broadly. Ex. E 
¶¶ 6-14 (harmful effects on the LGBTQ community); Ex. F ¶ 8-16 (efforts to curtail CSAM).  
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court preliminarily enjoin the Texas Attorney Gen-
eral from enforcing Sections 2 and 7 of H.B. 20 against Plaintiffs and their members. 
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       ) 
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 
AUSTIN DIVISION 
 
NETCHOICE, LLC, d/b/a NETCHOICE, a 
501(c)(6) District of Columbia organization; 
and COMPUTER & COMMUNICATIONS 
INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION d/b/a CCIA, a 






KEN PAXTON, in his official capacity as 









Civ. Action No. 21-cv-00840 
 
 
DECLARATION OF CCIA IN SUPPORT OF  
PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION  
 
I, Matthew Schruers, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, declare under penalty of perjury as 
follows: 
1. I am the President of the Computer & Communications Industry Association 
(“CCIA”). I have worked at the organization for sixteen years. Upon joining the Association, I 
focused on legal, legislative, and policy matters, before taking on the roles of Chief Operating 
Officer and President. In each of these capacities, I have worked closely and communicated often 
with CCIA members regarding how public policy proposals affect their businesses, operations, 
and relationships with their users.  
2. Trust and safety operations, and content moderation specifically, is an important 
area of CCIA’s work and a constant focus for many of our members. As a result, I spend significant 
time understanding the content-related policies and practices of CCIA’s members, as well as 
monitoring and analyzing the legislative and policy proposals that affect the critical business 
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function of trust and safety. I also interact regularly with trust and safety experts throughout the 
industry, and have an understanding of the challenges faced by trust and safety professionals. I 
have been tracking and evaluating the various legislative proposals in Texas bearing on our 
members’ editorial and curatorial discretion—including House Bill 20 (“H.B. 20”) and its 
companion bills and predecessors—since before its passage so as to advise CCIA members on its 
provisions and impact on their businesses.  
3. The statements contained in this declaration are made upon my personal 
knowledge. I am over 18 years of age and am competent to make the statements set forth herein. 
About CCIA 
4. CCIA is an international, not-for-profit membership association representing a 
broad cross-section of companies in the computer, Internet, information technology, and 
telecommunications industries. For nearly fifty years, CCIA has promoted open markets, open 
systems, and open networks, and advocated for the interests of the world’s leading providers of 
technology products and services before governments and the courts. 
5. CCIA’s membership includes computer and communications companies, 
equipment manufacturers, software developers, service providers, re-sellers, integrators, and 
financial service companies. Currently, CCIA’s members include: Amazon, Apple, BT Group 
(British Telecommunications), Cloudflare, Dish Network, eBay, Eventbrite, Facebook, Google, 
Intel, Intuit, McAfee, Mozilla, Newfold Digital, Pinterest, Powerhouse Management, Rakuten, 
Red Hat, Samsung, Shopify, Stripe, Twitter, Uber, Vimeo, Waymo, Wolt, Yahoo, and Zebra.  
6. Because of the broad definition of “social media platform” within the recently 
enacted H.B. 20, a number of CCIA’s members would qualify even though their services would 
not be considered as such by the general public. Such members span various sectors and products, 
and enable billions of users around the world to create and share using their products, whether to 
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facilitate work, study, prayer, socialization, commerce, or communications. These companies 
moderate and curate what is displayed on their services as a vital part of operations, and some must 
manage a massive and constantly expanding amount of content in order to provide valuable 
products and tools for their users. 
7. Because content moderation is central to the operations of these members, issues 
surrounding trust and safety constitute a significant part of CCIA’s policy and advocacy work. To 
that end—among our other endeavors and programs in this area—CCIA is currently incubating a 
new non-profit organization called the Digital Trust & Safety Partnership.1 The members of this 
new partnership include CCIA members and others dedicated to identifying and preventing 
harmful content online.2  
8. This new organization aims to develop and iterate upon industry best practices for, 
among other things, the moderation of third-party content and behavior, with the goal of ensuring 
a safer and more trustworthy Internet. The Partnership’s objectives include the facilitation of 
internal assessments, and subsequently independent third-party assessments, of participants’ 
implementation of identified best practices for promoting the safety of their users and the online 
communities that they maintain. The organization balances these collective goals with the 
recognition that each of its member companies has its own values, product aims, digital tools, and 
human-led processes for moderating the extremely broad range of human expression they 
facilitate.  
 
1 Digital Trust & Safety Partnership, https://dtspartnership.org/. 
2 Tech giants list principles for handling harmful content, Axios (Feb. 18, 2021), 
https://www.axios.com/tech-giants-list-principles-for-handling-harmful-content-5c9cfba9-05bc-
49ad-846a-baf01abf5976.html. 
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Content Moderation: How It Works and Why It Matters 
 
9. The online services provided by many CCIA members display or support a wide 
variety of user-created content in myriad forms—including text, videos, audio clips, and 
photographs. The scale of users and activity on these services is significant. Facebook3 and 
YouTube4 each has over two billion users. Every day, users watch over a billion hours of video on 
YouTube.5 Over 100 billion messages are shared every day on Facebook.6 Billions of searches are 
run on Google every day.7 More than 500 hours of content are uploaded to YouTube every minute.8 
Amazon has more than 1.9 million small- and medium-sized businesses selling on its online store,9 
and countless user-generated reviews are posted on the listings for the products of those businesses 
and others.10  
10. The material uploaded to these services comes from all over the world and is 
incredibly diverse. The services enable and provide a forum for the height of human thought and 
creativity: material that is culturally significant, highly informative, brilliantly funny or satirical, 
 
3 Hearing Before The United States Senate Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on Privacy, 
Technology, and the Law (Apr. 27, 2021), 
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Bickert%20Testimony.pdf. 
4 YouTube has over 2 billion monthly logged-in users, YouTube, 
https://blog.youtube/press/. 
5 Id. 
6 Company Info, Facebook, https://about.facebook.com/company-info/. 
7 Zeitgeist 2012, Google, https://www.internetlivestats.com/google-search-statistics/. 
8 YouTube has over 2 billion monthly logged-in users, YouTube, 
https://blog.youtube/press/. 
9 2020 Letter to Shareholders, Amazon (Apr. 15, 2021), 
https://www.aboutamazon.com/news/company-news/2020-letter-to-shareholders. 
10 Update on customer reviews, Amazon (Oct. 3 2016), 
https://www.aboutamazon.com/news/innovation-at-amazon/update-on-customer-reviews. 
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and politically engaging. To raise just a few examples of notable uses of members’ services during 
the ongoing public health crisis: 
a. When the COVID-19 pandemic struck, and communities implemented stay-at-
home orders, many small businesses turned to social media services and online 
tools to continue operations, engage current and prospective customers, and 
cultivate loyalty in a socially distant context.11 Many small businesses who 
succeeded in the “shut-in economy”12 did so by embracing social media services 
and digital tools.13  
b. Amid a quarantine of indeterminate length, schools and public services both turned 
to social media tools to meet the needs of distance-education students and citizens 
with special needs, such as live captions at local government press conferences on 
public health via Facebook Live,14 and live captions for remote learning via Google 
Meet and Zoom.15 These virtual tools helped make life during social distancing 
more accessible and inclusive for people who are deaf or English-language 
 
11 5 Small Business Owners Reveal How They Are Marketing On Social Media During 
COVID-19, U.S. Chamber (Sept. 3, 2020), https://www.uschamber.com/co/good-
company/growth-studio/promoting-business-on-social-media-during-pandemic. 
12 As COVID-19 Continues, Online Commerce Rises, Project DisCo (Dec. 14, 2020), 
https://www.project-disco.org/competition/121420-as-covid-19-continues-online-commerce-
rises/. 
13 See, e.g., Allison Hatfield, 7 ways technology is helping small businesses during COVID-
19, Dallas Morning News (Nov. 20, 2020), https://www.dallasnews.com/business/2020/11/20/7-
ways-technology-is-helping-small-businesses-during-covid-19/. 
14 Powered by AI, new automated captions are helping people receive news and critical 
updates, Facebook (Sept. 15, 2020), https://tech.fb.com/powered-by-ai-new-automated-captions-
are-helping-people-receive-news-and-critical-updates/. 
15 Google Meet expands live captions to 4 more languages, extends unlimited meetings, 
ZDNet (Dec. 15, 2020), https://www.zdnet.com/article/google-meet-expands-live-captions-to-4-
more-languages-extends-unlimited-meetings/. 
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learners,16 as well as helping families communicate when they are apart.17 Social 
media has also been a tool for mutual aid in Texas, both during COVID and when 
Texans lost power and heat during a storm in February and turned to digital tools 
like Twitter, Google Forms, and Venmo.18 
c. Social media and digital services are also a critical tool as learning returns to the 
classroom. For instance, in 2019 an elementary school teacher in Houston, Texas 
founded the #ClearTheList movement to help teachers clear their online wish lists 
from platforms like Amazon and Donors Choose to help teachers defray their 
personal expenses on classroom items, which now includes new technology for 
virtual learning and PPE.19 Social media has also enabled Texas country musicians 
to raise money for teachers in Texas and Oklahoma using the hashtag 
#TroubadoursForTeachers, especially as they’ve been home during COVID.20  
11. By contrast, some of the material posted on online services is the polar opposite. 
Because almost anyone can create an account and post content on certain social media services, 
users can attempt to submit content ranging from dangerous, illegal, and abusive, to things that are 
 
16 Live captions come to Meet in four new languages, Google (Dec. 15, 2020), 
https://blog.google/products/meet/live-captions-new-languages/. 
17 A CODA story: Why accessible technology matters, Google (Apr. 22, 2021), 
https://blog.google/outreach-initiatives/accessibility/tonys-story-accessibility-features/. 
18 Marissa Martinez, Texans used mutual aid to help their communities through a 
devastating winter storm (Feb. 23, 2021), https://www.texastribune.org/2021/02/23/mutual-aid-
texas-storm/. 
19 Allison Slater Tate, School supplies: Help teachers #ClearTheList with PPE, wipes, 
TODAY (July 30, 2020), https://www.today.com/parents/school-supplies-help-teachers-
clearthelist-ppe-wipes-t188220. 
20 Katy Blakey, Texas Country Artists Lend Their Voices to Help Teachers, NBC-DFW 
(Aug. 30, 2021), https://www.nbcdfw.com/news/local/texas-country-artists-lend-their-voices-to-
help-teachers/2730463/. 
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just undesirable or annoying. A few examples of content shared on the darker side of the Internet, 
which trust and safety teams work around the clock to address, include: 
a. Video footage of the mass shootings targeting a mosque in Christchurch, New 
Zealand that was recorded by the gunman and broadcast online, which despite being 
removed within minutes, resurfaced on various other services, leading to extensive 
efforts across the industry to remove the videos.21  
b. Videos and propaganda posted by ISIS to recruit American teenagers or otherwise 
persuade them to adopt its extremist ideology.22  
c. Fraud schemes that specifically target older adults online; for instance, by 
contacting a senior through social media, building a relationship, and then asking 
for money.23  
d. Sexual, graphic, or otherwise disturbing content that is lawful but may be 
inappropriate for certain audiences or contexts, such as on gaming platforms used 
by children.24 
 
21 Update on New Zealand, Facebook (Mar. 18, 2019), 
https://about.fb.com/news/2019/03/update-on-new-zealand/; Olivia Solon, Six months after 
Christchurch shootings, videos of attack are still on Facebook, NBC News (Sept. 20, 2019), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/six-months-after-christchurch-shootings-videos-
attack-are-still-facebook-n1056691. 
22 Dorian Geiger, This Is How ISIS Uses Social Media to Recruit American Teens, Teen 
Vogue (Nov. 20, 2015), https://www.teenvogue.com/story/isis-recruits-american-teens. 
23 Common Scams That Target the Elderly, Senior Living (Feb. 9, 2021), 
https://www.seniorliving.org/research/common-elderly-scams/ . 
24 Roblox tries to deal with adult content on a platform used by many kids (2020), Trust & 
Safety Foundation (Apr. 19, 2021), https://www.tsf.foundation/blog/roblox-tries-to-deal-with-
adult-content-on-a-platform-used-by-many-kids-2020. 
Case 1:21-cv-00840-RP   Document 8-3   Filed 09/30/21   Page 8 of 24
 
8 
e. Content that promotes or glorifies self-harm, including suicide, or that encourages 
young people to engage in dangerous conduct, such as consuming detergent pods 
or other bizarre behavior.25 
12. The companies my association represents, and many others like them,26 therefore 
have an obvious business need to address certain kinds of content and behavior, as well as to take 
action against abusive users who repeatedly or flagrantly violate their rules or post illegal, 
dangerous, or offensive material. Without the ability to respond to that content per the company’s 
stated policies and terms of service (along with limiting the ability of repeat offenders to continue 
abusing the company’s services), many services would be flooded with abusive, objectionable, 
and in some cases unlawful material, drowning out the good content and making their services far 
less enjoyable, useful, and safe.  
13. For that reason, CCIA members have rules governing what kinds of material and 
uses are, and are not, permitted.27 That is also why these services put significant amounts of time, 
resources, personnel, and effort into developing sophisticated trust and safety operations to protect 
 
25 Chaim Gartenberg, YouTube is taking down Tide Pod Challenge videos and oh my god 
don’t eat laundry pods, The Verge (Jan. 17, 2018), 
https://www.theverge.com/2018/1/17/16902990/youtube-tide-pod-challenge-video-take-down-
community-guidelines-removal. 
26 E.g., Drew Harwell, Rumble, a YouTube rival popular with conservatives, will pay 
creators who ‘challenge the status quo’, Washington Post (Aug. 12, 2021), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/08/12/rumble-video-gabbard-greenwald/; 
ArLuther Lee, Team Trump back in the game with new social media app called GETTR, The 
Atlanta Journal-Constitution (July 2, 2021), https://www.ajc.com/news/team-trump-back-in-the-
game-with-new-social-media-app-called-gettr/L4N5FCAINBF6ZNMU4NBBMP37RA/. 
27 E.g., Pinterest Community Guidelines, Pinterest, 
https://policy.pinterest.com/en/community-guidelines; Facebook Community Standards, 
Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards/; The Twitter Rules, Twitter, 
https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/twitter-rules; YouTube Community Guidelines, 
YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/howyoutubeworks/policies/community-guidelines/. 
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users and the public. The scope of these efforts reflects the sheer scale and volume of user-
generated content posted on popular online services.  
14. Content moderation takes many forms, including both human review and the use 
of digital tools that rely in part on algorithms (or other automated sorting). Moderation sometimes 
requires removing objectionable or illegal content or terminating the accounts of users who post 
it. But far more frequently, it involves context-specific decisions about how to arrange and display 
content, how best to recommend content to users based on their interests, and how easy it should 
be to access certain kinds of content. Instagram, for example—an image- and video-sharing service 
popular with younger users (which is owned by CCIA member Facebook)—has made it harder to 
search for graphic images involving suicide attempts and self-harm, and taken steps to stop 
recommending such content to users.28  
15. Another example of moderation is “age-gating,” whereby certain content is made 
accessible only to adults or teenagers but not to younger children. YouTube, for example, does 
this extensively.29 Content that may be age-restricted includes: videos about a cannabis dispensary; 
material featuring people in sexually provocative poses; material using vulgar language; or videos 
that show violent or gory imagery.30  
16. In other circumstances, moderation includes giving users tools to decide for 
themselves what content they wish to avoid, such as by obscuring potentially upsetting but clearly 
newsworthy information, blocking or muting other users (meaning that they no longer see that 
 
28 Tightening Our Policies and Expanding Resources to Prevent Suicide and Self-Harm, 
Facebook (Sept. 10, 2019), https://about.fb.com/news/2019/09/tightening-our-policies-and-
expanding-resources-to-prevent-suicide-and-self-harm/. 
29 Age-restricted content, YouTube, 
https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/2802167?hl=en (“Sometimes content doesn’t violate 
our policies, but it may not be appropriate for viewers under 18. In these cases, we may place an 
age-restriction on the video.”). 
30 See id. 
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user’s content), making certain content inaccessible to their children, or shielding themselves from 
material that is likely to offend sensitive users. For instance, YouTube provides a Restricted Mode 
that users (or institutions such as libraries and schools) can choose to activate in order to avoid 
such material.31 Likewise, on Instagram, users have a variety of tools for controlling how they 
interact with other users’ content, including blocking accounts or commenters, muting an account 
(which stops content from that user from showing up in a feed), and creating lists of words or 
emojis that the user does not wish to see in the comments on his or her posts.32  
17. Content moderation can also include direct speech by service providers. Sometimes 
the services engage in direct speech when they have made a considered determination that 
particular material conveyed via their service requires additional information or context. For 
example, services may decide to attach warning labels, disclaimers, or general commentary 
informing users that certain user-submitted content has either not been verified by official sources 
or may contain upsetting imagery: 
a. Facebook adds “warning screens” over potentially sensitive content such as violent 
or graphic imagery, nudity, and posts related to suicide or suicide attempts.33 
Similarly, Twitter requires users who may legitimately intend to share violent or 
abusive but newsworthy content (such as news media, bloggers, or citizen 
journalists) to mark their accounts as sensitive, such that media can be placed 
behind interstitial warnings. This ensures unsuspecting users are not suddenly 
 
31 Disable or enable Restricted Mode, YouTube, 
https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/174084.  
32 Keeping Instagram a safe and supportive place, Instagram, 
https://about.instagram.com/community/safety. 
33 Providing context on sensitive or misleading content, Facebook, 
https://transparency.fb.com/enforcement/taking-action/context-on-sensitive-misleading-content/. 
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confronted with sensitive media, such as violent news coverage from war zones or 
mass shootings.34 
b. YouTube adds labels to content by state-supported media channels, including 
flagging sources of funding—such as for videos sponsored by the Russian 
government.35  
c. During the 2020 election, Twitter added warning labels to Tweets making claims 
about election results that had not been verified by official sources.36  
18. Other times, however, content moderation is necessary so that even the most basic 
online functions, like shopping or searching for local businesses or having material arranged by 
topic or geography, work as intended. Without prioritizing, classifying, and ordering the never-
ending volume of online content, online services would have no way to deliver the content users 
want—or even critically need—to see. This, for example, is the essential function of Internet 
search engines like Google.37 The ability to search is also an essential function of many other 
online services. Customers rely on services like eBay to search for products they want to buy, and 
to provide helpful information and reviews about those products; users on Facebook want and 
expect to be able to search for people they might know; users on Pinterest want and expect to be 
able to search for recipes and design inspiration according to their taste and preferences. 
 
34 Sensitive media policy, Twitter, https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/media-
policy. 
35 Greater transparency for users around new broadcasters, YouTube, 
https://blog.youtube/news-and-events/greater-transparency-for-users-around; State media 
warning can counteract the effects of foreign misinformation, Harvard Kennedy School 
Misinformation Review, https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/state-media-warning-
labels-can-counteract-the-effects-of-foreign-misinformation/. 
36 Additional steps we’re taking ahead of the 2020 US Election, Twitter, 
https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2020/2020-election-changes.html (“Tweets which 
include premature claims will be labeled and direct people to our official US election page.”).  
37 How Google Search works, Google, https://www.google.com/search/howsearchworks/. 
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19. Content moderation serves at least three distinct vital functions. First, it is an 
important way that online services express themselves and effectuate their community standards, 
thereby delivering on commitments that they have made to their communities. Content rules and 
enforcement actions reflect normative judgments about what will best foster the kind of 
environment that companies have promised to their users. Choices about whether to allow 
pornography, depictions of violence, or certain kinds of offensive language, for example, are all 
editorial expressions of the service’s own preferences—important statements about the kind of 
online community it wishes to foster and what speech and speakers the company wishes to 
associate with or avoid. 
20. Second, content moderation is often a matter of ensuring online safety. Some 
content posted online unfortunately can be highly dangerous, whether to specific individuals or to 
the public at large. Social media companies regularly enforce their terms of service to remove 
material such as illegal non-consensual intimate imagery (sometimes referred to as “revenge 
pornography”), depictions of child sexual abuse, calls for genocide, efforts to steal people’s 
personal information, attempts to encourage teens to commit suicide, attempts to sell illegal 
weapons and drugs, content that aids counterfeiting, and efforts by foreign adversaries to 
manipulate the American public. Any effort that hamstrings how online services respond to these 
egregious communications threatens the safety of those services, their users, and the public. 
21. Third, content moderation facilitates the organization of content, rendering an 
online service more useful. Imagine if a search engine presented results in a random or purely 
chronological order—instead of prioritizing what is most relevant. Or if an online store presented 
a random assortment of products or listings—instead of those products the user actively sought 
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out. For many digital services, the main utility they offer to users is the editorial and curatorial 
functions of organizing, sorting, and presenting of the vast amount of information available online.  
The Importance of Content Moderation 
22. A daily challenge facing many CCIA members is pursuing these goals—upholding 
their terms in order to protect users—while addressing a massive and ever-changing body of 
content that users generate. Each piece of content involves different circumstances and different 
potential risks, which often requires an individualized judgment by the service regarding whether 
it calls for moderation. Rightly or not, members of the public often associate digital services with 
third-party content that appears on their service. Advertisers also associate digital services with 
content that appears on their site, due to concerns about the indirect impact on the advertisers’ 
brand. The reputational costs of such connections can be permanent. Thus, objectionable content 
that appears on a digital service—even if its presence were compelled by law—may irreparably 
harm the business prospects of a digital service. 
23. Normative judgments about how content is moderated within the bounds of a 
service’s policies frequently involve matters of opinion and values about which people could very 
well disagree. The choice of whether a violent but newsworthy video should be removed, left up, 
or obscured behind an interstitial warning pursuant to a service’s policy on sensitive media is as 
equally expressive as a newspaper’s calls about which stories make the front page, which editorials 
appear in the opinion column, and what is newsworthy, as a general matter. The difference is that 
online service providers are called upon to make moderation decisions on a vast scale for immense 
volumes of content. 
24. For example: 
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a. Facebook is a community of over three billion people, and over one billion “stories” 
(audio or video clips) are shared on its service every day.38 As one would expect, 
that means that Facebook has to remove millions of pieces of content each year to 
ensure that its service is safe and enjoyable for users. In the first quarter of 2021, 
Facebook removed 8.8 million pieces of “bullying and harassment content,” 9.8 
million pieces of “organized hate content,” and 25.2 million pieces of “hate speech 
content.”39 Since the beginning of the pandemic Facebook has removed over 3,000 
accounts, Pages and groups for repeatedly violating its rules against spreading 
COVID-19 and vaccine misinformation and removed more than 20 million pieces 
of content for breaking these rules.40 
b. Over 500 million accounts are active daily on Instagram, where they view and/or 
post photos, stories, and “reels.” To keep the service safe and usable, Instagram 
removed 5.5 million pieces of “bullying and harassment content,” 324,500 pieces 
of “organized hate content,” and 6.3 million pieces of “hate speech content” in the 
first quarter of 2021.41  
c. There are more than 300 billion “pins” or pieces of posted content on Pinterest. 
Because the Pinterest community is not welcoming to pornography,42 between 
 
38 Company Info, Facebook, https://about.facebook.com/company-info/. 
39 Id.; Community Standards Enforcement Report, First Quarter 2021, Facebook, 
https://about.fb.com/news/2021/05/community-standards-enforcement-report-q1-2021/. 
40 Monika Bickert, How We’re Taking Action Against Vaccine Misinformation 
Superspreaders, Facebook (Aug. 18, 2021), https://about.fb.com/news/2021/08/taking-action-
against-vaccine-misinformation-superspreaders/. 
41 Tell your brand story your way with Instagram, Facebook, 
https://www.facebook.com/business/marketing/instagram; Community Standards Enforcement 
Report, First Quarter 2021, Facebook, https://about.fb.com/news/2021/05/community-standards-
enforcement-report-q1-2021/. 
42 Community guidelines, Pinterest, https://policy.pinterest.com/en/community-guidelines. 
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October and December 2020, the service took down over 2.1 million distinct 
images containing adult content, which amounted to nearly 50 million pins 
(meaning that some images were pinned by users multiple times). In addition, 
Pinterest removed over 1.3 million discrete images or 3.4 million pins containing 
spam.43 
d. In the last six months of 2020, Twitter took action against 3.5 million accounts, 
suspended over 1 million accounts, and removed 4.5 million pieces of content. With 
respect to the removed content, the top three categories were (1) “hateful conduct,” 
which includes the promotion of violence against people on the basis of race, 
gender, age, and other protected characteristics (approx. 5,737,500 instances); 
(2) “abuse/harassment” (approx. 5,053,000 instances); and (3) “sensitive media,” 
including graphic violence and adult content (approx. 3,381,000 instances).44  
e. YouTube sees 500 hours of content uploaded to its platform every minute and has 
a community of over 2 billion users.45 In the last three months of 2020 alone, 
YouTube removed just over 2 million channels and over 9 million videos for 
violations of its policies, the majority of which had fewer than ten views each at the 
time of removal due to the use of automated processes for reviewing and removing 
violative content.46 Since February 2020, YouTube has removed more than 1 
 
43 Transparency report, Pinterest, https://policy.pinterest.com/en/transparency-report 
44 Twitter Transparency Report, Rules for Enforcement, Twitter, 
https://transparency.twitter.com/en/reports/rules-enforcement.html#2020-jul-dec. 
45 YouTube for Press, YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/intl/en-GB/about/press/. 
46 YouTube Transparency Report, YouTube Community Guidelines enforcement, 
YouTube, https://transparencyreport.google.com/youtube-policy/removals?hl=en. 
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million videos related to dangerous coronavirus misinformation, like false cures or 
claims of a hoax.47 
25. The sheer number of decisions that online services are forced to make is often 
matched by the degree of difficulty and nuance involved in the hardest judgment calls. For certain 
pieces of content, there is simply no right answer as to whether and how to moderate, and any 
decision holds significant consequences for the service’s online environment, its user community, 
and the public at large. To raise a few examples of such cases: 
a. Facebook generally aims to remove content that advertises marijuana. But for some 
pieces of content, it can be difficult to determine whether the material in question 
actually is advertising marijuana—such as when the product is obscured by 
packaging or resembles other products.48  
b. YouTube generally attempts to remove content that supports Nazi ideology or white 
supremacism. However, its policies on restricting such content are tested by 
material where it is not obvious whether the content is actually supporting Nazism 
or, instead, historical or informative in nature. For those videos, YouTube must 
determine whether ambiguous discussions regarding Nazism or interviews with 
white supremacists serve an educational function or, instead, glorify those 
ideologies.49 
 
47 Neal Mohan, Perspective: Tackling Misinformation on YouTube (Aug. 25, 2021), 
https://blog.youtube/inside-youtube/tackling-misinfo/. 
48 F8 2019 Day 2 keynote and session videos, Facebook, 
https://engineering.fb.com/2019/05/01/ai-research/f8-2019-day-2/. 
49 YouTube’s new policy on Nazi content results in removal of historical and education 
videos (2019), Trust & Safety Foundation, https://www.tsf.foundation/blog/youtube-s-new-
policy-on-nazi-content-results-in-removal-of-historical-and; Michael Grosack, A look at how we 
treat educational, documentary, scientific, and artistic content on YouTube (Sept. 17, 2020), 
https://blog.youtube/inside-youtube/look-how-we-treat-educational-documentary-scientific-and-
artistic-content-youtube/. 
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c. Given my role within the industry, I am aware that companies beyond CCIA’s 
membership frequently face similar problems. For example, Spotify previously 
announced that it would try to harmonize its values with the artists that it promoted. 
In practice, this included moderating or removing the portfolios of artists that 
engaged in reprehensible conduct, such as sexual assault. These judgment calls, 
however, are sensitive in nature, and prompt comparisons to other artists that are 
also accused of or found responsible for misconduct.50  
26. To make reasonable decisions about such content, a service needs flexibility to craft 
policies and rules that reflect their commitment to users and to adapt those policies to the ever-
changing circumstances presented by user content. CCIA’s members have never claimed that they 
will allow anyone to post any content without it being subject to moderation decisions. CCIA’s 
members have always moderated content to some degree. It goes without saying that no service is 
able to anticipate unexpected forms of content and decide how to moderate each instance in 
advance. It is for that very reason that these services develop policies and rules that act as 
guidelines for their future moderation decisions—and within which each service has the ability to 
exercise discretion in specific instances. 
27. The content that CCIA’s members moderate does not exist in a vacuum; it is also 
affected by societal circumstances and/or the service’s own attitudes. Because those circumstances 
and attitudes also evolve over time, adapting to changed circumstances, services may view their 
terms of service differently as they gain experience and encounter new material: 
 
50 Spotify enforces hateful conduct policy, removing artists from its platform for off-
platform behavior (2018), Trust & Safety Foundation, https://www.tsf.foundation/blog/spotify-
enforces-hateful-conduct-policy-removing-artists-from-its-platform. 
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a. Facebook, for example, has placed a greater emphasis in identifying and 
proactively suppressing racist content (such as depictions of blackface) and 
antisemitic content (such as content that denies the Holocaust or encourages the 
idea that Jews control the world), as it encounters more and more examples of that 
kind of content.51  
b. Similarly, Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, and YouTube have increasingly attempted 
to limit material that would encourage eating disorders or other forms of destructive 
self-harm.52  
c. As yet another example, YouTube recently took action to limit the influence of the 
military in Myanmar after the military launched a coup that captured control of the 
government. As a result of the changing circumstances and the military’s violence, 
YouTube prevented five television channels run by the military from conveying 
content via its service.53  
d. Twitter’s “hateful conduct policy” was updated to include “targeted misgendering 
or deadnaming of transgender individuals.” Twitter made that change as part of a 
broader change to its policy on “dehumanizing language,” which was expanded “to 
 
51 Measuring Our Progress Combating Hate Speech, Facebook, 
https://about.fb.com/news/2020/11/measuring-progress-combating-hate-speech/. 
52 Tightening Our Policies and Expanding Resources to Prevent Suicide and Self-Harm, 
Facebook, https://about.fb.com/news/2019/09/tightening-our-policies-and-expanding-resources-
to-prevent-suicide-and-self-harm/; Taking More Steps To Keep The People Who Use Instagram 
Safe, Instagram, https://about.instagram.com/blog/announcements/more-steps-to-keep-instagram-
users-safe; Suicide and Self-harm Policy, Twitter, https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-
policies/glorifying-self-harm; Suicide & self-injury policy, YouTube, 
https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/2802245. 
53 YouTube Bans Myanmar Military Channel as Violence Rises, New York Times (Mar. 5, 
2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/05/business/youtube-myanmar.html; YouTube removes 
five Myanmar TV channels from platform, Reuters (Mar. 4, 2021), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-politics-youtube/youtube-removes-five-myanmar-
tv-channels-from-platform-idUSKBN2AX0BQ. 
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include content that dehumanizes others based on their membership in an 
identifiable group, even when the material does not include a direct target.”54  
28. Furthermore, many digital services are “multi-sided markets,” meaning that their 
business model unites distinct constituencies in transactions. Users, therefore, are not the only 
community whose interests these services must seek to safeguard. For ad-supported, free-to-the-
user services, advertisers constitute another critical constituency. These advertisers are wary of 
what some refer to as “brand damage” should their products be advertised in proximity to 
problematic content. As a result, advertisers work closely with social media companies and other 
digital services to reduce the chance that their advertising dollars are perceived to support 
potentially harmful content or behavior.55 
29. Advertisers are not the only parties who associate expression on members’ websites 
and applications with members. For instance, the Mozilla Foundation has asserted that YouTube 
“is recommending videos with misinformation, violent content, hate speech, and scams.”56 
30. Content moderation is therefore far from static. Instead, it is a dynamic process in 
which the service has to account for its own values and opinions, user preferences, and what is 
 
54 Hateful conduct policy, Twitter, https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/hateful-
conduct-policy; see How Twitter’s Ban on ‘Deadnaming’ Promotes Free Speech, New York 
Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/29/opinion/twitter-deadnaming-ban-free-speech.html; 
Creating new policies together, Twitter, 
https://blog.twitter.com/official/en_us/topics/company/2018/Creating-new-policies-
together.html. 
55 Martinne Geller, Advertisers agree deal with social media on steps to curb harmful 
content, Reuters (Sept. 23, 2021), https://www.reuters.com/article/tech-advertising/advertisers-
agree-deal-with-social-media-on-steps-to-curb-harmful-content-idUSKCN26E1O1; Facebook to 
develop tools for advertisers to tackle harmful content, Reuters (Jan. 29, 2021), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-facebook-advertising/facebook-to-develop-tools-for-
advertisers-to-tackle-harmful-content-idUSKBN29Y1UJ. 
56 Mozilla, Mozilla Investigation: YouTube Algorithm Recommends Videos that Violate the 
Platform’s Very Own Policies (July 7, 2021), https://foundation.mozilla.org/en/blog/mozilla-
investigation-youtube-algorithm-recommends-videos-that-violate-the-platforms-very-own-
policies/. 
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happening in the world. Succeeding at that delicate balancing act requires companies to have the 
freedom to evolve moderation techniques over time, both to best serve the needs of their users and 
to protect the online environment that they are curating. Both the online and real world change 
from second to second, and each company must be able to respond to those changes in real time 
to protect its service and users.  
31. Due to the scale at which the covered online services operate, much of their 
moderation work must be done algorithmically—or at least with the assistance of algorithms or 
automated processes—in order to function.  
32. The capacity to make moderation decisions algorithmically in the first instance is 
vitally important to many services offered by CCIA members. Not only do these tools facilitate 
the moderation of the incalculable volume of content online, but for some of the content that 
requires moderation or removal—such as graphically violent, sexual, or criminal content—time is 
of the essence. An important aspect of the goodwill that many members have built up with their 
users over time is the ability of moderators to respond quickly to halt the spread of dangerous, 
illegal, or otherwise inappropriate content before it becomes widespread. Making certain 
moderation decisions algorithmically in the first instance allows the services to respond to 
objectionable content in a way that preserves the user experience, promotes online safety, and 
helps ensure that the communications that our members’ services disseminate reflect their 
community values. 
The Burdens Posed by H.B. 20 
33. Compliance with H.B. 20’s limitations on upholding terms of service would be 
unduly burdensome at a minimum, and may not be technically feasible at all.  
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34. Millions of Texans, and billions of people worldwide, use CCIA members’ 
services. And Texas users have access to all publicly available content on the websites and 
applications (subject to the settings the users have activated).  
35. H.B. 20 bans “censorship” of “viewpoint.” Yet all expressions contain a viewpoint, 
of some sort, including pro-Taliban extremist content and medical disinformation aimed at the 
public by foreign government propagandists.57 And “censor” is defined to include every 
enforcement tool available to the covered websites and applications: “to block, ban, remove, 
deplatform, demonetize, de-boost, restrict, deny equal access or visibility to, or otherwise 
discriminate against expression.” 
36. This definition even includes the platforms’ own speech, by prohibiting the 
platforms from broadly (and vaguely) “discriminat[ing]” against expression. For instance, when a 
platform appends a warning label or other expression on one piece of expression, but not another, 
H.B. 20 would allow users to sue for the disparate treatment.  
37. Thus, combining the requirements of the two key operative definitions, H.B. 20 
prohibits the exercise of editorial and curatorial discretion in implementing content moderation 
policies on the websites and applications H.B. 20 covers.  
38. Decisions to remove a particular item of content uploaded by a user, to deprioritize 
a piece of content, or to temporarily or permanently remove a user’s ability to upload content to 
the service, serve different purposes within our members’ businesses. These decisions often need 
 
57 Heather Greenfield, Texas Legislators Approve Bill Making It Easier To Sue Companies 
For Policies Protecting Users Online, CCIA (Aug. 30, 2021), 
https://www.ccianet.org/2021/08/texas-legislators-approve-bill-making-it-easier-to-sue-
companies-for-policies-protecting-users-online/; Rachel Pannett, Russia threatens to block 
YouTube after German channels are deleted over coronavirus misinformation, Washington Post 
(Sept. 29, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2021/09/29/russia-ban-youtube-
german-coronavirus/. 
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to strike a balance between limiting the detrimental effects of objectionable content on the services 
and preserving open access.  
39. Having a full panoply of moderation tools available enables CCIA member 
companies to strike an appropriate balance in each situation. H.B. 20’s requirements would remove 
the services’ ability to use those moderation tools and would upset the delicate balance between 
openness and responsibility that makes many members’ services usable and enjoyable by a wide 
variety of users. 
40. H.B. 20 grants millions of Texans—and the Attorney General—the opportunity to 
sue over countless editorial decisions across billions of pieces of content.  
41. With the risk of a lawsuit for any editorial decision—backed up by H.B. 20’s grant 
of authority for trial courts to impose daily punishments for “contempt”—it will be very difficult 
to justify removing or moderating any content at all.  
42. The sheer volume of content on these websites and applications will also make H.B. 
20’s “disclosure” and operational provisions unduly burdensome.  
43. For instance, the requirement for a report detailing every piece of content over 
which a covered member upheld their policies would be voluminous and would ultimately deter 
that member from performing content moderation or otherwise exercising editorial or curatorial 
discretion.  
44. Likewise, the notice requirement that applies whenever a Texas user is “censored” 
(as H.B. 20 defines that term) would likely result in the services sending millions of such notices 
per day. The breadth of the statutory definition of this term would apply to editorial decisions that 
remove clearly unacceptable material.  
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45. If these provisions were to go into effect, they would seriously undermine the safety 
and utility of the members’ services. The risk of liability on the basis of various provisions H.B. 
20 would require many member services to substantially cut back on their moderation efforts, with 
the foreseeable results of (1) leaving offensive and dangerous content accessible to the public via 
the services; (2) making maintenance of family-friendly, curated collections of user-uploaded 
content nearly impossible; and (3) making the services less useful for their intended purposes. 
46. For many services, a substantial proportion of the value provided to users is the 
service’s arrangement of relevant, useful, or entertaining information in a way that provides the 
sort of content and experience that the user is seeking. These ways of organizing information on a 
service can fall afoul of the statute’s definition of “censorship” despite being wholly conventional 
and benign.  
47. The statute’s broad and vague descriptions of what practices are prohibited leave a 
number of questions unanswered, and the provisions that are comprehensible impose practices that 
would severely undermine the services’ value to their users. 
 
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on September 
29, 2021 in Washington D.C. 
         
             Matthew Schruers 
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
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       ) 
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       ) 
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DECLARATION OF NETCHOICE, LLC IN SUPPORT OF  
PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION  
 
I, Carl Szabo, declare as follows: 
1. I am the Vice President and General Counsel of NetChoice, LLC (“NetChoice”). I 
submit this declaration in support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction. I am over 
the age of 18 and am competent to make the statements herein. I have personal knowledge of the 
facts set forth in this declaration and, if called and sworn as a witness, could and would compe-
tently testify to them. 
2. In addition to providing legal counsel to NetChoice, I coordinate NetChoice’s ad-
vocacy before legislative bodies, courts, and government agencies to promote NetChoice’s mis-
sion of advancing free enterprise and free expression on the Internet.  
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3. Plaintiff NetChoice is a national trade association of online businesses that share 
the goal of promoting free speech and free enterprise on the Internet. NetChoice is a 501(c)(6) 
nonprofit organization. As our website explains, NetChoice “works to make the Internet safe for 
free enterprise and free expression” and “engages at the local, state, national, and international 
levels to ensure a bright digital future.”1 In particular, we are dedicated to preserving the Internet 
as a vibrant marketplace for communication, commerce, and the exchange of ideas. When online 
businesses are free to make their own moderation decisions, they create choices for users and 
advertisers alike—for example, Texans looking for a less moderated experience can use social 
media platforms like Parler, Gab, or Rumble; those looking for more family-friendly services can 
find options from several NetChoice members. All in all, we strongly believe in giving users and 
advertisers choices in how they use the Internet. 
4. For over two decades, NetChoice has worked to promote online speech and com-
merce and to increase consumer access and options through the Internet, while minimizing bur-
dens on businesses to help make the Internet more accessible and useful for both businesses and 
consumers. Our members include a broad array of popular online services and platforms, includ-
ing: Airbnb, Alibaba.com, Amazon.com, AOL, DII, DRN, eBay, Etsy, Expedia, Facebook, Flu-
idtruck, Google, HomeAway, Hotels.com, Lime, Nextdoor, Lyft, Oath, OfferUp, Orbitz, PayPal, 
Pinterest, StubHub, TikTok, Travelocity, TravelTech, Trivago, Turo, Twitter, Verisign, VRBO, 
Vigilant Solutions, VSBLTY, Waymo, Wing, and Yahoo!.2 
5. Several of NetChoice’s members are subject to Texas’s new law, House Bill 20 
(the “Bill”), as they meet the statutory definition of a covered “social media platform” under the 
 
1 Home, NetChoice, https://perma.cc/3NPH-KH2T.  
2 About Us, NetChoice, https://perma.cc/4NPV-PLU7.  
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Bill because they: (i) are open to the public (subject to their respective terms and conditions and 
community guidelines); (ii) allow users to create accounts; (iii) enable users to communicate 
with other users for the “primary purpose” (though this requirement is vague) of posting infor-
mation, comments, messages, or images; and (iv) have more than 50 million monthly users in the 
United States of America. Several of these NetChoice members have submitted declarations at-
testing to the irreparable harms they will suffer if the Bill is allowed to go into effect.3 
6. NetChoice has over two decades of experience advocating for online businesses 
and the principles of free speech and free enterprise on the Internet, so we are intimately familiar 
with the business models our members use and rely on to provide services to users and advertis-
ers alike. That experience, combined with the practical applications of the law and declarations 
submitted by our members, leads us to conclude that this Bill, should it take effect, would irrepa-
rably harm our members and their business models by repelling users and advertisers and creat-
ing long-term, adverse impacts when it comes to our members’ reputations.  
7. These negative effects of the Bill are associative and enduring, and thus irrepara-
ble. Once the public associates an online business with harmful or offensive content, it is nearly 
impossible to undo that association. Indeed, what common sense suggests and evidence confirms 
is that users and advertisers prefer not to see harmful or objectionable content online and will 
strongly associate that content with the platform on which they saw it.4 
8. That is because online services, like most businesses, rely on their reputations—
which they have often spent many years diligently cultivating and protecting—to gain and main-
 
3 See, e.g., Veitch Decl. (Sept. 30, 2021); Potts Decl. (Sept. 30, 2021); Esparza Decl. 
(Sept. 29, 2021).  
4 See, e.g., Tiffany Hsu & Eleanor Lutz, More Than 1,000 Companies Boycotted Face-
book. Did it Work?, N.Y. Times (last updated Nov. 17, 2020), https://perma.cc/EL62-NCDP.  
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tain users and advertisers.5 By hosting harmful or objectionable content, as the Bill would force 
them to do, online services would suffer enduring reputational harm. Many long-time users and 
advertisers will likely quit or reduce use of these online services should their websites become 
polluted with offensive content. This content is also likely to repel potential users6 and turn off 
potential advertisers by greatly deteriorating the value and usability of these services.7 And, as 
experience has shown, these deleterious effects would likely lead advertisers—the main source 
of revenue for many online services—to reduce or curtail their spending on advertisements on 
these websites.8 
9. In fact, the World Federation of Advertisers—a leading global trade association 
for advertisers—is adamant that online services must moderate user-generated content to prevent 
exposure to objectionable or offensive content.9 “The issue of harmful content online,” WFA’s 
CEO Stephan Loerke explains, “has become one of the challenges of our generation. As the pri-
mary monetization mechanism of the online ecosystem, advertisers have a critical role to play in 
driving positive change . . . . A safer social media environment will provide huge benefits not 
just for advertisers and society but also to the platforms themselves.” Not only does the Bill im-
pose immediate financial harm to online businesses, it risks permanent, irreparable harm should 
any of those users or advertisers decide never to return to our members’ sites based on their past 
experience or the detrimental feedback they have heard from others. 
 
5 Veitch Decl. (Sept. 30, 2021); Potts Decl. (Sept. 30, 2021). 
6 Gutierrez Decl. (Sept. 27, 2021); Esparza Decl. (Sept. 29, 2021).   
7 Veitch Decl. (Sept. 30, 2021); Potts Decl. (Sept. 30, 2021). 
8 Veitch Decl. (Sept. 30, 2021); Potts Decl. (Sept. 30, 2021). 
9 See, e.g., WFA and Platforms Make Major Progress to Address Harmful Content, 
World Federation of Advertisers (Sept. 23, 2020), https://perma.cc/YC3N-738F.  
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10. Because many online businesses (not just social media platforms, but also online 
exchanges and websites that allow users to post reviews) rely on advertising as a necessary 
mechanism to remain in business, the decisions of advertisers to take their business elsewhere 
have very serious consequences for these businesses, including lost revenue and long-term repu-
tational damage.10 Not only will advertisers pull their ads and funding immediately after the Bill 
takes effect and forces our members to host objectionable content, advertisers will be hesitant to 
return to these businesses in the future. Consider that WFA’s call for advertisers to “driv[e] posi-
tive change” reveals an implicit truth about online services and digital platforms: their advertis-
ing space is valuable only if it is not displayed next to harmful and offensive content that users do 
not want to see and advertisers do not want to be associated with. This Bill, as discussed, makes 
our members more vulnerable to advertiser boycotts, which directly hurts their revenue and repu-
tation. In the long run, this loss of a quintessential monetization mechanism could jeopardize the 
very business model on which so many of these digital services rely. 
11. Being able to moderate, organize, curate, and otherwise prioritize content is criti-
cal to our members—especially search engines, social media platforms, and other digital services 
that retrieve and present information responsive to user requests—so that they can deliver users 
and advertisers the high-quality services they demand.11 As noted above, it is essential for our 
members to be able to develop a brand and customer experience that allows them to avoid expos-
ing their users to objectionable, offensive, harmful, or unlawful content.12 It is also essential that 
our members be able to organize and curate content in a way that is useful to users. For example, 
 
10 Veitch Decl. (Sept. 30, 2021); Potts Decl. (Sept. 30, 2021). 
11 Veitch Decl. (Sept. 30, 2021); Potts Decl. (Sept. 30, 2021); Gutierrez Decl. (Sept. 27, 
2021); Rumenap Decl. (Sept. 29, 2021).  
12 Veitch Decl. (Sept. 30, 2021); Potts Decl. (Sept. 30, 2021); Gutierrez Decl. (Sept. 27, 
2021); Rumenap Decl. (Sept. 29, 2021). 
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an online marketplace that displayed items in purely chronological order (rather than categoriz-
ing them by product type) would be far less helpful in connecting users with the products they 
are looking for. Similarly, a social media platform that is forced to deliver content in purely 
chronological order may cause its users to miss out on more relevant content. This Bill would 
deny our members the ability to organize and display content in ways that best serve the needs of 
their users.13 
12. If the Bill takes effect on December 2, 2021, NetChoice’s mission to protect free 
speech and free enterprise online would be directly and substantially hurt.  
13. NetChoice members would also be harmed by the Bill’s severe restrictions on 
their ability to exercise editorial discretion over their websites and applications (action that is 
protected under the First Amendment) and its provisions exposing our members to myriad poten-
tial private and Attorney General lawsuits if they do not comply with these onerous restrictions. 
14. The Bill will not only harm the private parties whose editorial discretion it re-
stricts, it will also limit user choice and would pollute family-friendly websites with highly of-
fensive and objectionable content and products, greatly reducing the value of the services for 
both users and advertisers.14 Most users do not want to see harmful content like advocacy of 
white supremacy, homophobia or bigoted speech, advocacy of extremism and terrorism, medical 
disinformation like so-called miracle cures for Covid-19, bullying and harassment, and other 
highly objectionable content.15 Advertisers likewise do not want their names and products dis-
 
13 Veitch Decl. (Sept. 30, 2021); Potts Decl. (Sept. 30, 2021); Gutierrez Decl. (Sept. 27, 
2021); Rumenap Decl. (Sept. 29, 2021). 
14 Gutierrez Decl. (Sept. 27, 2021); Rumenap Decl. (Sept. 29, 2021). 
15 Veitch Decl. (Sept. 30, 2021); Potts Decl. (Sept. 30, 2021); Gutierrez Decl. (Sept. 27, 
2021); Rumenap Decl. (Sept. 29, 2021). 
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played alongside such content. Users and advertisers would likely abandon online businesses that 
are no longer permitted to moderate offensive and harmful content. 
15. NetChoice’s members exercise editorial discretion over massive amounts of con-
tent, and 6 months in 2018 alone, Facebook, Google, and Twitter took some action on over 5 bil-
lion accounts or user-submissions—including 3 billion cases of spam, 57 million cases of por-
nography, 17 million cases of content regarding child safety, and 12 million cases of extremism, 
hate speech, and terrorist speech.16 
16. Such an outcome would greatly harm our members by directly and durably un-
dermining their business models. Perhaps more concerning, advertisers and users would associ-
ate this content with our members themselves, creating irreparable damage to our members’ rep-
utations and harming them well into the future. We have already seen this loss of revenue happen 
when advertisers removed millions of dollars’ worth of ads due to the presence of “extremist 
content.”17 NetChoice members moved quickly to rectify the situation, but even in this short in-
stance, NetChoice members lost millions.18 
17. For example, in 2017 Google’s wholly owned subsidiary YouTube lost millions 
of dollars in advertising revenue after a number of major corporations including Walmart, Veri-
zon, Johnson & Johnson, and Pepsi took down their ads after seeing them distributed next to vid-
 
16 See NetChoice Social Media Content Moderation Transparency Report 1-3, 
https://bit.ly/2UzXPct. 
17 See, e.g., Olivia Solon, Google’s Bad Week: YouTube Loses Millions as Advertising 
Row Reaches US, The Guardian (Mar. 25, 2017), https://perma.cc/Y WO5-BXGB; Kim Lyons, 
Coca- Cola, Microsoft, Starbucks, Target, Unilever, Verizon. All the Companies Pulling Ads 
from Facebook, The Verge (Jul. 2, 2020), https://perma.cc/LTC2-HKFW. 
18 Id.  
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eos containing extremist content and hate speech.19 Similarly, in 2020 Facebook saw a nearly 
identical response as some of the largest businesses in the world including Coca-Cola, Microsoft, 
Starbucks, Target, Hershey, Honda, and Unilever all pulled their ads and boycotted Facebook 
citing concerns of third parties’ use of the website to spread hate speech and misinformation.20  
18. While the short-term loss of revenue resulting from these examples was already 
substantial, it pales in comparison to the long-term reputational loss this Bill will inflict on 
YouTube and Facebook’s overall brand—not to mention the fact that such third-party content 
runs counter to these companies’ policies and standards. Once harmful or offensive content is 
associated with a business, it is nearly impossible to undo the harm. The content will forever be 
intertwined with a user’s or advertiser’s perception of the underlying business. 
19. The Bill prohibits the private exercise of editorial discretion over private websites 
and applications. The plain sweep of the law reaches almost all expression and every editorial 
tool NetChoice’s members have at their disposal.21 The vagueness in the operative provisions 
will ensure that NetChoice’s members are chilled from exercising their editorial discretion over 
whatever remaining expression the statute purports not to reach.22 
20. Under the Bill, NetChoice members will have to host content that they would oth-
erwise remove or restrict because it violates their editorial policies (like their terms of service 
and community guidelines), including the harmful and objectionable forms of content referenced 
above. Under the Bill, these online services would be significantly constrained in their ability to 
 
19 Olivia Solon, Google’s Bad Week: YouTube Loses Millions as Advertising Row Reach-
es US, The Guardian (Mar. 25, 2017), https://perma.cc/Y W5-BXGB. 
20 Kim Lyons, Coca- Cola, Microsoft, Starbucks, Target, Unilever, Verizon. All the Com-
panies Pulling Ads from Facebook, The Verge (Jul. 2, 2020), https://perma.cc/LTC2-HKFW.  
21 Veitch Decl. (Sept. 30, 2021); Potts Decl. (Sept. 30, 2021). 
22 Complaint, NetChoice v. Paxton, No. 1:21-cv-00840-RP (W.D. Tex. Austin Div.).  
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remove harmful content that offends their users and advertisers. As a result, NetChoice members 
would be forced to host harmful and offensive content including but not limited to: racial epi-
thets;23 Nazi antisemitism;24 aggressive homophobia and transphobia;25 medical misinformation 
and harmful at-home “remedies;26 dangerous conspiracy theories;27 and cyberbullying.28 
21. They will also be forced to host certain speakers as long as a single user in Texas 
wants to view that speaker’s content. For instance, Neo-Nazi websites like Stormfront would be 
privileged from NetChoice’s members’ private editorial discretion, regardless of how patently 
offensive or even dangerous Stormfront’s content may be.  
22. Likewise, the Taliban would be protected from commonsense editorial discretion 
as long as one of millions of Texas users sues for private “censorship” against the Taliban.29  
23. The potential for reputational harm is staggering. And the potential to repel users 
and advertisers is even worse: Trust between NetChoice members and their users and advertisers 
would evaporate and be difficult to regain—and understandably so. Society, online and off, has 
 
23 See Cheyenne MacDonald, These Abhorrent Images From Parler Show Why Apple 
Upheld its Ban, Input (Mar. 10, 2021), https://perma.cc/H7GV-ZFZQ.  
24 Nathan Grayson, Valve Removes Nazi Steam Profiles After German Complaints, Ko-
taku (Dec. 11, 2019), https://perma.cc/6L8E-E7NB; Brianna Sacks, Reddit Is Removing Nazi 
And Alt-Right Groups As Part Of A New Policy And Some Users Are Confused, BuzzFeed News 
(Oct. 25, 2017), https://perma.cc/W7NL-CKGN. 
25 See Removing Harassing Subreddits, Reddit (Jun. 10, 2015), https://perma.cc/65FE-
TPyC.  
26 See Beth Mole, Facebook Bans Health and Conspiracy Site Natural News [Updated], 
ARS Technica (Jun. 10, 2019), https://perma.cc/2875-RCYS.  
27 See Marianna Spring, The Casualties of This Year's Viral Conspiracy Theories, BBC 
News (Dec. 26, 2020), https://perma.cc/XAD2-3528.  
28 Alexandria Ingham, 7 Real Life Cyberbullying Horror Stories, Family Orbit Blog 
(Nov. 11, 2018), https://perma.cc/52DW-B3JN.  
29 Taliban slam Facebook for curbing Afghanistan’s freedom of speech after social media 
ban, India Today (August 18, 2021), https://bit.ly/3zgWNl4.  
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10 
an obligation to protect the most vulnerable among us and to create inclusive services that attract 
and retain users of all backgrounds.30  
24. NetChoice’s members would incur substantial, unrecoverable costs in complying 
with the Bill’s overly burdensome requirements. These costs could not be recouped if Plaintiffs’ 
challenge to the Bill is ultimately successful on the merits. 
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America, pursu-
ant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, that the foregoing to be true and correct to the best of my knowledge. 
Executed on this September 30, 2021 in Washington, DC.  
                                                                     ________________________ 
                                                                    Carl Szabo 
                                                                      
 
30 Gutierrez Decl. (Sept. 27, 2021); Rumenap Decl. (Sept. 29, 2021). 
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 
AUSTIN DIVISION 
 
NETCHOICE, LLC d/b/a NetChoice,  ) 
a 501(c)(6) District of Columbia organization, ) 
       ) 
   and    ) 
       ) 
COMPUTER & COMMUNICATIONS  ) 
INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION d/b/a CCIA, a  ) 
501(c)(6) non-stock Virginia Corporation,  ) Civil Action No. 1:21-cv-00840-RP 
      ) 
Plaintiffs,     ) 
       )  
 v.      ) 
       ) 
KEN PAXTON, in his official capacity as  ) 
Attorney General of Texas    ) 
       ) 
Defendant.     )  
_________________________________________ ) 
Exhibit C –  
YouTube’s 
Declaration 
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IN  THE  UNITED  STATES  DISTRICT  COURT  
FOR  THE  WESTERN  DISTRICT  OF  TEXAS  
AUSTIN  DIVISION  
  
DECLARATION  OF  YOUTUBE  IN  SUPPORT  OF  PLAINTIFFS’  
MOTION  FOR  PRELIMINARY  INJUNCTION  
I,  Alexandra  N.  Veitch,  declare  as  follows:  
  
1. I  am  the  Director  of  Public  Policy  for  the  Americas  at  YouTube.  As  part  of  my  
role,  I  lead  a  team  that  advises  the  company  on  public  policy  issues  around  online,  
user-generated  content.  My  team  advises  on  YouTube’s  content  moderation  policies  and  
practices,  identifies  when  changes  to  our  policies  or  their  application  are  required  in  response  to  
new  challenges,  and  assesses  policy  proposals  and  legislation,  such  as  Texas’s  H.B.  20,  that  
would  affect  YouTube’s  ability  to  moderate  content.   
2. The  statements  contained  in  this  declaration  are  made  upon  my  personal  
knowledge.  I  am  over  the  age  of  18  and  am  competent  to  make  the  statements  herein.  I  make  this  
Declaration  in  Support  of  Plaintiffs’  Motion  for  Preliminary  Injunction  in  the  above-captioned  
matter.  If  called  as  a  witness,  I  could  and  would  testify  under  oath  as  follows.  
NETCHOICE,  LLC,  d/b/a  NETCHOICE,  a  
501(c)(6)  District  of  Columbia  organization;  
and  COMPUTER  &  COMMUNICATIONS  
INDUSTRY  ASSOCIATION  d/b/a  CCIA,  a  
501(c)(6)  non-stock  Virginia  corporation,  
  




KEN  PAXTON,  in  his  official  capacity  as  
Attorney  General  of  Texas,   
  







Civ.  Action  No.  21-cv-840  
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3. YouTube  is  an  online  platform  that  allows  users  to  create,  upload,  and  share  
videos  with  others  around  the  world.  YouTube  strives  to  be  a  community  that  fosters  
self-expression  on  an  array  of  topics  as  diverse  as  its  user  base,  and  to  nurture  a  thriving  creative  
and  informational  ecosystem,  as  well  as  an  engine  of  economic  opportunity.  Over  two  billion  
logged-in  users  worldwide  visit  each  month,  and  over  500  hours  of  content  are  uploaded  every  
minute  by  an  extraordinarily  diverse  community  of  creators,  who  span  over  100  countries  and  80  
languages.  On  a  daily  basis,  users  watch  over  a  billion  hours  of  video  on  YouTube.   
4. YouTube  is  a  part  of  Google  LLC,  a  member  of  NetChoice  and  CCIA.  YouTube  
does  business  in  Texas  and  many  of  its  users  are  located  in  Texas.  Texas  users  have  access  
generally  to  all  content  on  YouTube  that  is  available  in  the  United  States  and  worldwide.   
Responsibility  at  YouTube  
5. YouTube  believes  that  the  Internet  is  a  force  for  creativity,  learning,  and  access  to  
information.  Supporting  the  free  flow  of  ideas  is  at  the  heart  of  YouTube’s  mission.  We  believe  
that  the  world  is  a  better  place  when  we  listen,  share,  and  build  community  through  our  stories.  
We  strive  to  make  YouTube  as  open  as  possible:  to  empower  users  to  access,  create,  and  share  
information.  We  believe  that  openness  brings  opportunity,  community,  and  learning,  and  enables  
diverse  and  authentic  voices  to  break  through.   
6. Yet  an  open  platform  means  challenges,  and  it  demands  accountability  to  connect  
people  with  quality  information.  When  you  create  a  place  designed  to  welcome  many  different  
voices,  some  will  inevitably  cross  the  line.  Bad  actors  will  try  to  exploit  platforms  for  their  own  
personal  gain,  even  as  we  invest  in  the  systems  to  stop  and  deter  them.  Harmful  content  on  our  
platform  makes  YouTube  less  open,  not  more,  by  creating  a  space  where  creators  and  users  may 
2   
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not  feel  safe  to  share.  We  believe  that,  in  order  to  have  and  protect  openness,  you  must  have  
responsibility.  A  commitment  to  openness  is  not  easy.  It  sometimes  means  leaving  up  content  
that  is  outside  the  mainstream,  controversial,  or  even  offensive.  But  YouTube  believes  that  
hearing  a  broad  range  of  perspectives  ultimately  makes  us  a  stronger  and  more  informed  society,  
even  if  we  disagree  with  some  of  those  views.  YouTube  seeks  to  strike  the  right  balance  between  
fostering  freedom  of  expression  and  decreasing  the  likelihood  that  users  will  encounter  harmful  
content  on  our  platform.   
7. These  beliefs  and  values  drive  the  decisions  we’ve  made  in  building  YouTube,  
and  the  editorial  judgements  we’ve  made  in  crafting  the  content  moderation  tools  and  policies  
that  protect  our  platform.  We  want  YouTube  to  live  up  to  the  ideals  of  these  values–despite  
challenges,  complexities,  and  emerging  threats.  We  work  to  maintain  our  community  as  a  
positive,  open,  and  useful  space  on  the  Internet.  Our  balanced  approach  to  content  moderation,  
described  below,  represents  these  values.  While  important  work  remains  to  be  done,  this  
approach  also  represents  years  of  ongoing  conversations  amongst  YouTube  and  its  users,  
creators,  and  advertisers,  of  the  right  balance  for  our  products  and  businesses.  
8. Responsibility  is  YouTube’s  number  one  priority.  Indeed,  our  unique  business  
model  only  works  when  our  viewers,  creators,  and  advertisers  all  have  confidence  that  we  are  
living  up  to  our  responsibility  as  a  business.  That  responsibility  has  been  critical  to  YouTube’s  
success  and  essential  to  our  continued  growth,  so  we’ve  invested  heavily  in  hiring  people  and  
developing  products,  technology,  and  systems  to  apply  our  editorial  discretion  at  scale.  
YouTube’s  Approach  to  Responsibility  and  Content  Moderation   
3   
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9. YouTube  takes  a  multi-faceted  and  nuanced  approach  to  exercising  its  discretion  
in  setting  its  content-moderation  policies,  working  to  distinguish  those  posts  that  are  truly  
problematic,  those  that  are  borderline,  and  those  that  contribute  positively  to  the  YouTube  
community.  To  that  end,  we  have  a  diverse  set  of  tools  to  help  us  enforce  our  content-moderation  
policies,  including:  age-gating,  removing  videos  and  comments,  appending  warnings,  and  
suspending  and/or  terminating  accounts.  We  also  have  other  tools  to  help  us  provide  authoritative  
information  on  our  platform  -  such  as  the  use  of  information  panels.  And  we  further  limit  when  
YouTube  makes  recommendations  of  borderline  content  to  users.  Because  removing  content  is  
only  part  of  the  discussion,  YouTube  has  chosen  to  develop  and  invest  in  this  diverse  set  of  tools  
that  are  essential  in  balancing  free  expression  and  responsibility  on  our  platform.  Simply  put,  
these  tools  give  us  broader  options  than  simply  removing  (or  not  removing)  content  from  our  
platform.   
10. Yet  H.B.  20  would  eliminate  much  of  our  ability  to  make  these  kinds  of  choices  in  
setting  our  policies  and  would  subject  YouTube  and  its  community  to  serious  harm  by  frustrating  
our  ongoing  efforts  to  make  YouTube  a  far  more  accessible  and  welcoming  place.   
11. YouTube  has  always  had  policies  that  govern  how  people  may  use  the  service,  
including  restrictions  on  the  types  of  content  that  they  may  post.  These  policies  are  designed  and  
regularly  updated  to  make  YouTube  a  safer  and  more  enjoyable  place  for  users  and  creators,  and  
reflect  years  of  experience,  investment,  and  an  ongoing  conversation  between  YouTube  and  its  
users.  YouTube’s  approach  has  four  pillars,  set  forth  below.  
4   
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12. First,  we  remove  content  that  violates  our  Community  Guidelines ,  a  series  of  
clear,  publicly-facing  policies  governing  what  is  allowed  and  not  allowed  on  our  platform.  We   1
work  closely  with  outside  experts  to  help  us  craft  these  policies  (and  their  enforcement),  
primarily  focused  on  preventing  real-world  harms.  The  Community  Guidelines  prohibit  a  variety  
of  harmful,  offensive,  and  unlawful  material,  such  as  hate  speech,  pornography,  terrorist  
incitement,  false  propaganda  spread  by  hostile  foreign  governments,  promotion  of  fraudulent  
schemes,  spam,  egregious  violations  of  personal  privacy  like  revenge  pornography,  violations  of  
intellectual  property  rights,  bullying  and  harassment,  conspiracy  theories,  and  dangerous  
computer  viruses.  A  full  list  of  YouTube’s  Community  Guidelines  is  available  at:  
https://bit.ly/3CbToFY .   
13. We  employ  an  array  of  remedial  actions  when  enforcing  our  policies,  ranging  
from  demonetization  (i.e.,  removing  a  creator’s  ability  to  earn  advertising  revenue)  and  
warnings,  to  service-usage  penalties  such  as  temporary  suspensions  of  uploading  rights  and  
permanent  termination  of  accounts.  When  an  account  uploads  content  that  violates  the  
Community  Guidelines,  the  content  is  removed  and  the  account  generally  receives  a  warning.  
Subsequent  violative  content  can  result  in  a  “strike,”  which  temporarily  suspends  the  account’s  
ability  to  upload  content.  Generally,  three  strikes  within  90  days  leads  to  the  account’s  
termination  and  deletion  of  all  content  uploaded  from  the  account.  In  the  case  of  severe  abuse  
(such  as  predatory  behavior,  spam,  or  pornography),  YouTube  will  immediately  terminate  
accounts  to  protect  the  YouTube  community.   
1  We  communicate  our  practices  to  all  users  through  YouTube’s  Community  Guidelines,   
which  are  incorporated  into  our  Terms  of  Service.  A  user  must  agree  to  both  the  Terms  and  the  
Community  Guidelines  in  order  to  create  an  account  and  upload  materials  to  YouTube.   
5   
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14. Second,  we  reduce  the  spread  of  harmful  misinformation  and  content  that  
brushes  up  against  our  policy  lines .  We  refer  to  content  that  comes  close  to  violating  our  
Community  Guidelines  (but  does  not)  as  “borderline  content”.  Borderline  content  is  just  a  
fraction  of  1%  of  what  is  watched  on  YouTube  in  the  United  States,  and  examples  include  videos  
promoting  a  phony  miracle  cure  for  a  serious  illness  or  conspiracy  theory  videos  (e.g.,  “the  moon  
landing  was  faked”).  
15. Rather  than  remove  such  content  outright,  we’ve  chosen  to  take  steps  to  reduce  
the  spread  of  such  content  using  a  variety  of  methods.  Because  such  borderline  content  may  be  
disturbing  or  otherwise  inappropriate  for  some  viewers,  YouTube  has  chosen  to  take  action  
(using  algorithms)  to  reduce  its  availability,  including  updating  YouTube’s  recommendations  
system,  and  disabling  features  like  sharing,  commenting,  and  liking  for  the  borderline  content.  
We  set  a  high  bar  for  what  videos  we  display  prominently  in  our  recommendations  on  the  
YouTube  homepage  or  through  the  “Up  next”  panel.   
  
16. Third,  we  raise  authoritative  and  trusted  content.  For  subjects  such  as  news,  
science,  and  historical  events,  we  believe  that  accuracy  and  authoritativeness  are  key  and  the 
quality  of  information  and  context  matter  most  (as  compared  to  other  topics  such  as  music  or  
entertainment,  where  we  look  to  relevance,  newness,  and  popularity).  Here,  content  moderation  
can  include  affirmatively  providing  users  with  information  to  help  them  make  choices  about  
whether  or  not  to  interact  with  certain  kinds  of  content.  It  is  sometimes  helpful  to  provide  
viewers  with  additional  context  about  the  content  they  are  watching.   
● Information  Panels.  We  display  a  variety  of  information  panels  that  provide  users  with  
context  on  content  relating  to  topics  and  news  prone  to  misinformation,  as  well  as  context  
6   
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about  who  submitted  the  content.  One  example  is  an  information  panel  displayed  on  
videos  from  a  channel  owned  by  a  news  publisher  that  is  funded  by  a  government.   2
Another  example  is  National  Suicide  Prevention  Hotline  information  that  we  display  in  
response  to  search  queries  for  terms  related  to  suicide.  Information  panels,  across  all  
types,  have  been  collectively  shown  billions  of  times.  The  COVID-19  information  panels  
alone  have  been  shown  over  400  billion  times.   
● Breaking  News.  Similarly,  after  a  breaking  news  event,  it  takes  time  to  verify,  produce,  
and  publish  high-quality  videos.  Journalists  often  write  articles  first  to  break  the  news  
rather  than  produce  videos.  So  YouTube  has  chosen  to  prioritize  these  articles  and  
provides  a  short  preview  of  news  articles  in  search  results  on  YouTube  that  link  to  the  full  
article  during  the  initial  hours  of  a  major  news  event.  
17. Fourth,  we  reward  trusted,  eligible  creators  by  setting  a  higher  bar  for  
ads/monetization .  Users  must  meet  additional  eligibility  requirements  for  the  privilege  of  3
earning  advertising  revenue  (“monetization”)  on  videos  they  upload.  They  must  be  eligible  for,  
and  join,  the  YouTube  Partner  Program  (“YTPP”)  and  follow  YTPP  guidelines.  Just  over  2   4
million  users  worldwide,  out  of  the  2  billion  monthly  users  generally,  are  part  of  the  YTPP  and  
monetize  their  videos.  Such  users  and  their  monetized  videos  also  must  meet  more  restrictive  
criteria,  including  the  Ad-friendly  Content  Guidelines,  because  advertisers  typically  do  not  want  
to  be  associated  with  controversial  or  sensitive  content  on  YouTube.  Violations  of  the  guidelines   5
may  result  in  a  range  of  actions,  such  as  (1)  ads  being  disabled  on  a  particular  video,  (2)  
2  https://bit.ly/3fpnHzu .   
3  https://www.youtube.com/howyoutubeworks/policies/monetization-policies/     
4  https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/72851?hl=en&ref_topic=9153826     
5  https://bit.ly/3ojt7B9 .    
7   
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suspending  or  permanently  disabling  a  user’s  eligibility  to  monetize  ads,  (3)  or,  in  exceptional  
circumstances,  suspending  or  disabling  a  user’s  account  altogether  to  protect  the  integrity  of  the  
platform  or  protect  our  users  from  harm.  
18. Scale.  In  Q2  2021  alone,  YouTube  removed  over  4  million  channels  (or  accounts),  
over  6  million  videos,  and  over  1  billion  comments,  for  violations  of  YouTube’s  Community  
Guidelines  alone.  In  Q2  2021,  29.9%  of  the  videos  removed  were  due  to  child  safety  issues.   6
55%  of  removed  comments  were  due  to  spam.  Further  statistics  (including  others  discussed  in   7
this  declaration)  may  be  found  in  the  YouTube  Community  Guidelines  enforcement  report,  
updated  quarterly.    8
19. H.B.  20  significantly  limits  these  ongoing  efforts  to  prevent  harm  to  our  users  and  
to  make  YouTube  an  accessible  and  welcoming  place.   
The  Evolution  of  YouTube’s  Content  Moderation  
20. YouTube  has  always  had  rules  of  what  speech  we  permit  on  the  platform,  and  we  
have  never  claimed  that  YouTube  would  host  all  user-generated  content.  YouTube  has  never  
allowed  pornography,  incitement  to  violence,  or  content  that  would  harm  children,  for  example.  
21. The  harms  of  user-generated  content  are  ever-evolving  and  often  unpredictable,  
and  YouTube’s  content  moderation  policies  have  necessarily  had  to  evolve  to  address  them.  Each  
of  our  policies  is  carefully  thought  through  (so  they  are  consistent,  well-informed,  and  can  be  
applied  to  content  from  around  the  world),  and  often  developed  in  partnership  with  a  wide  range  
6  Of  those  videos,  more  than  30,000  contained  misinformation  about  the  COVID-19   
vaccine.  This  was  part  of  YouTube’s  larger  effort  to  remove  medical  misinformation  about  the  
virus,  which  resulted  in  the  removal  of  over  1,000,000  videos  related  to  dangerous  or  misleading  
COVID-19  information  since  February  2020.   
7  YouTube  uses  automated  systems  to  identify  comments  that  are  likely  spam.   
8  https://bit.ly/2VhAsVG .   
8   
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of  external  industry  and  policy  experts.  We  revise  them  regularly  to  account  for  new  and  
different  content  or  behavior  that  YouTube  deems  unacceptable,  unsafe,  or  unwelcome  on  its  
service.  YouTube  has  also  invested  significantly  in  being  able  to  detect  and  respond  quickly  to  
emerging  harms.  YouTube’s  Intelligence  Desk,  an  internal  team,  monitors  news,  social  media,  
and  user  reports  to  detect  these  new  trends—such  as  the  unpredictable  viral  ‘dares’  that  risk  
significant  physical  harm  by,  for  instance,  encouraging  viewers  to  ingest  Tide  Pods—so  as  to  
address  them  before  they  become  a  larger  issue.  YouTube  has  over  100  people  working  to  
develop  new  content-moderation  policies  and  improve  existing  ones.   
22. This  approach  and  investment  has  given  YouTube  flexibility  to  build  and  maintain 
responsible  practices  to  handle  legal  but  potentially  harmful  speech.  In  2020,  for  instance,  
YouTube  updated  its  policies  related  to  medical  misinformation  alone  more  than  ten  times,  which  
is  in  line  with  historical  trends.  In  2019,  YouTube  made  over  30  updates  to  its  content  
moderation  policies  generally—on  average,  once  every  12  days.  We  saw  a  similar  pace  in  2018. 
And  when  necessary,  YouTube  is  able  to  react  quickly  to  promote  the  safety  of  its  users  in  
changing  and  emerging  contexts.  For  example,  when  mobile  phone  towers  in  the  U.K.  were  set  
on  fire  after  a  conspiracy  theory  video  blamed  COVID-19  on  5G  wireless  networks,  we  updated  
our  Community  Guidelines  in  a  single  day  to  ban  and  remove  that  harmful  content.   
23. YouTube’s  judgments  evolve  over  time  as  social  and  cultural  conditions  change  or  
unforeseen  threats  and  challenges  arise.  For  instance,  after  a  recent  violent  military  coup  in  
Myanmar,  YouTube  took  action  against  five  existing  YouTube  channels  run  by  the  Myanmar  
military,  terminating  the  channels  to  prevent  the  military  from  promoting  political  propaganda.     9
9  https://nyti.ms/3xoq0IW .    
9   
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Algorithms  and  Machine  Learning  
24. YouTube’s  engineers  have  designed  and  built  sophisticated  software  systems  
using  machine  learning—a  type  of  algorithm—to  moderate  content  in  two  key  ways:  1)  to  
proactively  identify  and  flag  potentially  harmful  content  uploaded  to  the  site,  and  2)  to  
automatically  remove  content  that  is  identical  or  substantially  similar  to  violative  content  that  
was  previously  removed.  Machine  learning  is  the  product  of  human  decision-making  and  is  used  
to  implement  the  standards  set  in  our  Community  Guidelines,  thereby  reflecting  YouTube’s  
editorial  judgments.  Our  engineers  design  these  systems  to  identify  certain  types  of  content.  We  
then  use  data  inputs  (reflecting  the  judgment  of  human  reviewers)  to  train  these  machine  learning  
systems  to  identify  patterns  in  content—both  the  rich  media  content  in  videos,  as  well  as  textual  
content  like  metadata  and  comments—so  that  our  systems  can  make  predictions  and  find  new  
examples  to  match  the  identified  types  of  content.  Machine  learning  is  well-suited  to  detecting  
patterns,  which  helps  us  to  identify  new  content  similar  to  that  we  have  already  removed,  even  
before  it  is  ever  viewed.  We  also  use  hashes  (or  “digital  fingerprints”)  to  automatically  identify  
copies  of  known  violative  content  before  they  are  ever  made  available  for  viewing.  These   10
systems  automatically  remove  content  only  where  there  is  high  confidence  of  a  policy  
violation— e.g. ,  spam—and  flag  the  rest  for  human  review.  Algorithmic  detection  identifies  the  
vast  majority  of  content  deemed  to  violate  the  Community  Guidelines.   
25. Machine  learning  is  critical  to  implementing  all  aspects  of  YouTube’s  approach  to  
content  moderation  and  keeping  our  users  safe.  YouTube  relies  heavily  on  technology  and  
algorithms  to  moderate  content  and  cannot  feasibly  do  otherwise,  since  over  500  hours  of  video  
10  In  Q1  2021,  27.8%  of  removed  videos  were  taken  down  before  a  single  view.  A  further   
39%  of  removed  videos  had  between  1  and  10  views.  https://bit.ly/3fpoLmY  
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are  uploaded  to  YouTube  every  single  minute  of  every  day.  At  this  massive  scale,  it  would  be  
virtually  impossible  to  remove  content  that  violates  our  Community  Guidelines  without  the  use  
of  algorithmic  tools,  even  with  tens  of  thousands  of  reviewers  watching  newly  uploaded  videos  
24  hours  a  day,  7  days  a  week.  Due  to  large  multi-year  investments  in  machine  learning  
algorithms,  since  2017  we  have  seen  a  70%  drop  in  the  quarterly  estimate  of  the  number  of  views  
for  video  deemed  violate  to  our  policies  (known  as  the  violative  view  rate,  “VVR”).    11
26. The  vast  majority  of  Community  Guidelines  violations  were  flagged  by  
algorithms.  In  Q2  2021,  YouTube  removed  6,278,771  videos  that  violated  the  Community  
Guidelines.  The  vast  majority—5,927,201,  or  94%  of  the  total  removals—were  automatically  
flagged  for  moderation  by  YouTube’s  algorithms.  About  5%—351,570  videos—were  removed  
based  on  initial  flags  by  a  user  or  other  human.  This  removal  system  is  highly  efficient:  the  
majority  of  removed  videos  were  removed  before  accumulating  more  than  10  views.  Similarly  in  
Q2  2021,  YouTube  also  removed  over  1  billion  comments,  99.5%  of  which  were  flagged  for  
moderation  by  YouTube’s  automated  systems.   
27. Our  machine  learning  and  human  reviewers  work  hand  in  hand:  machine  learning  
is  effective  for  scale  and  volume,  whereas  human  reviewers  can  evaluate  context  for  more  
nuanced  enforcement  of  our  policies.  Once  our  machine  learning  systems  flag  a  potentially  
violative  video  without  high  confidence  of  a  policy  violation,  human  reviewers  assess  whether  
the  content  does  indeed  violate  our  policies,  and  remove  those  that  do.  In  making  those  judgment  
calls,  the  reviewers  seek  to  protect  content  that  has  an  educational,  documentary,  scientific,  or  
artistic  purpose,  keeping  such  videos  on  the  platform.  These  human  decisions  and  judgments  are  
11  See  https://bit.ly/38noixm .     
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in  turn  used  as  data  inputs  to  improve  the  accuracy  of  our  automated  detection  systems  so  that  
we  are  constantly  updating  and  improving  the  system’s  ability  to  identify  potentially  violative  
content.  Using  that  human  review,  our  machine  learning  systems  can  automatically  remove  
re-uploads  of  content  that  has  already  been  reviewed  and  determined  to  violate  our  policies.  In  
addition,  when  we  introduce  a  new  policy  or  alter  an  existing  one,  it  takes  our  systems  time  to  
improve  detection  rates  and  begin  accurately  detecting  violative  content  at  scale.  Our  
enforcement  of  new  policies  improves  over  time.   
Further  Examples  of  Our  Values  Embodied  in  YouTube’s  Content  Moderation  Processes.   
28. During  summer  2020,  YouTube  faced  a  dilemma  when  confronting  the  tension  
that  arises  between  1)  accuracy  when  enforcing  content  policies  and  2)  the  need  to  limit  
potentially  harmful  content  accessible  on  the  site.  In  response  to  COVID-19  lockdowns  
worldwide,  YouTube  took  steps  to  protect  the  health  and  safety  of  our  extended  workforce  and  
reduced  in-office  staffing.  As  a  result  of  reduced  human  review  capacity,  YouTube  had  to  choose  
between  limiting  enforcement  while  maintaining  a  high  degree  of  accuracy,  or  relying  on  
automated  systems  and  algorithms  to  cast  a  wider  net  to  remove  potentially  harmful  content  
quickly  but  with  less  accuracy.  Because  of  YouTube’s  belief  that  responsibility  is  critical,  
YouTube  chose  the  latter,  despite  the  risks  that  automation  would  lead  to  over-enforcement—in  
other  words,  removing  more  content  that  may  not  violate  our  policies  for  the  sake  of  removing  
more  violative  content  overall.   
29. For  certain  sensitive  high-risk  policy  areas,  such  as  violent  extremism  and  child  
safety,  YouTube  chooses  to  accept  a  lower  level  of  accuracy  to  remove  as  many  pieces  of  
violative  content  as  possible  (again,  to  protect  the  health  and  safety  of  our  extended  workforce  
12   
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and  reduced  in-office  staffing).  This  also  means  that,  in  these  areas  specifically,  a  higher  amount  
of  non-violative  content  was  removed.  YouTube’s  decision  to  over-enforce  in  these  policy  
areas—out  of  an  abundance  of  caution—has  led  to  a  more  than  3x  increase  in  removals  of  
content  that  our  systems  suspected  was  tied  to  violent  extremism  or  potentially  harmful  to  
children.  These  include  dares,  challenges,  or  other  posted  content  that  may  endanger  minors.  
Moreover,  YouTube  will  immediately  suspend  users  for  egregious  violations  (rather  than  
allowing  a  user  multiple  ‘strikes’).   
30. EDSA.  Because  YouTube  values  creativity  and  learning,  our  content  policies  have  
an  exception  for  videos  that  would  otherwise  be  in  violation  if  there  is  a  compelling  educational,  
documentary,  scientific,  or  artistic  reason  that  is  apparent  in  the  content  or  context  of  the  video.  
YouTube  refers  to  this  exception  as  “EDSA,”  which  is  a  critical  way  to  make  sure  that  important  
speech  remains  on  YouTube,  while  simultaneously  protecting  the  wider  YouTube  ecosystem  
from  harmful  content.  These  decisions  depend  on  a  variety  of  factors  that  depend  on  context   12
and  require  nuanced  judgments,  and  the  bar  varies  by  video  and  policy  category.  For  example,  
hate  speech  and  encouragement  of  violence  violate  our  policies  but  a  documentary  about  WWII  
that  features  speeches  from  Nazi  leaders  may  be  allowed  if  the  documentary  provides  historical  
context  and  does  not  aim  to  support  the  despicable  views  promoted  by  the  Nazis.  There  are  also  
certain  types  of  content  where  we  don't  allow  an  EDSA  exception  under  any  circumstances  
because  of  the  sensitivity  and  egregiously  harmful  nature  of  the  content,  or  when  it  violates  the  
law.  For  example,  content  that  endangers  children  or  any  content  with  footage  of  deadly  violence  
filmed  by  the  perpetrator  is  not  allowed  on  YouTube  regardless  of  the  context.   
12  https://bit.ly/2VhM7DW   
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Transparency  
31. Given  YouTube’s  scale,  we  sometimes  make  mistakes,  which  is  why  creators  can  
appeal  video  removal  decisions.  YouTube  generally  notifies  creators  when  their  video  is  
removed,  and  we  provide  a  link  with  instructions  on  how  to  appeal  the  removal  decision.  If  a  
creator  chooses  to  submit  an  appeal,  the  video  goes  to  human  review,  and  the  decision  is  upheld,  
reversed,  or  modified  (modification  leads  to  reinstatement  of  the  video  but  with  restricted  
access).  We  provide  transparency  about  our  appeals  process.  As  reported  in  our  most  recent  
Transparency  Report,  in  Q2  2021,  creators  appealed  approximately  217,446  videos,  or  3.5%  of  
all  videos  removed.  Of  those,  more  than  52,696  were  reinstated.  
The  Burdens  Posed  by  H.B.  20   
32. I  understand  that  on  September  9,  2021,  the  State  of  Texas  enacted  H.B.  20,  
which  will  go  into  effect  on  December  2,  2021.   
33. The  restrictions  of  H.B.  20  would  fundamentally  burden  and  undermine  
YouTube’s  ability  to  operate  responsibly  and  enforce  the  content-moderation  policies  described  
above.  The  statute  has  a  broad  definition  of  “censorship”  (“to  block,  ban,  remove,  deplatform,  
demonetize,  de-boost,  restrict,  deny  equal  access  or  visibility  to,  or  otherwise  discriminate  
against  expression.”)  that  covers  YouTube’s  broad  portfolio  of  content-moderation  tools  
(reflecting  our  judgment  and  discretion)  across  a  broad  variety  of  topics.   
34. “Expression”  is  defined  broadly  by  H.B.  20,  and  would  include  any  and  all  
user-generated  content  on  YouTube.   
35. For  instance,  YouTube  simply  “blocks”  or  “removes”  certain  speech  like  hate  
speech  that  violates  our  Community  Guidelines’  policy  on  hate  speech.  But  because  hate  speech  
14   
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expresses  “viewpoints”—as  abhorrent  as  those  viewpoints  are—H.B.  20  would  bar  YouTube  
from  taking  any  content  moderation  action  against  such  content,  such  as  removing  it,  
age-restricting  it,  or  demonetizing  it.   
36. H.B.  20’s  “censorship”  prohibition  will  directly  prevent  YouTube  from  enforcing 
critical  standards  designed  to  prevent  the  degradation  of  our  users’  experiences  on  the  platform  
and  to  ensure  their  safety,  including  for  children.  YouTube  needs  discretion  and  flexibility  when  
designing,  building,  and  maintaining  our  content-moderation  policies  because  it  encounters  such  
a  broad  range  of  content,  and  at  such  high  volumes.  As  described  above,  YouTube’s  Terms  of  
Service,  Community  Guidelines,  and  other  content-moderation  rules  include  flexible  terms  that  
allow  YouTube  to  exercise  its  judgment  about  specific  uses  or  pieces  of  content  in  order  to  
provide  a  better  and  safer  user  experience.   
37. While  H.B.  20  contains  certain  content  exceptions  chosen  by  the  Texas  
Legislature  under  Section  143A.006,  the  state’s  narrow  choices  mean  that  the  broad  restrictions  
on  content  moderation  would  still  eliminate  wholesale  many  of  the  categories  of  content  (in  both  
our  Community  Guidelines  and  Advertising  policies)  that  YouTube  has  chosen  to  moderate.  
38. YouTube  currently  has  numerous  viewpoint-based  policies  against  many  kinds  of  
harmful  content,  for  which  H.B.  20  has  no  applicable  exception.  For  example,  YouTube’s  
Community  Guidelines  has  a  Violent  Criminal  Organizations  policy  under  which  YouTube   13
currently  removes  content  produced  by  violent  criminal  or  terrorist  organizations  (“VCTOs”),  
content  praising  or  justifying  violent  acts  carried  out  by  VCTOs,  content  aimed  at  recruiting  
members  for  VCTOs,  or  hostage  videos.  In  order  to  comply  with  H.B.  20,  YouTube  would  have  
13  bit.ly/3m0tMVo.   
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to  stop  removing  such  violent  extremist  content.  Similarly,  paragraphs  41-45  below  discuss  
examples  of  additional  categories  ranging  from  dangerous  pranks  risking  imminent  harm,  drug  
use,  suicide/self  harm,  animal  abuse,  and  medical  misinformation.   
39. H.B.  20  seems  to  allow  moderation  of  content  that  “directly  incites  criminal  
activity  or  consists  of  specific  threats  of  violence  targeted  against  a  person  or  group.”  But  this  
limited  exception  actually  excludes  many  categories  found  in  YouTube’s  Community  Guidelines  
hate  speech  policy.  143A.006(3).  For  example,  YouTube  removes  content  “promoting  violence   14
or  hatred  against  individuals  or  groups  based  on,”  among  other  things,  veterans  status  or  sexual  
orientation.  H.B.  20  would  stop  YouTube  from  taking  action  against,  for  example,  content  
promoting  violence  or  hatred  against  veterans.  Even  in  the  categories  that  H.B.  20  enumerates,  
H.B.  20  would  still  bar  YouTube  from  taking  action  against  content  “promoting  violence  or  
hatred”  without  a  specific  threat  of  violence.   
40. Reflecting  our  view  of  the  nuance  involved  in  balancing  freedom  of  expression  
and  responsibility,  YouTube  has  chosen  to  build  systems  and  processes  that  apply  different  
standards  for  different  content-moderation  actions.  For  example,  we  apply  the  Community  
Guidelines  for  removals,  and  the  Ad-friendly  Content  Guidelines  for  demonetization.  We  also  
age-restrict,  reduce  availability  or  functionality,  or  restrict  other  borderline  content  (which  
otherwise  remains  available  on  our  platform).  By  treating  all  these  actions  as  prohibited  
“censorship,”  H.B.  20  will  eliminate  YouTube’s  discretion  to  find  the  right  balance  between  free  
expression  on  YouTube  and  responsibility  for  fostering  a  safe  community  for  its  users.  The  
14  https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/2801939?hl=en&ref_topic=9282436  
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following  are  examples  showing  the  nuance  and  complexity  of  YouTube’s  content  moderation  
policies  applied  in  contexts  where  H.B.  20  would  prohibit  YouTube  from  taking  action.   
41. Dangerous  Pranks .  Under  our  Community  Guidelines  we  remove  videos  depicting  
extremely  dangerous  challenges  that  pose  an  imminent  risk  of  physical  injury,  such  as  the  
well-known  “Tide  Pod”  challenge.  Another  example  is  the  “No  Lackin’”  challenge,  where  
people  post  videos  of  themselves  pointing  guns  at  others.  Because  YouTube  is  concerned  that   15
minors  could  easily  imitate  such  challenges,  we  may  allow,  but  age-restrict,  content  that  explains  
these  challenges  in  an  educational  or  documentary  way.  However,  YouTube  may  allow,  without  
restriction,  a  video  warning  minors  against  performing  such  challenges.  H.B.  20  would  require 
YouTube  to  treat  each  of  these  examples  of  dangerous  prank-related  content  equally  and  leave  all  
of  them  up  on  our  platform.  
42. Drug  Use.  Under  our  Community  Guidelines,  we  remove  videos  with  depictions  
of  the  use  of  hard  drugs  (like  intravenous  heroin  injection),  and  depictions  of  minors  using  any  
alcohol  or  drugs  (using  vaporizers,  e-cigarettes,  tobacco,  or  marijuana).  Still,  we  may  allow  
videos  that  discuss  the  scientific  effects  of  drug  use,  content  that  does  not  promote  or  glorify  
drug  usage  (e.g.,  a  personal  story  about  the  opioids  crisis),  or  news  reports  about  drug  busts  (with  
no  visible  consumption  or  distribution).  Such  content,  especially  if  it  shows  the  injection  of  
drugs,  may  still  be  age-restricted.  H.B.  20  would  require  YouTube  to  treat  each  of  these  different  
examples  of  drug  use-related  content  equally  and  leave  all  of  them  up  on  our  platform.  
43. Suicide .  Our  Community  Guidelines  prohibit  (1)  videos  promoting  or  glorifying  
suicide,  (2)  providing  instructions  on  how  to  self-harm  or  die  by  suicide,  and  (3)  graphic  images  
15  News  articles  report  that  this  challenge  was  involved  in  one  2019  death  in  the  Houston  
area.  https://abc13.com/no-lackin-challenge-teen-shooting-killed-playing-with-guns/5009272/     
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of  self-harm  posted  to  shock  or  disgust  viewers.  Still,  we  may  permit,  without  advertising,  videos  
with  first-person  accounts  (e.g.,  a  biography  or  detailed  interview  on  survivors  and  their  pasts)  
and  detailed  descriptions  of  suicide.  Further,  for  searches  for  terms  related  to  suicide,  YouTube  
shows  authoritative  content  helping  users  connect  with  the  National  Suicide  Prevention  Hotline.  
H.B.  20  would  require  YouTube  to  treat  each  of  these  different  examples  of  suicide-related  
content  equally  and  leave  all  of  them  up  on  our  platform.   
44. Animals .  Under  our  current  Community  Guidelines,  we  remove  depiction  of  
content  that  includes  a  human  maliciously  causing  an  animal  to  experience  suffering,  or  where  
animals  are  encouraged  or  coerced  to  fight  by  humans.  Under  our  Ad-Friendly  Content  
Guidelines,  we  demonetize,  but  allow,  videos  with  graphic  depictions  of  skinning  or  slaughtering  
animals.  We  permit  advertising  on  videos  portraying  animal  preparation  for  eating  by  
professionals  focusing  on  the  trade  and  act  of  cutting  animals,  or  the  preparation  of  meat  or  fish  
(such  as  BBQ  cooking  techniques).  H.B.  20  would  require  YouTube  to  treat  each  of  these  
different  examples  of  animal-related  content  equally  and  leave  all  of  them  up  on  our  platform.  
45. Medical  Misinformation .  YouTube  does  not  allow  certain  types  of  misleading  or  
deceptive  content  with  serious  risk  of  egregious  harm,  like  medical  misinformation  (such  as  
content  claiming  that  harmful  substances  or  treatments  can  have  health  benefits).  This  includes  
content  about  COVID-19  that  poses  a  serious  risk  of  egregious  harm,  such  as  treatment  
misinformation.  One  example  is  content  that  promotes  drinking  “mineral  miracle  solution  
(MMS)”  as  a  treatment  for  COVID-19.  The  FDA  has  warned  that  “MMS  Consumers  Are  
Drinking  Bleach”  since  “when  mixed  according  to  package  directions,  [MMS  products]  become  
18   
Case 1:21-cv-00840-RP   Document 8-5   Filed 09/30/21   Page 19 of 26
a  strong  chemical  that  is  used  as  bleach.”  H.B.  20  would  bar  YouTube  from  taking  any  content   16
moderation  action  against  content  expressing  these  viewpoints.  
46. More  generally,  much  of  what  YouTube  does  is  to  vary  “access  or  visibility”  to  
certain  pieces  of  content—or  certain  classes  of  content—according  to  subjective  judgments  
about  the  viewpoint  expressed  in  the  speech  in  accordance  with  its  policies  and  what  YouTube  
believes  will  be  most  relevant  to  individual  users.   
47. Because  H.B.  20’s  definition  of  “censor”  includes  “restrict”  and  “deboost,”  H.B.  
20  would  prohibit  YouTube’s  approach  to  borderline  content–-content  that,  in  our  judgement,  
comes  close  to  violating  our  Community  Guidelines.  Rather  than  remove  this  content  entirely,  
YouTube  currently  takes  steps  to  reduce  the  spread  and  restrict  its  availability  (rather  than  
remove  the  content  outright).  In  2019,  we  changed  our  recommendation  system  to  reduce  
suggesting  such  borderline  content  to  users.   
48.  YouTube  has  designed  our  search  ranking  systems  and  algorithms  to  prioritize   
different  factors  depending  on  the  search  term  requested.  In  areas  such  as  music  or  
entertainment,  we  often  use  relevance,  freshness,  or  popularity  to  rank  search  results.  In  other  
areas  where  veracity  and  credibility  are  key,  including  news,  politics,  and  medical  or  scientific  
information,  our  search  systems  prioritize  surfacing  authoritative  content  from  trusted  sources.  
For  example,  when  you  proactively  search  for  news-related  topics,  a  Top  News  section  will  
appear  near  the  top  of  search  results,  which  raises  relevant  results  from  authoritative  voices  
including  news  sources  like  CNN  and  Fox  News.   
16  https://bit.ly/3kNf8BF.  
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49. So  H.B.  20  will  forbid  YouTube  from  making  both  individualized  decisions  that  
perhaps  one  user  will  prefer  certain  content  relative  to  other  content  because  of  the  “viewpoints”  
expressed  in  that  content;  and  broad  decisions  that  certain  content  should  be  emphasized  or  
deemphasized  across  all  users.   
50. H.B.  20’s  definition  of  censorship  includes  action  to  “demonetize”  based  on  
viewpoint.  Currently,  YouTube  requires  that  users  wishing  to  monetize  their  content  comply  with  
Community  Guidelines,  but  also  an  additional  set  of  viewpoint-based  guidelines,  the  
Advertiser-friendly  Content  Guidelines.  H.B.  20  would  bar  YouTube  from  enforcing  these  
guidelines,  and  prevent  YouTube  from  demonetizing  harmful/offensive  content.  YouTube  would  
be  forced  to  continue  to  let  a  harmful  content  creator  earn  advertising  revenue  off  YouTube’s  
platform  and  thus  encourage  that  creator  to  upload  as  much  harmful  and  offensive  content  as  
quickly  as  possible.  
51. Finally,  H.B.  20  prohibits  YouTube  from  engaging  in  its  own  speech  because  it  
prohibits  YouTube  from  “otherwise  discriminat[ing]”  against  user-submitted  expression.  This  
provision—as  vague  and  broad  as  it  is—encompasses  situations  in  which  YouTube  appends  its  
own  expression  to  user-submitted  content,  whether  to  express  disagreement  with  or  disapproval  
of  that  expression,  or  to  add  context  YouTube  believes  is  necessary  for  certain  topics  prone  to  
misinformation.  For  certain  content  (e.g.,  potential  hate  speech)  that  is  both  close  to  the  
Community  Guidelines  line  for  removal  and  is  offensive  to  viewers,  YouTube  adds  a  warning  
message  before  viewers  can  watch  the  video.  Because  YouTube  will  only  append  its  own  
expression  based  on  the  “viewpoint”  expressed  in  the  content,  that  would  constitute  censorship  
under  H.B.  20.  Similarly,  YouTube  displays  a  variety  of  information  panels  that  provide  users  
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with  context  on  content  relating  to  topics  and  news  prone  to  misinformation,  as  well  as  context  
about  the  publishers  of  the  content.   
52. Therefore,  YouTube  will  face  an  impossible  choice  between  (1)  risking  liability  
by  moderating  content  identified  to  violate  its  standards  or  (2)  subjecting  YouTube’s  community  
to  harm  by  allowing  violative  content  to  remain  on  the  site.  
Other  Impact   
53. Age  Gating,  Restricted  Mode,  and  YouTube  Kids.  YouTube  provides  features,  
tools,  and  age-gated  offerings  to  sensitive  users  and  organizations  (such  as  libraries  and  families  
with  young  children).  These  features  are  a  way  for  YouTube  to  balance  free  expression  with  
responsibility.  For  example,  YouTube  uses  age-gating,  a  process  whereby  certain  content—such  
as  material  featuring  sexual  situations,  heavy  profanity,  or  graphic  depictions  of  violence—is  
made  inaccessible  to  users  under  age  18.  In  order  to  view  this  content,  users  coming  to  YouTube  
must  be  signed-in  and  the  age  associated  with  their  account  must  be  18  or  older  in  order  to  view  
the  video.  YouTube  also  has  a  feature  called  Restricted  Mode,  an  optional  setting  that  sensitive  
users  can  choose  to  use  to  limit  the  content  they  see  on  YouTube.  It  is  also  used  by  libraries,  
schools,  and  public  institutions.  Videos  containing  potentially  adult  content  like  drugs  or  alcohol  
use,  sexual  situations,  or  violence  are  not  shown  to  users  in  Restricted  Mode.  YouTube  also   17
produces  an  app  called  YouTube  Kids,  which  includes  only  videos  that  are  determined  to  be  
suitable  for  children  through  a  combination  of  human  and  algorithmic  review,  and  which  blocks  
access  to  comments  more  suitable  for  adults.  For  example,  YouTube  Kids  does  not  show  videos  
17  https://bit.ly/3jiTWl1 .  
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with  paid  product  placements  or  endorsements,  nor  overly  commercial  or  promotional  videos.  
Over  35  million  weekly  viewers  in  more  than  100  countries  use  YouTube  Kids.  
54. H.B.  20’s  prohibition  on  “censorship”  includes  “restricting”  content.  Complying  
with  that  requirement  would  force  Restricted  Mode  and  YouTube  Kids  to  display  all  content,  
even  if  that  content  would  otherwise  be  violative  of  YouTube’s  policies,  or  is  content  that  
YouTube  (and  a  reasonable  user  would)  believe  in  its  judgment  to  be  inappropriate  for  those  
audiences.  Similarly,  YouTube  would  have  to  stop  age-gating  such  content.  These  changes  would  
contradict  the  purpose  of  these  features  and  products  to  give  parents  options  for  increased  safety,  
forcing  YouTube  to  make  age-inappropriate  content  available  to  minors  generally,  and  to  other  
users  choosing  to  use  Restricted  Mode.   
55. Disclosure  and  Notice  Requirements.  The  “disclosure”  and  operational  
restrictions  will  likewise  burden  YouTube’s  discretion  in  designing  its  content-moderation  
systems  and  processes.  While  YouTube  endeavors  to  be  transparent  with  its  users  and  creators,  
this  law  would  impose  ambiguous  and  wide-ranging  transparency  requirements  on  all  of  
YouTube’s  decisions  to  remove  content  of  any  kind.  For  example,  these  transparency  
requirements  would  apply  to  all  types  of  content–not  just  videos–on  YouTube.  When  removing  
videos  under  the  Community  Guidelines,  YouTube  generally  provides  users  with  notice,  a  
complaint  system,  and  an  ability  to  appeal–but  it  does  not  currently  provide  any  of  this  when  
removing  comments.   
56. To  comply  with  H.B.  20,  YouTube  would  have  to  expand  these  systems’  capacity  
by  over  100X–from  a  volume  handling  millions  of  removals  to  that  of  over  a  billion  removals:  
during  the  last  quarter  (Q2  2021),  YouTube  removed  9.5  million  videos  and  well  over  1.16  
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billion  comments.  YouTube  would  have  to  provide  notice  of  each  of  these  1.16  billion  decisions  
to  remove  a  comment.  When  any  users  receiving  notice  complain  about,  or  appeal,  those  1.16  
billion  removal  decisions,  YouTube  will  have  to  handle  those  requests  within  an  accelerated  
response  period.   
57. Though  YouTube  endeavors  to  be  transparent  about  its  Terms  of  Service,  
Community  Guidelines,  and  other  content  moderation  practices  generally,  H.B.  20  does  not 
explain  the  level  of  “specific  information”  required  by  the  public  disclosures  section.  For 
example,  it  seeks  public  disclosure  of  “search,  ranking,  or  other  algorithms  or  procedures.” 
Public  disclosure  of  that  aspect  (and  others)  of  YouTube’s  content  moderation  would  risk  
revealing  its  trade  secrets  and  other  confidential  intellectual  property  to  our  competitors,  since  
YouTube  relies  on  sophisticated  proprietary  software  systems,  including  machine  learning  
algorithms,  in  which  YouTube  has  invested  significant  resources  to  build  and  develop.  Moreover,  
detailed  disclosure  of  technical  details  of  our  enforcement  methods  would  risk  empowering  the  
unscrupulous  users  seeking  gaps  and  weaknesses  in  our  systems  for  exploitation  and  to  evolve  
their  tactics  to  evade  our  efforts.  For  these  reasons,  YouTube  does  not  publicly  disclose  these  
kinds  of  technical  details.   
58. H.B.  20  requires  a  biannual  transparency  report  calling  for  expansive  though  
ambiguous  disclosure  including,  for  example,  whenever  YouTube  took  action  including  “any 
other  action  taken  in  accordance  with  the  platform’s  acceptable  use  policy,”  including  detailed  
breakdowns  by  rule  violated  and  source  of  alert.  At  the  immense  scale  that  YouTube  operates,  
this  level  of  granular  reporting  of  every  content-moderation  decision  would  be  extremely  
burdensome.   
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59. The  specter  of  liability  from  countless  private  lawsuits  (only  for  the  
anti-editorial-discretion  provisions)  and  Attorney  General  enforcement  (for  all  of  the  provisions)  
will  substantially  chill  YouTube’s  use  of  editorial  discretion  to  moderate  content.   
60. User  Scope.  H.B.  20  prohibits  “censoring”  a  Texas  “user’s  ability  to  receive  the  
expression  of  another  person,”  and  that  “person”  need  not  be  in  Texas.  YouTube  has  no  way  to  
comply  without  altering  its  editorial  policies  platform-wide,  because  YouTube’s  Community  
Guidelines  are  enforced  consistently  across  the  globe,  regardless  of  where  the  content  is  
uploaded.  When  content  is  removed  for  violating  YouTube’s  Community  Guidelines,  it  is  
removed  globally.   
61. Harm  to  YouTube.  To  comply  with  this  law,  YouTube  would  have  to  eliminate  
many,  if  not  most,  of  our  content-moderation  standards  that  currently  apply  to  any  video  and  
comment  posted  platform-wide.  Users  will  leave  YouTube  for  platforms  that  are  able  to  
responsibly  moderate  their  platforms.  Controversial  content  generally  does  not  perform  well  with  
users  on  YouTube  (compared  to  other  categories  like  music  or  comedy).  Advertisers  do  not  want  
their  brands  associated  with  problematic  content  and  actors.  We’ve  seen  first-hand  that  when  
advertisers  lack  trust  in  our  systems,  they  scale  back  their  spend  on  YouTube.  In  response  to  
several  prior  incidents  involving  extremist,  child  exploitation,  and  other  harmful  content,  
advertisers  (who  do  not  want  their  advertisements  next  to  objectionable  content)  have  stopped  
advertising  on  YouTube.  Loss  of  advertiser  trust  negatively  impacts  creator  earnings  (since  that  
revenue  is  dependent  upon  the  willingness  of  advertisers  to  associate  their  brands  with  YouTube  
content),  causing  creators,  too,  to  seek  alternative  platforms.  The  cost  of  not  taking  sufficient  
action  over  the  long  term  results  in  lack  of  trust  from  our  users,  advertisers,  and  creators.  Past  
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egregious  actions  of  just  a  handful  of  creators  have  harmed  the  reputation  of  YouTube  and  the  
creator  community  among  advertisers,  the  media  industry  and  most  importantly,  the  general  
public.  When  just  one  creator  does  something  particularly  blatant—like  conducts  a  heinous  
prank  where  people  are  traumatized,  promotes  violence  or  hate  toward  a  group,  demonstrates  
cruelty,  or  sensationalizes  the  pain  of  others  in  an  attempt  to  gain  views  or  subscribers—we  have  
seen  how  it  can  cause  lasting  damage  to  the  community,  including  viewers,  creators  and  the  
outside  world.   
62. This  harm  is  why  responsibility  is  critical  to  YouTube’s  success,  and  is  our  
number  one  priority.  YouTube  has  responded  to  these  past  incidents  by  updating  the  way  we  
moderate  content  with  stricter  policies,  better  controls,  and  greater  transparency.  We’ve  made  
much  progress  to  earn  trust,  recognizing  more  can  and  should  be  done.  Yet  H.B.  20  would  
unilaterally  replace  much  of  this  entire  framework  to  content  moderation  and  runs  contrary  to  
user  safety  and  enjoyment  of  the  user  experience.   
I  declare  under  penalty  of  perjury  under  the  laws  of  the  United  States  of  America,  
pursuant  to  28  U.S.C.  §  1746,  that  the  foregoing  to  be  true  and  correct  to  the  best  of  my  
knowledge.  Executed  on  this  September  30,  2021  in  Washington,  DC.  
   
 ________________________  
 Alexandra  N.  Veitch  
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       ) 
   and    ) 
       ) 
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Civ. Action No. 1:21-cv-00840-RP 
 
 
DECLARATION OF FACEBOOK IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS’ 
MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 
 
I, Neil Potts, declare as follows: 
1. I am currently a Vice President, Trust & Safety Policy, at Facebook, Inc. 
(“Facebook”), and have been employed there since April 2016. The statements contained in this 
declaration are made upon my personal knowledge. I am over the age of 18 and am competent to 
make the statements herein. I make this Declaration in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for 
Preliminary Injunction in the above-captioned matter. If called as a witness, I could and would 
testify under oath as follows. 
Background 
2. Facebook was founded in 2004. Its products enable more than 3 billion people 
around the world to share ideas, offer support, and discuss important issues, including politics, 
public health, and social issues. Users of Facebook’s products share over a billion stories and over 
100 billion messages, every day. 
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3. On Facebook, people can share status updates, photos, videos, and links (among 
other types of content) with family and friends. People can also follow Pages managed by 
businesses, organizations, and public figures (such as politicians or celebrities) that share content, 
as well as join Groups or attend Events that relate to topics of interest to them. These are some of 
the many ways in which people can share and interact with others on Facebook.  
4. The average person could be flooded with millions of posts each day from people 
all over the world, but most people do not have time (or interest) to look at all of their available 
content. As a result, Facebook has invested significant resources to develop systems to “rank” 
content that users are most likely to find relevant and meaningful. The rankings are unique to each 
user and are informed by their individual choices and actions (both historical and real-time).  
5. Facebook displays ranked content in a curated News Feed, a feature Facebook 
launched in 2006. News Feed uses algorithms to show a constantly updated and personalized list 
of stories—for example, vacation pictures from friends, videos from family gatherings, articles 
from local or national news outlets, and much more.  
6. Millions of Facebook users reside in Texas and have access to and engage with 
content posted by users across the United States and throughout the world.  
Content Moderation 
7. Facebook’s mission is to give people the power to build community and bring the 
world closer together.  
8. Facebook has invested substantial resources to foster and maintain a safe 
experience for its community.  People will not use Facebook if they do not feel safe.  Similarly, 
advertisers will not advertise on Facebook if they believe it is not effective at removing harmful 
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content or content that violates our community standards.  Indeed, people and advertisers have 
stopped using Facebook due to these concerns.   
9. Facebook has long recognized the importance of giving its users a voice and 
allowing debate on topics about which people may disagree. But content that harasses, threatens, 
seeks to defraud, or violates the rights of other users makes the community less safe and/or puts 
people at risk of harm.  
10. Facebook has over many years developed robust policies and practices relating to 
content permitted on its service. Facebook continues to refine these policies and practices based 
on its experience, evolving societal norms, extraordinary current events, and input from external 
stakeholders and experts (among others). Moderating speech often involves difficult judgment 
calls—a task further complicated by the sheer volume of content appearing online, the global reach 
of Facebook’s products, and the absence of vital context typically accompanying speech in the 
offline world.  
11. Facebook’s publicly available Terms of Service (to which people must agree to use 
the service) and Community Standards (which people agree not to violate) describe what content 
is acceptable. Facebook has had terms and policies like these in place for many years, though the 
specific requirements have evolved. 
12. The Terms of Service prohibit users from, among other things, doing or sharing 
anything that is “unlawful, misleading, discriminatory or fraudulent” or that “infringes or violates 
someone else’s rights, including their intellectual property rights.”1  
 
1 Terms of Service, Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/terms.php (last visited Sept. 29, 
2021). 
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13. The Community Standards provide details about what content is not allowed on 
Facebook.2 The Community Standards are organized into five categories: (i) violence and criminal 
behavior, (ii) safety, (iii) objectionable content, (iv) integrity and authenticity, and (v) respecting 
intellectual property. Within each of those five categories, the Community Standards identify 
additional subcategories, such as “adult nudity and sexual activity” or “hate speech.” Users can 
see Facebook’s policy rationale for prohibiting each category of content and examples. For 
example, the Community Standards explain that “hate speech” is not allowed on Facebook. 
Facebook, however, recognizes that people sometimes share content that includes someone else’s 
hate speech to condemn it or raise awareness.3 In other cases, user expression, including speech, 
that might otherwise violate our standards can be used self-referentially or in an empowering way. 
Facebook’s policies are designed to allow room for these types of expression. The Community 
Standards also include information about when content may be accompanied by a sensitivity 
warning. 
14. Facebook relies on both automated and human review to enforce its terms and 
policies at scale across its global service.  For many categories, Facebook’s artificial intelligence 
systems find more than 90% of the content they remove before anyone reports it. Facebook also 
has over 35,000 people working on safety and security. Teams across the company work together 
to, for example, prevent millions of attempts to create fake Facebook accounts and remove million 
of pieces of content containing adult nudity, sexual activity, bullying and harassment, child nudity 
and sexual exploitation of children, and hate speech, content shared by terrorist and organized hate 
 
2 Community Standards, Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards/ (last 
visited Sept. 29, 2021) (Facebook Community Standards). 
3 Facebook Community Standards. 
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groups, and content that violates intellectual property rights. Facebook publicly shares information 
about its enforcement efforts in its Transparency Center.4 
15. Facebook regularly publishes updates about its efforts to remove harmful content 
and protect its community. For example, in September 2018, Facebook published an article on 
how it uses artificial intelligence on Facebook to help suicide prevention efforts. In October 2019, 
Facebook published an article about the substantial efforts it had undertaken to protect against 
efforts to interfere with the 2020 U.S. election. In June 2020, Facebook published an article related 
to labels it would add to content and ads from entities believed to be state-controlled media; in 
February 2021, Facebook announced it would add informational labels to some posts related to 
climate change. In May 2021, Facebook published a threat report on efforts it is taking to protect 
against influence operations aimed at manipulating or corrupting public debate on Facebook by 
governments, commercial entities, politicians, and conspiracy and fringe political groups.  
16. Facebook has had to implement changes to its policies and practices in response to 
extraordinary situations. For example, following Myanmar’s military coup in February 2021, 
Facebook reduced the distribution of misinformation shared by the Myanmar military but also 
protected content, including political speech, that allowed “the people of Myanmar to express 
themselves.” Facebook also revised its policies as information emerged during the COVID-19 
pandemic. 
17. Facebook has an appeals process for users to request review of most of its 
enforcement decisions. If Facebook determines it should not have removed the content under its 
policies, it will restore the content. In May 2020, Facebook established an external Oversight 
 
4 Transparency Center, Facebook, https://transparency.fb.com/ (last visited Sept. 29, 
2021) (Facebook Transparency Center). 
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Board to review some of the most difficult enforcement decisions; the Oversight Board’s decisions 
are binding on Facebook. Facebook also relies on independent, third-party fact-checkers to help 
identify and review certain types of content.  If a fact-checker determines a particular post contains 
false information, Facebook will label the content and reduce its distribution.   
18. Facebook also has tools that enable users to further curate their own News Feeds—
for example, choosing a list of “Favorite” friends and pages to feature, blocking content from 
certain users or Pages, and reporting content they believe is inappropriate. Facebook has rolled out 
other features in response to feedback, such as the ability to turn off a counter displaying how 
many people have “liked” a post or photo. 
19. Facebook has implemented a number of changes over the years to the way it ranks 
and displays content in News Feed. For example, in January 2018, Facebook announced changes 
to prioritize content from friends, family, and Groups in News Feed. Facebook recognized this 
change would likely decrease the amount of time users spent on Facebook, which it did, but 
believed it would be good for the community and its business over the long term. Facebook also 
announced recently that users were requesting to see less political content in their News Feeds and 
so it was studying ways to reduce the prominence of such posts. 
House Bill 20’s Impact on Facebook 
20. I understand that on or around September 9, 2021, the State of Texas enacted House 
Bill 20 (the “Bill”), which is set to go into effect on December 2, 2021. I also understand that 
Facebook will be subject to the law. 
21. The Bill will significantly undermine, if not outright prevent, Facebook from 
enforcing its content policies and will require substantial and burdensome changes to the design 
and operation of its products. I will describe some examples below.   
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22. I understand that the Bill will force Facebook to display and prioritize content it 
would otherwise remove, restrict, or arrange differently. For example, the Bill prohibits 
“censorship” of any content based on the “viewpoint” of the expression or the speaker. 
“Censorship” includes decisions “to block, ban, remove, deplatform, demonetize, de-boost, 
restrict, deny equal access or visibility to, or otherwise discriminate against expression.”  
23. This definition is broad enough to prevent Facebook from enforcing its terms and 
policies and even “ranking” the content that users are eligible to see in their News Feeds.  
24. The definition of “viewpoint” is broad enough to include virtually any type of user 
expression, including hate speech and other objectionable content like white supremacist content, 
anti-Semitic conspiracy theories, and other racist content.   
25. Similarly, the vague prohibition against “deny[ing] equal access or visibility to” 
content would appear to strike directly at Facebook’s ability to rank and prioritize content to show 
people what they individually would deem most meaningful and valuable.    
26. Further, because the Bill prohibits Facebook from “censoring” a Texas “user’s 
ability to receive the expression of another person,” the Bill effectively will require Facebook to 
alter its policies globally as Texans can access and engage with billions of pieces of content shared 
by billions of people across the world and every statement arguably expresses some viewpoint.  
The required changes will be extraordinarily burdensome to implement and will adversely impact 
Facebook’s community. 
27. Finally, the Bill appears to prohibit Facebook from engaging in its own speech 
because it vaguely prohibits Facebook from “otherwise discriminat[ing]” against user-submitted 
expression—which encompasses situations where Facebook appends a warning label (or other 
statement) to certain user-submitted content. So, for example, Facebook effectively will be 
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precluded from warning users, including teens, before viewing graphically-violent content or about 
content independent fact-checkers have determined is false. 
28. I also understand that the Bill will impose a number of “disclosure”, administrative, 
and operational requirements on Facebook.  These requirements are also extraordinarily 
burdensome.  
29. I understand that the Bill requires Facebook to “publicly disclose accurate 
information” regarding its content moderation practices, “including specific information regarding 
how the social media platform: (i) curates and targets content to users; (ii) places and promotes 
content, services, and products, including its own content, services, and products; (iii) moderates 
content; (iv) uses search, ranking, or other algorithms or procedures that determine results on the 
platform; and (v) provides users’ performance data on the use of the platform and its products and 
services.”  
30. Though Facebook publishes its terms of service and community standards, the Bill 
does not explain what it means that Facebook’s editorial policies must be “sufficient to enable 
users to make an informed choice regarding the purchase of or use of access to or services from 
the platform.” 
31. Moreover, although Facebook’s detailed policies are publicly available, the Bill 
purports to demand even more without any guidance, making it impossible to publish policies that 
will account for each and every decision Facebook makes regarding the billions of pieces of 
content users can access on its services every day.  All such decisions are unique and context-
specific, and involve some measure of  judgment.  
32. The Bill also requires Facebook to disclose highly confidential, competitively 
sensitive business information, such as the “algorithms or procedures that determine results on the 
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platform.”  The underlying technology and processes that personalize users’ News Feeds are 
highly proprietary and critical to Facebook’s success.  The public disclosure of this kind of 
information will result in competitive harm to Facebook and also expose Facebook and its 
community to harm by bad actors who will exploit such information.    
33. I also understand that the Bill imposes a wide range of administrative and 
operational requirements that will be extraordinarily burdensome and require a substantial 
investment of time and resources to comply—for example:  
● If  Facebook removes content based on a violation of its “acceptable use policy,” it 
must notify the user who provided the content of the removal and explain why the 
content was removed.  
● Facebook must publish a “biannual transparency report” “outlining actions taken 
to enforce the policy,” such as, for example, the number of instances the platform 
“was alerted to” and “took action with respect to illegal content, illegal activity, or 
potentially policy-violating content,” including things like “content removal,” 
“content demonetization,” “content deprioritization” (which happens every time a 
user loads her or his News Feed since our product experiences are personalized), 
“account suspension,” and “account removal,” among others.  The report must also 
include information on other matters, such as the “number of coordinated 
campaigns,” the number of appeals by users, the percentage of successful appeals, 
and more.   
● Facebook must implement a user complaint system that requires Facebook, within 
14 days (excluding weekends), to review the content that is the subject of the 
complaint, determine whether the content adheres to Facebook’s “acceptable use 
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policy,” “take appropriate steps based on the determination,” and then notify the 
user “regarding the determination made” and “steps taken.”  Facebook also must 
implement a specific appeals process that allows the user to appeal the decision to 
remove content from the platform, and provides written notice to the user of the 
determination of the appeal.  
34. Given the extraordinary scale of Facebook’s systems and enforcement efforts, as 
described above and in Facebook’s transparency reports, these disclosure, administrative, and 
operational requirements would impose an enormous burden on Facebook, to the extent 
compliance is even feasible. 
35. In short, if the Bill’s restrictions go into effect, it will, among other things, force 
Facebook to display, arrange, and prioritize content it would otherwise remove, restrict, or arrange 
differently; it will chill Facebook’s own speech; it will lead some users and advertisers to use 
Facebook less or stop use entirely; it will force Facebook to substantially modify the design and 
operation of its products; it will force Facebook to disclose highly sensitive, confidential business 
information; and it will impose highly onerous administrative and operational burdens on 
Facebook. 
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America, pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, that the foregoing to be true and correct to the best of my knowledge. Executed 
on September 30, 2021 in Washington, D.C..  
                                                                     ________________________ 
                                                                     Neil Potts 
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DECLARATION OF LGBT TECHNOLOGY INSTITUTE IN SUPPORT OF  
LAIN IFF  MO ION FO  PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION  
 
I, Carlos Gutierrez, declare as follows: 
1. I am Deputy Director and General Counsel of LGBT Technology Institute (LGBT 
Tech), a 501(c)(3) nonprofit organization incorporated in West Virginia and headquartered in 
Staunton, VA.  
2. I subm   dec a a     P a  Motion for a Preliminary 
Injunction. I am over the age of 18 and am competent to make the statements herein. I have 
personal knowledge of the facts set forth in this declaration and, if called and sworn as a witness, 
could and would competently testify to them. 
3. LGBT Tech is a national, nonpartisan group of LGBT organizations, academics, 
and high technology companies. First, we engage with critical technology and public policy leaders 
about media, technology, and telecommunications issues of specific concern to LGBTQ 
communities. And second, we work to bridge the technology gap for all LGBTQ individuals. 
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4. We also engage in research, education, volunteerism, and partnerships to provide 
cutting-edge technology and resources to improve the lives of LGBTQ individuals, especially 
those who are disadvantaged.  
5. A  b ,  e  e e a  e LGBTQ c  ec c c ce  a e 
part of the conversation. Because of the unique stigmas society often inflicts on those identifying 
as LGBTQ, and because too many LGBTQ individuals still face isolation, these concerns are often 
overlooked or overpowered. But technology smart phones, social media, high-speed networks
help connect LGBTQ individuals, allowing them to form connections, to meet, and to find support. 
Thanks to technology, LGBTQ individuals can form inclusive, supportive communities that 
transcend geography. T  c e a e  e a e   ec  a ce  LGBTQ c e  
and individuals: 
x For the LGBTQ community, the internet has always been a vital tool to access 
education, employment opportunities and health care.  High numbers of LGBT 
youth use the internet to search for health information and a majority of LGBTQ 
individuals use the internet to connect with other members of their community 
via social networking.  
x LGBTQ youths are no longer confined to growing up in a world where they feel 
alone; thanks to the internet, social media, messaging services, and 
smartphones, they can connect no matter their culture or background; 
x LGBTQ individuals and those struggling with their sexual orientation or 
gender identity have access to information and support that is not always 
available in-person, especially in smaller or remote communities; and 
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x Exposure to LGBTQ individuals and LGBTQ-related content, especially on 
social media, has helped society accept LGBTQ individuals and better 
understand our concerns. 
6. Despite all these benefits, however, technology poses unique risks to LGBTQ 
communities. Consider just a few ways: 
x Without adequate privacy controls, technology, including social media 
acc , ca  be ed  or even harass, threaten, or blackmail an 
LGBTQ teenager; and 
x Without adequate content moderation policies, digital forums and apps can 
become breeding grounds for homophobia, bullying (cyber and otherwise), 
harassment, and misinformation. 
7. It is the latter example unsafe and toxic internet forums and social media 
platforms a  e   add e    Dec a a . I  Te a  e  c a  ed a a ,  
as House Bill 20, takes effect, covered platforms like Snap (owner of Snapchat), Amazon, 
Facebook, TikTok, YouTube, Twitter, Reddit, and even LinkedIn will be prohibited from 
ce  c e  ba ed  e e  (a) e e  e   (b) e c e  e .  
We are greatly concerned that this law will make the internet, including the very services and 
platforms LGBTQ individuals use daily, unsafe to such an extent that LGBTQ communities will 
lose access to valuable indeed, sometimes life-saving information and services. 
8. W e e a  e  c a    ea   ec  ee eec , c d  a e 
eec ,    c  ue harms on LGBTQ communities and individuals who rely on 
ec  a  c e  de a  e   remove the worst of the worst. In particular, 
the proliferation of such content will make it harder for marginalized groups like LGBTQ 
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individuals to participate and communicate freely on the internet or to do so without being 
harassed. It also risks fomenting homophobic and hateful stereotypes and myths in society more 
broadly.  
9. And it could have serious consequences. Consider conversion therapy. Despite 
c c e c e c a d ed ca  e ea c     da e   a  LGBTQ d d a  
emotional, spiritual, mental, and physical wellbeing, too many organizations and individuals 
c e  edd e  a  a ac e c e a .  U de   a , c e  e a  c d e 
and market their harmful services without any pushback; anti-LGBTQ groups and individuals 
could flood spaces intended to be safe havens for LGBTQ individuals with misinformation about 
c e  e a  cce  a e; a d -LGBTQ individuals, including parents of a teen 
struggling with their sexuality, would e  a a e e e  c e  e a  a e ed be e . 
But under HB 20, platfo  d a e  ea e  c e   beca e  e ec  a e
a dangerous one.  
10. C de  a  a e eec .  W e e a   a d e  e 
specifically about protecting conservative speech, the law goes far beyond protecting political 
speech. It protects, promotes, and prioritizes hateful content that is neither liberal nor conservative, 
just hateful. Here are real-life examples of content that is currently removed or restricted but that 
platforms would be compelled to host should the law take effect: 
x Anti-trans content that insists transgender individuals are mentally ill;  
x Homophobic content that recycles old stereotypes of gay men being social 
deviants who deserve to contract HIV, and professional LGBTQ individuals 
like teachers being inherently predatory toward children; and 
Case 1:21-cv-00840-RP   Document 8-7   Filed 09/30/21   Page 5 of 7
5 
x Ha a  a d b  c e  a  e  d  e a  a d a  e  
LGBTQ culture and sexual orientation as verbal weapons to degrade others, be 
they heteronormative or LGBTQ. 
11. To be sure, creating safe, inclusive online communities for LGBTQ users is no easy 
feat. Even without HB 20 in effect, platforms and civil society face growing challenges. According 
to GLADD  S c a  Med a Sa e  I de , b ed ea e   ea  a d c  Pe  Re earch 
survey results from January, an astounding 68% of LGBTQ adults have encountered online hate 
a d a a e , a d 51% a e bee  a e ed  e e e e   e ab e. 1 By 
comparison, roughly 41% of straight adults reported enduring any form of online harassment.2  
12. These survey results confirm what LGBT Tech knows firsthand: content 
de a   e e a   ed c  e a e a d a a e . B  de  HB 20, a e  a e  
 a a  e   ec ed a d ed e  ecting users and prioritizing 
inclusivity. The law leaves little wiggle room: Should the platforms remove hateful content, they 
may be sued. The practical effect of that liability threat accords with common sense: like any 
business in any industry, an online platform will seek to minimize its risks and mitigate its liability. 
T  d  a   Te a , e e ,  ea  ac c  e e e   acce a ce  a d 
support for LGBTQ individuals everywhere, not just in Texas, and rolling back the clock on social 
progress.  
13. While social media platforms are not without their problems, they offer LGBTQ 
individuals and communities unprecedented opportunities to connect safely and participate in a 
society that is still not available to them on fully equal terms. Rather than promoting civil discourse 
 
1 See p. 9 https://www.glaad.org/sites/default/files/images/2021-
05/GLAAD%20SOCIAL%20MEDIA%20SAFETY%20INDEX_0.pdf  
2 Id. 
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and mutual understanding between different groups, HB 20 threatens to sabotage online speech 
and drive reasonable users from the marketplace of ideas. Put simply, few users gay, straight, 
trans; white, black, brown; young or old want to scroll through hateful content and messages. 
But because HB 20 compels platforms to host such content, and because bad actors tend to spam 
message boards, private group pages, and other forums with hateful messages, many users will 
flee these platforms. At the very least, many will engage less.  
14. More broadly, we, along with other LGBTQ groups across the spectrum, encourage 
businesses and corporations to take inclusivity seriously and to keep LGBTQ individuals in mind 
as they craft policies and implement practices. Since content moderation policies often reflect a 
c a  a e , e have been encouraged to see platforms adopt explicit anti-hate-speech 
policies that protect LGBTQ d d a  access to their services. To be sure, there is still work to 
be done and as technology evolves, new challenges will arise. But if a State like Texas can force 
a private company to abandon its values and to host all viewpoints, then State lawmakers and their 
viewpoints and values will come to define the internet. Aside from the obvious dangers of state-
run media, such a power dynamic would mean that marginalized communities are once again shut 
out of the conversation and once again left to the whims of the political process which, as history 
has shown, is rarely on our side.  
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America, pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, that the foregoing to be true and correct to the best of my knowledge. Executed 
on this 27th day of September in Silver Spring, MD.  
                                                                     ________________________ 
                                                                     Carlos Gutierrez 
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IN THE UNITED ST ATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 
AUSTIN DIVISION 
NETCHOICE, LLC, d/b/a NETCHOICE, a 
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torney General of Texas, 
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Civ. Action No. 21-cv-00840 
DECLARATION OF STOP CHILD PREDATORS 
IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 
I, Stacie D. Rumenap, declare as follows: 
1. I am President at Stop Child Predators (SCP), an organization founded in 2005 to 
combat the sexual exploitation of children and protect the rights of crime victims nationwide. I 
have led SCP since 2006, having worked in all 50 states-including spearheading the passage in 
46 states of Jessica's Law-on laws and educational efforts to bring together a team of policy 
experts, law enforcement officers, community leaders, and parents to launch state and federal cam- 
paigns to inform lawmakers and the public about policy changes that will protect America's chil- 
dren from sexual predators both online and in the real world. 
2. The statements contained in this declaration are made upon my personal 
knowledge. I am over the age of 18 and am competent to make the statements herein. I make this 
Declaration in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction in the above-captioned 
matter. If called as a witness, I could and would testify under oath as follows. 
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3. We work with parents, lawmakers, and technology companies to better educate 
families, schools, and lawmakers about the potential risks children face online, including groom- 
ing, luring, bullying, child pornography, and other harms to children. 
4. We also launched the Stop Internet Predators (SIP) initiative in 2008 because sex 
offender management and child safety must be addressed both in the real world and online. SIP 
recognizes that child predators often use online social-networking platforms to recruit child sex- 
trafficking victims, to groom children for sexual exploitation, and to sexually victimize children 
in general. Because previously convicted and registered sex offenders are the most identifiable and 
likely class of predators to target children online, we focus our policy efforts on keeping social 
media and the Internet more broadly safe for children. 
5. To do this, we work with leading online platforms, including Plaintiffs' members, 
to develop and enforce safety policies that prioritize children's safety while still promoting free 
speech. Our goal is to help these businesses develop tools and mechanisms to identify illegal con- 
tent-Child Sexual Abuse Material (CSAM)-as soon as possible so that children are not exposed 
to abuse. 
6. Unfortunately, CSAM is prolific on the Internet. In 2018 alone, leading social me- 
dia platforms reported over 45 million photos and videos of children being social media platforms 
reported over 45 million photos and videos of children being sexually abused.1 In fact, there are 
so many reports of child exploitation that FBI and Department of Justice officials said it would 
require assigning cases to every FBI agent. The government does not presently have the resources 
to do that.2 
1 Katie Benner & Mike Isaac, Child-Welfare Activists Attack Facebook Over Encryption 
Plans, N.Y. Times (Feb. 5, 2020), https://nyti.ms/38rN3IX. 
2 Id. 
2 
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7. The government's limited resources underscore the critical importance of private 
moderation and filtering technologies. In order to detect CSAM, as well as to report it to authori- 
ties, online companies must develop and use advanced algorithms and other screening tools. 
8. If House Bill 20 (HB 20) is allowed to go into effect, we are concerned it will be 
harder to remove objectionable content online and to keep children safe online. 
9. The online platforms we work with remove millions of pieces of content that would 
otherwise enable child predation and harm children. We have grave concerns that HB 20 will im- 
pede their ability to remove such content and undermine my group's efforts to stop child predation 
and to make the internet safer for children. HB 20 is also vague and broad enough to prohibit the 
covered "social media platforms" from using algorithms in ways that could flag, remove, restrict, 
or demote harmful content, including CSAM. 
10. Similarly, HB 20's disclosure requirements give child predators a roadmap to es- 
cape detection. If they know how algorithms and other forms of editorial discretion work in detail, 
they will have an easier time evading detection and preying on vulnerable children. 
11. Likewise, HB 20's onerous obligations for account and content removal will likely 
cause online platforms to moderate less aggressively. That is particularly concerning at a time 
when we need even more moderation and even more filtering. 
12. I understand that HB 20 permits the covered "social media platforms" to continue 
their editorial discretion over expression that "is the subject of a referral or request from an organ- 
ization with the purpose of preventing the sexual exploitation of children and protecting survivors 
of sexual abuse from ongoing harassment." 
13. While this carve-out is welcome, we still have three main concerns. 
3 
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14. First, it is unclear whether this carve-out applies only to individual pieces of harm- 
ful content, or whether it prevents the programmatic efforts we have helped develop with the cov- 
ered "social media platforms." 
15. Second, in all events, we are concerned that the threat of countless lawsuits will 
lead to under-enforcement of such policies. 
16. And third, it relies entirely on third-party organizations to detect and flag such con- 
tent. As someone who has experience reporting such content for removal, I can say that it is im- 
possible for third-party organizations to flag all or even most of this content. Sadly, many types of 
harmful content-including child grooming and predatory messages-remain hidden from public 
view. That is why it is essential that the platforms retain their right to remove harmful content and 
to use algorithms to help with that. 
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America, pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, that the foregoing to be true and correct to the best ofmy knowledge. Executed 
on this [28" day of September, 2021] in [Washington, DC]. 
3 44, 
[Stacie D. Rumenap] 
4 
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 
AUSTIN DIVISION 
NETCHOICE, LLC, d/b/a NETCHOICE, a 
501(c)(6) District of Columbia organization; 
and COMPUTER & COMMUNICATIONS 
INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION d/b/a CCIA, a 
501(c)(6) non-stock Virginia corporation, 
Civ. Action No. 1 :21-cv-00840 
Plaintiffs, 
V. 
KEN PAXTON, in his official capacity as 
Attorney General of Texas, 
Defendant. 
DECLARATION OF TECHNOLOGY NETWORK IN SUPPORT OF 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 
I, Servando Esparza, declare as fallows: 
1. I am the Executive Director of Texas and the Southeast at Technology 
Network. As TechNet's executive director for Texas and the Southeast, I develop 
and manage TechNet operations in the Southeast region of the United States, 
coordinating with TechNet members, TechNet's vice president of state policy and 
government relations, and other TechNet staff. I work closely, in a bipartisan 
fashion, with state legislators and their senior staff, policymakers in the executive 
branch of state governments and at state regulatory bodies, and TechNet members 
to lobby and advocate on behalf of TechNet's agenda before state legislatures. 
2. Technology Network is the national, bipartisan network of technology 
1 
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CEOs and senior executives that promotes the growth of the innovation economy by 
advocating a targeted policy agenda at the federal and 50-state level. TechNet's 
diverse membership includes dynamic American businesses ranging from startups 
to the most iconic companies on the planet and represents more than four million 
employees and countless customers in the fields of information technology, e- 
commerce, the sharing and gig economies, advanced energy, cybersecurity, venture 
capital, and finance. TechNet is a 50l(C)(6) trade association based in Washington, 
DC. TechNet represents its members at the state and federal levels of government 
by advocating for or against legislation that affects its members. 
3. TechNet's work is guided by our federal and state policy principles, 
which cover a broad set of policy issues. At the state level, these include privacy and 
security, energy, education and workforce development, financial technology, 
diversity and inclusion, new technologies and the future of work, automated 
vehicles, procurement, smart infrastructure, and taxation. TechNet's policy 
principles are decided by TechNet members on an annual basis and outlined on 
TechNet's website1. TechNet represents 87 companies including Facebook, Google, 
Amazon, eBay, Apple, AT&T, DoorDash, Dell, HP, Lyft, Uber, Comcast, 
Salesforce, Verizon, Yahoo and many others. Social media platforms as defined in 
H.B. 20 would include several TechNet members including Facebook, Google, and 
1 See www.technet.org. 
2 
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Amazon (affected TechNet social media platform members"). Electronic mail 
("Email") service providers as defined in the Act would include several TechNet 
members including Google, Yahoo, Salesforce, Comcast, and Amazon ("affected 
TechNet email service provider members") 
4. Social media platforms understand that they have an obligation to 
remove objectionable content, otherwise their users will be subjected to dangers like 
images of child endangerment, financial scams, spam, and other harmful links. 
Companies take this responsibility seriously, removing harmful content while 
keeping their services open to a broad range of ideas. In the overwhelming number 
of cases, removal of offensive content is accomplished as intended. However, the 
sheer volume of content hundreds of millions of posts per day ensures that both 
artificial intelligence and human reviewers at companies cannot get it right 100 
percent of the time. Billions of transactions, after all, will inevitably lead to errors. 
The Act will allow users to sue social media platforms merely for enforcing their 
content policies standards that are laid out in detail on the platforms' websites. 
5. The Act perversely creates an incentive for affected TechNet social 
media platform members to not prohibit and remove any objectionable content on 
their social media platforms in order to avoid being accused of violating Tex. Civ. 
Prac. & Rem. Code $ 143A.002(a)(1)-(3) and being sued by a user. Tex. Civ. Prac. 
& Rem. Code $ 143A.002(a)(1)-(3) would prohibit affected TechNet social media 
3 
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platform members from taking any moderation action against a user, a user's 
expression, or a user's ability to receive the expression of another person based on 
the viewpoint of the user or another person, the viewpoint represented in the user's 
expression or another person's expression or a user's geographic location in Texas 
except for a small number of limited occasions outlined in Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. 
Code § 143A.006. Content including threatening or intimidating messages, 
conspiracy theories, anti-vaccine misinformation, Holocaust denial, and white 
supremacy is not explicitly allowed to be removed by social media platforms. If 
affected TechNet social media platform members do remove that content, it could 
violate the Act. This would cause real-world, irreversible harm in Texas' 
communities and beyond. 
6. Content moderation is at the core of the business models for social 
media platforms because it is critical for their business that the platforms are safe 
and family- and workplace-friendly. If affected TechNet social media platform 
members are unable to maintain a family- and workplace-friendly platform, it will 
affect their ability to attract advertisers that will not want to be associated with 
objectionable content. Additionally, users may decide to leave the platform if 
objectionable content that they report is not removed. Losing users and advertisers 
will have a negative financial impact on affected TechNet members. 
7. The Act runs counter to the American free speech law governing 
4 
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content liability on the internet, Section 230 of the federal Communications Decency 
Act ("Section 230). Since its enactment in 1996, Section 230's two key provisions 
have empowered online intermediaries to remove harmful content while providing 
them with the immunity that commonly exists in other real world offline contexts - 
for example, not holding a bookseller liable for libelous books, but rather the 
individual who committed the libel. Due to Section 230, American companies have 
the right to curate information on their service to meet the needs and expectations of 
their customers. Section 230 has supported innovation across the internet while also 
encouraging companies to be "Good Samaritans" by allowing them to "to restrict 
access to or availability of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, 
lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, 
whether or not such material is constitutionally protected." 
8. It is estimated that over 320 billion spam emails are sent each day. 
With increasing threats by spammers and cybercriminals, email service providers 
take steps to protect email users from those threats. Tex. Business & Commerce 
Code § 321.054 will make it difficult for email service providers to block spam and 
other malicious threats, as the exceptions in statute do not cover all forms of threats. 
With billions of spam emails sent each day, it is important that email service 
2 See Forbes https :/ /www.forbes.com/ sites/daveywinder/2020/0 5/03/this-surprisingly-simple-email-trick-will-stop- 
spam-with-one-click/?sh=6 766166379 l 
5 
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providers are able to block emails that may cause harm to email users and avoid the 
unintended consequences that could result in an influx of spam and risk emails in 
Texan's inboxes. 
9. I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States 
of America that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed this 29th day of 
September, 2021 in Austin, Texas. 
Executive Director, Texas & Southeast 
TechNet 
6 
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